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ABSTRACT 
The appearance of low cost scheduled airlines in Europe, operating with the 
same philosophy of low fares, ` no-frills' and high frequency service to that of 
Southwest airlines has been the main departure from the existing market `status 
quo'. After a 6-year period which saw such airlines becoming more numerous 
and gaining wider acceptance from the public, this study tries to investigate 
whether they will have an assured future and, if so, what form this will take. 
The investigation is in two parts. In the first part the background environment is 
investigated in terms of the policy application, the industry infrastructure and the 
economic conditions prevalent in the past years as well as currently. 
Additionally, comparisons of the differences between the approaches to 
deregulation of the US and the EU policy makers are analysed, hence their 
repercussions on the low cost carrier market are examined. 
In the second part, a model was thus developed to simulate the direct costs of 
operations of a low cost airline. The model provided information about the cost 
per distance flown for an airline flying on a given route. Following that a 
number of routes were surveyed to find the aircraft costs per sector of flying 
each route so that a fully costed route portfolio was available. In the next stage 
an airline intra-European scheduled operation was created using a small number 
of aircraft with two different schedule types: a typical low cost high frequency 
operation and one reflecting a full cost, business and leisure traffic mix. 
Comparisons of the overall performances between the two schedules were 
carried out. Subsequent to that, 381 European routes grouped as scheduled, 
charter and domestic were used to apply the derived data to check their 
suitability for entry by the low cost carrier. 
The results obtained clearly demonstrate the increased operational efficiency of 
the low cost type of schedules. Growth will continue as the low cost formula 
makes considerable inroads to existing markets. Secondly, the future route entry 
opportunities are to be found with many monopoly or duopoly city pairs 
currently under-served, provided airport access is assured. 
The biggest opportunities though are with a large number of leisure routes 
served by charter carriers, as they fit both the low cost airline passenger profile 
as well as the airline's requirements. Finally, the domestic routes were all served 
too intensively to make them viable for entry. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the new unified Single Internal market composed of 325 million people 
transportation services play a fundamental role in the European Union's 
economic development. The free movement of goods and passengers is a 
prerequisite to establishing an economy of scale. A market cannot be 
considered fully integrated if transportation costs remain so high that 
businesses cannot afford to ship commodities across member states' borders. 
Unless they decreased, deregulation of the industry would remain a purely 
theoretical prospect. Until recently the transportation industry has been highly 
regulated with central control being exercised through dependence on 
government subsidies. This has fostered a fragmented economy which is 
estimated to increase the cost of transporting goods by up to 10 percent and 
decreases business profits by up to $30 billion a year. Delays at border 
crossings for customs controls amounted of up to 40 percent of the total trip 
time. Air carriers offer higher speeds and avoid border-crossing controls, but 
are only competitive over and above 300 km trips. 
Many factors have affected why liberalisation took place in Europe. The main 
ones are the observations of the benefits of the U. S. deregulation, mainly in the 
reduction of the cost of air travel for the consumer and the need to provide a 
more efficient transport industry independent of frequent financial support 
from the public funds. Various studies were undertaken showing that less 
regulation or even none at all would be beneficial to the market. Until then the 
failure of the Community to introduce competition into the scheduled sector 
1 
was contrary to the EEC's intended philosophy of portraying that it was 
creating a People's Europe. Many countries with more liberal points of view 
and particularly the UK were beginning to liberalise their domestic market and 
to seek expanded liberalised markets throughout the EEC by adopting more 
liberal bilateral agreements. 
Liberalisation did bring some of the desired effects, although because of the 
nature of the legislation, the competition policy followed by the EU 
Commission, the structure of the European market, the infrastructure 
constraints and barriers as well as the deep recession experienced in the early 
1990s it has taken a long time to achieve the desired results. Despite the 
gradualist method of liberalisation undertaken by the EC, the most interesting 
development has been the creation and rise to power of the low cost, `no-frills' 
carriers, copying the operating philosophy of Southwest Airlines in the U. S. 
The philosophy of the low cost `no- frills' airlines is to focus strongly on the 
provision of a simple transportation product at a significantly lower fare level, 
than the fares offered by its competitors. Although Southwest was not `a child 
of U. S. deregulation' it has nonetheless proved to be one of the most successful 
and most profitable U. S. airlines of the last 25 years. It is the aim of this thesis 
to examine the European imitators of Southwest i. e. airlines like Ryanair, 
EasyJet, Go, and others like them, identify their innovations and show in which 
areas they can offer an alternative to the established airlines. 
Furthermore, it is proposed to project how far this different type of airline 
philosophy will advance in the market, within the current or foreseeable 
economic conditions. Hence, to try and discover what their future is likely to 
be within the EU marketplace. 
2 
1.1 INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORTATION 
In order to assist the understanding of how deregulation came about one has to 
briefly examine the basic framework in place and the regulatory regime and 
some of its aspects that preceded it. 
The beginning of the need to bring the air into a legal framework has existed 
since Roman times. Since then a dispute has existed between the idea existing 
under Roman law that the air was collective property ("res communis") or 
belonged to the owner of the soil underneath it ("uscue ad coelum") as 
proposed by English law. During the nineteenth century the idea of air as a 
commodity was further refined until in 1872 a New York court clarified it to be 
"... the rule or maxim giving the right of ownership to everything above the 
surface to the owner of the soil has full effect without extending it to anything 
entirely disconnected with or detached from the soil itself'. ' As air navigation 
became possible, freedom of the air inspired by the doctrine of the "free sea" 
clashed during the 1912 Paris Conference of the International Law Association 
with the philosophy held by some, that social and national interests were at 
stake and States should exercise and maintain their sovereignty which they 
were able to control, as part of their territory. This confrontation was 
eventually solved through compromise a year later in Madrid2 by those who 
recognised that national interests were closely linked to an emerging civil 
aviation. Then at the Paris Convention of 19193 and with the hindsight of the 
1 Hoffman vs. Armstrong cf. A. McNair op. cit. p. 33. 
2 International Law Association, 28th Report, Madrid, 1913 
3 Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Paris, October 13,1919; ratified by 
32 countries. 
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First World War the notion of national sovereignty was transformed from an 
almost exalted spiritual value to the cornerstone of the regulatory system for 
international air services. This remained unchanged until near the end of the 
Second World War. 
1.1.1 The establishment of the regulatory background 
At the same time in 1944 as General von Rundstedt was launching his 
Ardennes offensive in WW II, state representatives were convening in Chicago 
for the Convention on international Civil Aviation' to consider the future of 
international civil aviation in a world wide perspective. All concerned had 
already witnessed the destruction caused by aviation during the two World 
Wars and, particularly, the Americans were eager for aviation to foster the 
development of peaceful and harmonious relationships amongst all peoples. 
Among the 56 governments invited to the Convention the United States were in 
the best position because most of their civil aviation was going to emerge as 
the strongest, having the greatest capacity and best equipment. Hence their 
outlook and intentions were to ensure through the Convention "open skies" 
free of any controls on tariffs, capacity and with the maximum exchange of 
traffic rights possible around the world, in which their airlines could expand 
would prevail. Their views were shared by other nations such as the 
Netherlands or Sweden whose airlines depended on international traffic 
because their domestic markets were very small. The United Kingdom, which 
Convention International Civil Aviation, Chicago, (the Chicago Convention), December 7,1944 
Cmd 6614 (1945) There are currently over 183 signatories. A UN specialised agency - ICAO - was 
4 
was the other big power of that time, together with other European countries, 
had to take account of their respective industries, which were decimated by the 
war. They therefore presented a more protectionist attitude calling for the 
establishment of an International Air Authority to license operators, determine 
and allocate frequencies, and fix tariffs. American domination achievable 
through expansion of civil aviation in a liberal multilateral environment was 
thus blocked. 
The most important principle set out was in Article I of the Chicago 
Convention providing that "every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty 
over the air space above its territory. " The principle of "freedom of the air" to 
allow easy entry to the aviation market was superseded. Apart from the 
principle described in Article 1, the Convention established a series of other 
basic principles: 
i. equal rights for all States to participate in the traffic 
ii. the laws and regulations established by a Contracting state must be 
complied by aircraft of all other Contracting states "without distinction as 
to nationality" (Art. 11) 
iii. all states are free to designate the national companies to operate the 
Services. 
iv. the scope of the Convention is for the use of civil aircraft (Art 3a, c) 
v. the rights of governments to regulate air navigation above their territory 
are not absolute but are subject to international regulations. (Art. 1) 
established as a forum to supervise technical standards for safety and operations and to aid third 
world countries to set an aviation infrastructure. 
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vi. a liberal regime was envisaged for non-scheduled flights (Art 5. ) 
although such flights would have to be authorised. 
Although a consensus on a system to exchange the `freedoms of the air among 
free nations' was not found, major principles had nevertheless been agreed 
upon as well as the major institution that would be formed to monitor 
developments in accordance with the principles agreed. In comparison to 
today's experiences and standards in international decision making and 
agreement drafting, the drafting, adoption and opening for signature of one 
major convention, three agreements, a standard form of bilateral agreement for 
air routes and the text of twelve draft technical annexes were an awesome 
result. In parallel with the signature of the Chicago Convention, two other 
major agreements were signed regulating the nature of the different rights that 
may be offered to airlines by the States. The International Air Transport 
Agreement established the "five freedoms of the air" which later on evolved to 
become eight. These freedoms were concerned with the right of airlines to 
travel between countries on a commercial basis and to be able to pickup 
passengers, mail and cargo for onward travel from each country. The first two 
freedoms were really of technical nature (overflying a territory and landing for 
refuelling or repairs). The original intentions were that all five freedoms would 
be granted on a multilateral basis to the signatories. The stumbling block was 
the granting of the third, fourth and fifth freedoms, which came up against the 
issues of profitability and viability of the routes operated. Carrying traffic to a 
third country on a fifth freedom basis had the effects of both increasing the 
payload for one airline while at the same time removing potential traffic for the 
country granting fifth freedom. In the end the pursuit of self-interest by all the 
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participants meant that traffic rights would be exchanged on a bilateral basis. 
The Standard Air Services Agreement was drafted to provide a model. 
The Chicago Convention was a major achievement because, on the positive 
side it: 
i) established a viable framework for commercial air transport. 
ii) established the principles of: equal rights of access to air transport for all 
nations, sovereignty and limitations of its use, nationality of aircraft. 
iii) set up ICAO which would allow the harmonisation of navigation rules, 
increase co-operation for safety and would provide a neutral forum where 
aviation experts could share knowledge, confront or exchange views and avoid 
the pitfalls of international politics. 
The compromises made necessary in order to achieve all the above meant that 
some objectives were not realised and became shortcomings as time went by. 
These included: 
Absence of positive legislation: there were no specific rules binding the 
signatory members but instead sets of rules were merely agreed. ICAO was an 
institution designed to guard the law although the specific law had not been set 
up. 
The wide scope and vast ambitions of the Chicago Convention together with its 
associated Agreements provided only a framework for bilateral agreements, 
general regulation on international air navigation and the skeleton of a code of 
conduct to govern international air transport. 
In contrast to the acknowledged agreement for the setting up of technical 
standards for air navigation, sensitive politico-economic issues remained vague 
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and proved ineffective at critical times. Hence, States derived authority from 
other legal instrument described in Article 1 of the Convention and sought little 
guidance from ICAO. In the long term such legal uncertainty exposed the 
international regime to tensions. 
When in 1984 the Convention celebrated its 40th Anniversary it was called `an 
act of faith in civil aviation' by the long time chairman of ICAO, Mr Kotaites 
and that " it had met the need in 40 years' use" 6 
1.1.2 The application of the Chicago Convention 
As mentioned earlier the Chicago Convention was a compromise reached 
between the two countries whose doctrines conflicted the most. Therefore it 
seemed that "the two leading aviation powers of the world"' had a duty to 
endeavour to reconcile their views on the exchange of commercial traffic rights 
and their modalities. A more conceptual compromise beyond the mere 
pragmatic arrangement, which they might otherwise have reached, was needed. 
This led to the signing on February 11,1946 of the Bermuda Air Services 
Agreement between the USA and the UK. 
5 A. Kotaite, `The Chicago Convention, An Act of Faith in Civil Aviation', 39 ICAO Bulletin, Nov 
1989, p. 14 
6 Y. Lambert, " The Chicago Convention has met the need in 40 years' use", 30 ICAO Bulletin, 
Nov. 1984 p. 15 
7Albert W. Stoffel, " American Bilateral Air Transport Agreements on the Threshold of the Jet 
Transport Age", J. A. L. C., 122 (1959) " Such an agreement was necessary between the two leading 
civil aviation powers of the world because of the differences of their approaches to the problem of 
the exchange of commercial air rights which had become evident in Chicago. The agreement 
constituted a compromise between the liberal American and the restrictive British concepts. " 
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The greater bargaining power of the UK, controlling the widest range of cities 
with which to trade traffic rights on world-wide air routes was counterbalanced 
by the liberal American philosophy reflected in the capacity clauses and the 
pricing philosophies of its liberal economists of the time. The main chapters of 
the agreement can be grouped together in the following areas: 
" Definitions of the freedoms of the air. 
" General principles on: fair and equal opportunity, etc; 
" Capacity clauses 
9 Air fares and rates clauses 
" Legal and administrative clauses 
" Definition and allocation of air routes over which the airlines could 
apply to operate. 
This way the foundation of the bilateral exchange of traffic rights became 
possible and all subsequent agreements would follow this model. The general 
rules involved governments designating carriers, which, in turn, would supply 
capacity as they saw fit. Fares would be subject to bilateral government 
approval and be subsequently fixed. All of this would be done through the 
machinery of IATA. Due to the way the compromise between bilateralism and 
multilateralism was formulated, within the Bermuda Agreement most states 
tended to consider a right of ownership of the traffic originating in their 
territories. Hence, therein lies the root of the problem that would affect the 
bilateral regime of regulation and would eventually lead to moves towards its 
dismantling. 
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The founding fathers of the international regulatory system did not intend for it 
to be a totally rigid system, but one with enough built in flexibility that would 
allow economic and technical developments. As it failed to provide directly for 
a multilateral exchange of traffic rights, it was left to the Bermuda Agreement 
plan to provide the illusion that this could be achieved on a voluntary basis by 
each country. Therefore it was only to be expected that once this framework 
was subjected to tensions, it would regress to a more restrictive consensus, and 
national interests would prevail. This would be observed in time within the 
terms of IATA tariff agreements. Bin Cheng8 noted about the Bermuda plan 
that what had started as an ad hoc and temporary arrangement had now taken 
the form of `a new skyscape ' in international law. 
One system that the Chicago Convention considered unimportant for regulation 
was non-scheduled services. In 1944, it mainly consisted of small air-taxi 
operators, rescue and emergency flights and some cargo. They did not threaten 
to damage competition. If only they could imagine that this is where the direct 
comparisons that would undo regulation would come from. 
6 Bin Cheng op. cit., p. 3; Bin Cheng, The Right to Fly, Grotius Society Transactions, 1956, pt 99, 
pp. 105 
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2 REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK ON U. S. 
DEREGULATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Airlines Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978 has been one of the most 
controversial issues in air transportation. It was brought into existence because 
as suggested, was creating continuous over-capacity problems, made worse by 
slackening demand, at a time of economic stagnation, inflationary pressures 
and increasing fuel expenses [Moore (1986)]. 
In the 1970s there had always been a variety of opinions about the nature of the 
U. S. airline industry, [OECD (1988)]. Pro-regulation opinion considered the 
industry to be either a natural monopoly or oligopolistic which required 
constant regulation to keep fares at competitive levels. Alternatively, one that it 
is subject to excessive entry or to the, so called, "cream-skimmers" who will 
enter the lucrative markets only, thus spoiling the balance for the rest of the 
cross subsidised regulated marketplace. 
The anti-regulation group considered that the threat of entry would force all the 
carriers to maintain competitive fare levels. The theory was called the 
contestability theory, was mainly advocated by A. Kahn, a Cornell economics 
professor, who became chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and 
W. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, R. D. Willig (1982) amongst others. The main premise 
that supported this theory was the assumption that this type of market has no 
sunk costs which cannot be recovered, thus enabling or even threatening a `hit 
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and run' entry. Subsequently, it has been proven by a variety of studies, 
reviewed later, that sunk costs do indeed exist creating barriers to entry and 
hence airline markets are not perfectly contestable. Such barriers include: 
scarcity in airport slots and gates, computer reservation systems (CRS), 
economies of scale and scope, and the design or the transformation of airline 
networks into hub and spoke types which naturally disadvantage any new 
entrant. Some of these barriers can be said to have been developed by the 
incumbent carriers as defensive measures since deregulation. Some others are 
believed to be genuine nation-wide infrastructure problems, which assist the 
dominance of incumbents. 
Its proponents have found little benefits from it while the opponents have 
found many things to criticise about it. Having the benefit of hindsight and 
examining the progression of the U. S. deregulated industry several questions 
are generated. The main question refers to the contestability hypothesis and 
whether this has been proved to apply to all the markets. If the hypothesis and 
deregulation in general has not come up to the expectations does it mean that it 
is flawed or is this failure attributable to other factors? What would be the 
implications and lessons to be learned by Europe's intention to deregulate? All 
these are questions that have been asked but no clear answers are available. 
With reference to the last question about the inherent nature of air 
transportation Button (1996) investigates this possibility further for the case of 
the European liberalisation (see Section 4.2. ) 
Before the policy of deregulation had gathered enough pace, opinion about its 
success was divided. Some disagreed fundamentally because they viewed the 
airline markets as naturally oligopolistic and predicted that this would be the 
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outcome of any deregulatory attempt. On the other hand its advocates pointed 
to the much lower intrastate fares (up to 50 percent lower than equivalent 
interstate markets) where pricing and entry were free. It had been observed that 
despite high regulated fares the major carriers dissipated their extra returns 
through service quality competition in the form of frequencies and capacity. On 
the more dense and concentrated markets this phenomenon was not so apparent 
as service competition was less and the load factors were higher. Overall the 
industry showed that even under regulation firms could not co-ordinate their 
services or collude on capacity and prices to earn excess profits. This proven 
inability of the airlines to collude would allow competitive forces to shape the 
markets with reasonable effectiveness. 
Since the passing of the ADA in 1979 there followed a rapid flurry of new 
entry which reduced concentration only by a small margin because most of the 
new entrants were small in size. In October 1978, Midway Airlines became the 
first completely new airline in 38 years to be granted a CAB certificate, it was 
quickly followed by New York Air, Muse, People Express, and several others. 
Over the next half dozen years, CAB would certify an additional two dozen 
brand-new airlines and would approve the expansion of many established 
intrastate and charter carriers. Some of these new airlines entered mainline, 
short-haul routes, offering non-stop, point-to-point service in markets with high 
passenger volumes-like New York Air, flying between N. Y. LaGuardia and 
Washington National. The new operators usually were completely new 
ventures set up to take advantage of lower costs and more efficient operating 
characteristics. Some existing intrastate carriers also entered long-haul 
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markets. Below follows a quick examination of the developments in the most 
important areas of U. S. deregulation. 
2.2 RouTEs 
During the regulation years routes the CAB strictly controlled entry. This 
created only few opportunities for route entry, which consequently ensured 
large returns to those who had authorisation. Once the entry and exit of routes 
was made completely open to all airlines the airline networks changed into a 
hub and spoke structure. Point to point services declined drastically as traffic 
from cities was fed through hubs 9, centralised airports co-ordinated so as to 
enable onward connections to be made using the same airline. The economic 
justification for this is termed `economies of scope' meaning the savings 
possible when the joint production of two outputs is less than the costs of 
production of two separate outputs. 
The advent of larger wide-bodied aircraft having greater passenger capacity 
and range has achieved lower costs per seat-mile compared with the narrow- 
bodies used exclusively in the past. So as the number of passengers on a route 
increases one would expect the size of the aircraft to increase too and 
consequently costs should fall. There are limits to this theory however since 
larger aircraft are unsuitable for use on short haul routes. Studies made by 
Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984) and by Gillen, Oum, and Tretheway 
(1985) indicate clearly that the corollary from this is that it is not always 
economical for a carrier to offer non-stop service between all city pairs in the 
9 An air traffic hub is not necessarily an airport. According to the FAA definition `a hub' is a city 
and Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) requiring aviation services. 
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network. Instead traffic needs to be channelled through corridors so as to 
concentrate it, offering the advantages of realising higher economies of density 
and offering better frequencies. Fig. 2.1 below shows the dramatic effect this 
restructuring had on travel between this period. 
Change in Connecting Passenger Traffic 1977-1988 
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Fig. 2.1: Hubbing Connections 
The exclusion of interlining traffic at the same hub pre-empts competition on a 
route level, transferring it to the network level. Furthermore the number of 
carriers in a system might be limited by the combination of economies of 
density and economies of route integration, also known as economies of scope, 
because several extra benefits are realised by serving numerous city pairs 
through the same hub. Going one step further, if consideration is given to the 
assumption that a network can only support a certain number of carriers, once 
these hubs have been established and are working then they will act as `traffic 
siphons' and will make it extremely difficult for a new carrier which is not 
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established in such a way to enter the market served by an incumbent. 
Conversely at the same time non stop service between non hub cities and small 
hubs declined or has been relegated to smaller feeder or commuter carriers who 
usually provide the service in non jet aircraft. In more recent years this trend 
has dominated, as these carriers are franchise or wholly owned subsidiary 
operators of the incumbent, who are now re-equipping with the latest 
generation of regional jets. 
A study by Berry (1990) examines the importance of airport presence in 
determining the profit of operating in a given city pair. Ever since the 
formulation of the theory of contestable markets in a deregulated airline 
industry it has been suggested that entry or even the threat of it occurring will 
enforce competitive conditions. Some analysts have investigated potential 
barriers to market entry but only Borenstein (1989) and Levine (1987) have 
argued that airport presence at both ends of the city pair could provide 
significant advantages. 
Prior literature could be classified in two groups: those emphasising the 
economies of hub-spoke networks, which make it easier for an airline to 
differentiate its product through schedule targeting, and FFPs. The other group 
argues that the incumbents' control of airports allows them to exercise a 
substantial strategic advantage in preventing entry. Although there are cost 
savings made by putting passengers with different ultimate destinations 
initially into the same plane the higher prices charged when travelling from 
such airports are the realisation of their dominating advantage. In the past 
models allowing for the higher prices and the lower costs involved in the hubs 
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have been developed. In this paper however an effort is made to quantify the 
profit advantage from such an airport presence. This could be useful to both 
airlines and policymakers. The former would try to alter market structure 
through mergers and the latter to achieve the same through subsidies or 
intervention for ease of entry. 
Using a partial equilibrium approach, observations occur over one particular 
city pair at a given point in time. Given each firm's overall network structure it 
has to decide on the given city pair. Having considered all the relevant market- 
level variables i. e. its own airport presence and number of competitors in the 
city pair, it must calculate the likely post entry profits. If these are positive then 
market entry is made. The distinction is made of applying such a model to 
isolated markets rather than to oligopolistic ones. The discreet method 
approach of using observed entry decisions as an indicator of underlying 
profitability uses inferences about the firms' specific sources of profit in the 
presence of a large number of potential entrants. The periods examined were 
first and third quarter of 1980 which is long enough for the airline to plan and 
execute an entry decision but not long enough for cost and demand to change 
significantly. The period chosen is very close after the effective deregulation of 
the market and perhaps most airlines remained cautious as to how best to 
proceed. 
A definite link between airport presence and airline profitability is shown 
although the benefits of this decline rapidly with increasing entries. Finally, the 
models used in this paper fail to fully describe the post entry competition or the 
full dynamics of entry. Further investigations are required. 
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2.3 STRUCTURE 
The early period considered to be the first 10 years from ADA passing was 
characterised by considerable turbulence, coinciding with two economic 
recessions, sharp increases and drops in the jet fuel prices and the mass 
dismissal of the air traffic controllers by President Reagan. 
All of the new entrants had a variety of cost advantages over the incumbents by 
using non unionised labour, flexible working practices, cheap second-hand 
leased aircraft and lower wage rates. Using their lower costs they attacked the 
incumbents on trunk routes thereby diluting the incumbents' market shares 
across the country. The incumbents followed suit in trying to replicate the 
lower costs in equipment and labour of the new entrants, in the process creating 
considerable industrial unrest by upsetting entrenched labour positions. 
The turbulence peaked in 1985-86 when competition had pushed a number of 
airlines into bankruptcy or merger. Those incumbents that survived had now 
relatively reduced their costs and had discovered that with a combination of 
aggressive pricing tactics and marketing tools they could knock out any new 
entrant infringing their network. All except one: Southwest Airlines. 
Forsyth et al. (1986) not only found steady efficiency improvements in the U. S. 
carriers between 1979 and 1984 but also that overall efficiency is higher in the 
U. S. carriers than anywhere else in the world. This latter point could not 
necessarily be attributable to deregulation but to the overall structure of the 
U. S. airline industry, which had privately owned airlines, without state 
intervention enjoying a more liberal domestic environment when compared to 
the restrictive European international bilateral system. 
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Fares overall fell by 30-35 percent but only due to the wide variety of discount 
fares (see also fig. 2.5) that appeared as a way to stimulate traffic. 
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Fig. 2.2: Trends in Air Fares 1968-87 
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McGowan and Trengrove, (1986) state that over 80 percent of passengers 
travelled on discount fares in 1984, compared to around 45 percent in 1978. 
Although the average fare has fallen the price reduction has occurred on the 
long-haul routes and the large city markets. On the other end of the spectrum, 
fares have increased on small distance and small city markets. This could be a 
logical correction as there is now a better resource allocation by airlines on 
these long distance markets which are more important to passengers because, 
in the U. S., the railway system does not provide an adequate alternative over 
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these very long distances. Traffic was therefore stimulated, particularly after a 
period of stagnation in the recession years. 
Many studies have tried to quantify the savings and the improvements in 
efficiency, productivity and service quality. Caves, Christensen et at. (1987) 
found a rise of 3.0 percent per annum in U. S. airline productivity prior to 
deregulation compared to 3.3 percent per annum afterwards. Correspondingly 
non-U. S. airlines achieved 4.5 and 2.8 percent per annum respectively. 
Although, airline fares declined (by 15 
- 
20 percent on average), service 
improved, more airlines were competing providing a wider consumer choice, a 
wave of consolidation occurred during the latter part of this decade. During this 
period new entry slowed down and industry concentration started rising to pre- 
deregulation levels, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Fig. 2.3: Concentration of U. S. Airlines 1978-88 
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The last 2 years of the 1980s produced record traffic and profits for the 
reformed incumbents amid the general economic euphoria. However the early 
1990s quickly undid all the progress, due to the 1990-91 recession and the Gulf 
War. Nevertheless, the booming economy that followed ensured record profits 
once again in the mid-90s. Average fares continued to fall in real terms by 
around 20 percent, partly attributed to a new wave of new entrants like Valujet, 
Reno Air, who replaced those of the 80s. From them only AmericaWest, 
Midway Express and American Trans Air had survived. 
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Fig. 2.4a: U. S. Airline Industry Activity 1988-98 
After 1985 a wave of mergers gripped the industry. The more notable ones are: 
Pan Am's Pacific Division to United, Northwest 
- 
Republic, TWA 
- 
Ozark, 
Texas Air-Eastern, Texas Air-People Express and USAir-Piedmont. The U. S. 
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Department of Justice (DoJ) has resisted mergers of airlines sharing the same 
hub but the Department of Transport (DoT) allowed them. 
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Fig. 2.4b: Mergers and Acquisitions 1979-87 
The pace of concentration peaked between 1986 and 1987 as shown in Figures 
2.4a and b. A study by Evans and Kessides (1991) points out that although 
after the consolidation the majority of passengers still fly on only eight airlines, 
they now have more choice from 2.5 airlines per route compared to 1.5 before. 
Although the average number of competitors in 1988 went up to 5 from 2 in 
1978, they only account for a very small share of the traffic. 
Regarding the wave of mergers they state that most mergers and acquisitions 
occurred between carriers with complementary route networks. The exceptions 
to this observation were Northwest 
- 
Republic and TWA 
- 
Ozark who shared 
the same hub. It could be said that these horizontal mergers were actually 
rationalising the market as they were eliminating `redundant' capacity. 
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Purposefully reducing competition is another valid argument, as the two are not 
mutually exclusive. 
As Butler and Huston (1989a, b) observe they increase the number of cities 
served, the number of connections possible but the numbers of flights were 
reduced by 7 percent in Minneapolis and 11 percent in St. Louis. Service 
improvements can sometimes be accompanied by increased market power. 
The study made by Jordan (1988), analyses the effects of the mergers and 
acquisitions on the surviving carriers' operating expenses, airports served, 
traffic and profit. The analysis is carried out from historical and post 
deregulation periods, particularly extending it to the relative changes in traffic 
and profits of the survivors. In the data examined those for Canadian carriers 
are also included. For the mergers occurring during the period of regulation i. e. 
up to October 1978, suggest that, although other related factors are at work, 
somehow a number of points in the carriers system that could be served 
efficiently in a smaller network could not be served as efficiently in a larger 
one. For the group of early mergers (1979-1982) occurring after deregulation, 
including Continental 
- 
Texas Air Corp., Pan Am 
- 
National, Republic 
- 
Hughes Airwest, and North Central 
- 
Southern a consistent pattern emerged 
whereby every survivor does terminate service to a large number of points and 
until they have done so their operating expenses per RTM increase relative to 
comparable carriers. Showing that with one exception the norm for the carriers 
was to increase their points served right up to 1984 disproves the argument that 
under deregulation all trunk carriers of the time were terminating services to 
various points. Hence the termination of points served is identified as a 
characteristic of the merged airlines only. The deletion of services naturally, 
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has a negative impact on the traffic of the surviving carrier as not only does it 
make the carrier's network more homogenous but also reduces the total market 
served. In fact, decreases in relative traffic were in evidence in a variety of 
degrees, in all four mergers analysed. 
Studies published by Keeler (1981) have tried to prove a correlation between 
concentration (measured by the Herfindahl Index) and fares, indicating that 
entry of a new firm even by an established 'high cost' carrier does have a 
downward effect on fares. Kanafani and Hansen (1989) agree that the 
Herfindahl Index10 can and should be used to measure industry concentration. 
In the case of deregulation it is specifically applied to concentration of network 
hubs. Reynolds-Feighan (1992) however suggests that the main problem with 
the Herfindahl Index is that it can be a poor measure as it is size dependent and 
relatively insensitive to changes in the number of airports served and to the 
redistribution of traffic among these airports over different time periods. 
Alternatively the Gini Index" is presented as more suitable because it measures 
the difference between actual traffic distribution and a traffic distribution 
where all the carriers carried the same proportion of traffic. Furthermore it 
takes account of more intuitive properties which good measures of 
concentration should have. 12 Using this index it was shown clearly that airport 
2 
10 The Herfndahl Index is defined as H 
x; 
= where xi is the traffic or its distribution Ix, 
in airport i as handled by carrier i 
The Gini Index of concentration is defined as G= 2n 
Y Y, 
-Y3 
I 
where the y's are 
air traffic at i and j, are ranked in increasing order and y is the mean. 
12 Sen (1976) established 4 axioms that define these more intuitive properties of a good 
concentration / inequality measurement index 
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and airline concentration were very high prior to deregulation, so that the 
hubbing phenomenon, supposed to be a deregulation development, had been in 
place for a long period before passage of the ADA. During deregulation it 
simply became more prominent. 
One other aspect of the mergers has been whether a wave of mergers will result 
in the concentration of traffic in the hands of the few. Jordan (1988) proposes 
to examine firstly if the size has been associated with increasing traffic shares 
and whether the traffic shares of the surviving carrier will be so much larger 
than previously, thus increasing disproportionately their future market power. 
The data from this show that all but Northwest of the seven largest carriers lost 
traffic share during the initial years of deregulation. Even Northwest's results 
are attributed entirely to its international services where deregulation did not 
apply. After its merger with Republic in 1985 it too lost traffic share. In the 
1985-86 period only American had a larger traffic share than 1979, which it did 
not surpass until 1985, six years after deregulation. Hence taking all seven 
largest carriers' experience together between 1979 and 1986, does not support 
the argument that size alone bestows significant market power. 
The next factor examined were the profits following the mergers. As examined 
above, increases in average operating expenses and the decrease in traffic 
imply decline in profits following a merger. Other expenses directly related 
with mergers are increased debt and increased interest expenses, fleet 
rationalisation and re organisation of staff expenses will ensure the merger will 
be felt in the finances of the airline for a long time after it occurs. 
In the comparison made of the profits before tax and profits as percentage of 
total expenses for merging and non merging carriers, it is discovered that the 
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merging carriers suffered on both counts. Generally, the performance above 
indicated that mergers have an overall adverse effect on the profitability of the 
merging airline and under the initial period of deregulation yielded lower 
profits among merging carriers as compared to comparable ones. One note of 
caution which needs to be made here is that the period during which these 
results were collected was during a recessionary economic cycle which would 
tend to apply downwards pressures on the economic parameters of any carrier 
world-wide. Hence, the effects of the recession could be diluting the real 
picture. 
A parallel analysis of the behaviour of the Canadian carriers that merged 
following the deregulation of the market was undertaken in this paper. The 
results relevant to the evidence on average operating expenses per RTM 
obtained from U. S. carriers compare favourably with the Canadian ones and 
follow exactly the same pattern with discontinuing service to several points 
after the merger. There were also declines in the traffic shares of the merging 
carriers as well as adversely affected profits. The consistency of the pattern 
regardless of the regulatory environment in operation provides ample evidence 
that mergers in the industry provide fundamental effects on their performance, 
which are usually adverse. 
Merging airlines tend to have a slower post-merger growth of traffic. The 
points they will drop could foster further competition perhaps amongst a 
smaller scale carrier. This is currently applied by the use of smaller associated 
or partly owned commuter carriers which code share and co-ordinate their 
schedules with the majors, effectively allowing their parent airline to reduce 
their average costs by dropping points to its smaller associate. Also, unless the 
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merged majors are able to reduce their operating expenses down to those of 
unmerged airlines they will lose even more traffic to the unmerged lower cost 
carriers. A typical example of this are carriers which have not merged often 
which now enjoy cost advantages but have less market power like Southwest. 
2.4 COMPETITION 
Studies by Bailey, Graham and Kaplan (1985), Morrison and Winston (1987), 
Borenstein (1989), Butler and Houston (1989b) have found flaws in the 
original hypothesis and have also discovered that a relationship does exist 
between concentration and fares. Both Morrison and Winston (1987) and 
Keeler (1978) proved and predicted that potential entry does not play an 
important role in determining fares. 
As the forces of deregulation proceeded, academic consensus has moved away 
from the belief of the early 80s that markets are fully contestable and due to a 
more recent study by Reiss and Spiller (1989) a new model has been 
developed. This finds that oligopoly behaviour with regard to airline entry and 
price competition is applicable in low density markets where the fixed costs are 
very small. 
Other studies made by Call and Keeler (1986); Hurdle, Johnson et al. (1989) 
have tried to establish if the contestability theory holds then the number of 
airlines actually competeing on a route should have no effect on prices. 
Unfortunately they have all found that: in 1990 prices, two active competitors 
reduced prices by 8 percent than monopoly, and a third competitor produced a 
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further 8 percent reduction, all other things being equal. Hence, potential 
competition is not sufficient substitute for actual. 
Morrison and Winston stipulate that the total benefits to the public have been 
in the order of $5.7bn in 1977 values and the industry profits were $2.5bn 
higher than they would have been without deregulation. Additionally, they 
state that stock market valuations when analysed confirmed the pattern of 
profitability. Between 1976 and 1983 there has been almost no change in the 
total value of stock for the big national carriers, while regionals increased 
theirs six-fold in the same period. 
Accordingly, profitability declined sharply, and return on investment 
plummeted by 11.2 points from 1978 to 1982. (Figs. 2.5,2.6 and 2.7) What is 
difficult to estimate is how much is attributable to the recession and how much 
directly to deregulation. 
It is interesting to note however, that the decline in R. O. I. started just ahead of 
the ADA passing, which tends to suggest that airlines were already preparing 
themselves ahead of the actual legislation. By the end of this initial period and 
during the latter part of the 1980s the industry entered a wave of consolidation. 
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FARE DISCOUNTS 
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Fig. 2.5: U. S. fare discounts 1981-87 
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Fig. 2.6: U. S. Carriers R. O. I. 1981-87 
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U. S. SCHEDULED AIRLINES Yield & Unit Revenues 1977-99 
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Fig. 2.7: U. S. Carriers Earnings 1977-99 
From 1985 onwards the initial new entrants either filed for bankruptcy or were 
merged into one of the incumbents, so that by 1988 the main new airlines 
accounted for only 7 percent of the domestic scheduled mileage from the 12.5 
percent of 1985. Of all those airlines only AmericaWest is still flying today in 
its original form, despite having filed for Chapter 11 protection and re- 
emerged. A typical example of this phase is the rise of People Express, created 
by Donald Burr in 198 1 initially flying just 3 Boeing 727s. The combination of 
ultra low, no-frills fares (in some cases as low as $19), a loose management 
style and stockholder-employees, managed to establish a hub and spoke 
network radiating from Newark and grew to 80 aircraft by the end of 1986. 
Trying to compete with the majors, People Express became involved in price 
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cutting competition that reduced their yields, profitability and ultimately led to 
failure. Texas Air, the parent of Continental Airlines took over People Express 
and continued to use its low costs against the competition from other majors. 
Table 2.1 shows a summary of the start-up's development for that period. 
CARRIER SERVICE ENTRY SERVICE END REASONS 
Air Atlanta 1984 1986 Bankruptcy 
Air Chicago 1980 1982 Bankruptcy 
Air One 1983 1984 Bankruptcy 
America West 1983 1994 Chapter 11 (re-emerged) 
American Internat. 1982 1984 Bankruptcy 
Florida Express 1984 1988 Acquired by Braniff II 
Frontier Horizon 1984 1985 Bankruptcy 
Hawaii Express 1982 1983 Bankruptcy 
Jet America 1982 1986 Acquired by Alaska 
McClain Airlines 1986 1987 Bankruptcy 
MGM Grand Air 1987 1993 Became charter only, then 
Bankruptcy 
Midway 1979 1991 Bankruptcy 
Midwest Express 1984 Still Operating 
Muse (TranStar) 1981 1985 Acquired by Southwest 
Airlines 
New York Air 1980 1985 Acquired by Continental 
Northeastern 1982 1984 Bankruptcy 
Pacific East 1982 1984 Bankruptcy 
Pacific Express 1982 1984 Bankruptcy 
People Express 1981 1986 Acquired by Continental 
Presidential 1985 1989 Bankruptcy 
Sun World 1983 1988 Bankruptcy 
MGM Grand Air 1987 1993 Became charter only, then 
Bankruptcy 
Air Winsconsin a 1982 1992 Acquired by United 
Empire 8 1980 1986 Acquired by Piedmont 
Horizon a 1981 1986 Acquired by Alaska 
American Trans Air' 1992 Still operating 
Capitol b 1979 1984 Bankruptcy 
Carnival b 1988 1997 Acquired by Pan Am II 
Morris Air b 1992 1994 Acquired by Southwest A/I 
Tower b 1983 Still operating 
World b 1979 1985 Bankruptcy 
Source: Gudmundsson (1998) 
Table 2.1: Start-up jet operating new-entrants 1979-1986 
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As discussed previously airline networks have become more efficiently 
organised as the industry structure has become more competitive. Kanafani and 
Hansen (1989) claim that hubbing can increase productivity by allowing the 
use of larger economical aircraft, maintain high frequencies and high load 
factors. McShan and Windle (1989) examined the economic effects of hubs on 
a network level and state that although individual city pair markets may be 
regarded as contestable economic rent can be gained by incumbents due to 
superior access at the airports more suitable for hubbing which they already 
hold. As a result airport access constraints not only prevent new entrance or 
existing airlines from constructing a competing hub and spoke network at pre- 
existing airports, but also reduces the ability of others to achieve similar traffic 
densities and therefore their unit costs become disproportionately higher. 
Raising competitors' costs is an established anti-competitive tactic. As non 
incumbents are not able to obtain the slots to either enter the market in 
sufficient scale to obtain market share, or even existing carriers with 
established hubs elsewhere are also blocked, then the entrenched position is 
safeguarded and in due course it is possible for the newer carrier to be 
gradually squeezed out altogether. A comparative study is shown graphically in 
Fig. 2.8. 
The recommended solution is to increase capacity at targeted airports and to 
use efficient pricing of the existing facilities. However the relationship between 
airports and their best clients with their long lease agreements severely restrict 
this possibility. 
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Fig. 2.8: Domestic Slots Distribution 
The second effect caused by the constrained hubs is that because a carrier is 
dominant on the spoke routes, new entry is mostly impossible and the 
incumbent it has the market power to apply premium fares on routes radiating 
from the hub. This is demonstrated in Fig. 2.9 overleaf. 
During deregulation's second decade average fares have continued to decline 
more than 20 percent in real terms [Meyer and Menzies (2000)]. In the TRB 
- 
NRC Report (US NRC 1999) evidence was found that increasingly average 
fare prices mask wider dispersion of fares. This tends to suggest that a few 
travellers are increasingly restricted to paying higher fares and at the same time 
passengers on short haul routes are finding fewer of the cheapest fares 
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available. For the former group which today account for between 40 
- 
60 
percent of the traffic, price inelasticity reflects flexibility in their travel 
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Fig. 2.9: Effect of hubs on fares 
planning (peak hour flights, changeable itinerary etc. ) For the latter group it 
reflects the low and heavily restricted fares they enjoy priced on a marginal 
cost basis. However the overall picture that comes across from the report is that 
the airlines are trying to shift various groups of passengers onto higher fare 
classes. Between the years 1992 and 1998 the highest 5 percent of fare payers 
increased from 8 percent to 18 percent in short haul markets, and from 13 to 17 
percent in the medium and long haul markets, respectively. Conversely, in the 
same period the lowest 5 percent of fare payers declined from 14 to 10 percent 
in short haul markets, and remained almost constant in the others. The 
passengers most likely to be suffering high fares are business passengers 
  
Other constrained airports 
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travelling from a major airline's hub airport, for a trip of short to medium 
length. The optimisation of yield management systems has been instrumental 
in this area. Firstly, it helps the carrier to differentiate between its customers to 
a very high degree and consequently, to `guide' them onto the `appropriate' 
fare class. Belobaba (1987a, b) states that a good revenue and yield 
management system was worth up to $40 million in extra revenue to airlines 
like Republic or Western and up to $140 million extra to carriers like TWA, 
Eastern and Delta. Today American and United's yield management systems 
are considered to be the most finely tuned systems in the industry. 
In May 1999 it was announced that in a$4.3 billion transaction United 
Airlines (UAL), in partnership with American Airlines (AA) have agreed to 
buy up U. S. Air, the number 3 ranked airline, and divide the constituent parts 
of USAir between them. For UAL the benefits include the acquisition of 
USAir's hubs at Charlotte (90 percent seat dominance), Pittsburgh (89 
percent), and Philadelphia (66 percent), the lucrative East Coast Shuttle and 80 
percent of its USAir's total available capacity where AA will get the other 20 
percent. According to Michael Levine, co-architect of the early deregulation at 
the CAB and Harvard law professor, the fact that UAL's arch rival AA was 
invited into this merger by UAL seems to show that the two giants are 
embarking on a `share ubiquity' philosophy which means sharing the higher 
yield East Coast market, which is now impenetrable due to infrastructure 
constraints and from that derive monopolistic rents which can be used to fortify 
their positions in other markets. This way they will maintain `.. a revenue 
premium over Delta, Continental and Northwest... generate network rents and 
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stave off the economic impact of Southwest which has recently entered the 
New York market area at a secondary airport (Islip)'. 
In July 2001 however it was made clear that the DoJ would not provide 
antitrust clearance to the merger which was immediately abandoned by the two 
major airlines. In what has been described as a ".. most surprising antitrust 
decision of the Bush administration " it pointed to the fact that the DoJ under 
the new Republican President will be quite different to that under previous 
Republican Presidents. 
In parallel to that it was announced at the end of 2000 that American Airlines 
was buying the long-ailing TWA for $500 million. In the last 10 years TWA 
has filed for bankruptcy protection twice, has very few real assets and has 
never been profitable. However, it was the dominant carrier in a central mid- 
continent hub of St Louis and employed 20,000 people. Both merged airlines 
seem to suggest that their revenues has been weakened long term by the 
presence of low cost competition, particularly by Southwest around St Louis 
and the East Coast region. 
This new development had it gone ahead, certainly would have adverse 
implications for competition both on a national level as well in the North East 
regional level. A comparison is shown in figures 2.10,2.11 below. It can be 
seen from these that the low cost carriers account for only 11 percent of 
Available Seat Miles of the total U. S. market. 
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Fig. 2.11: Further U. S. consolidation 
37 
2 
.5 
MARKETING TOOLS 
Brief examination will now be given to some of the most important and 
frequently used marketing practices, which have grown in significance during 
the deregulation years. Although most of these tools could be used purely for 
purposes of furthering an airline's image and customer base they have been 
consistently used in anti competitive ways and in an effort to block the 
expansion of other carriers in the marketplace. 
2.5.1 Code sharing partners 
The transformation of the airline networks was accompanied by a simultaneous 
expansion in joint marketing agreements between the major airlines and a 
variety of commuter or regionals. The aim was for the majors to use the 
regionals' network to feed traffic form the hub hinterland to their hub for 
connecting onward journeys. Undertaken under `code share agreements' 
between the two carriers it ensured a continuation of the on-line service, which 
carried the same airline designator code, although there were two different 
operators. This policy has the implication of establishing the dominance of the 
hub incumbent to the more localised level of the small town or city. 
Particularly with the advent of newer, faster, longer-ranged regional jets it can 
allow the penetration into a far distant local market which might not be totally 
protected from such an approach. Indeed, once a code share agreement has 
been established and fine tuned it makes entering the market a costlier affair 
for any potential competitor. 
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On the other hand any commuter airline that enters into such agreements is 
usually dependent on the major airline for marketing, ticketing, reservation and 
a variety of other functions. The majors have tended to expect exclusivity from 
the commuters as a way to protect their product, investment and their 
catchment areas. This trend has now meant that increasingly commuter airlines 
are now partly or wholly owned subsidiaries of the larger carriers and are 
operated under the same brand. 
2.5.2 Frequent Flyer Programmes 
One other method to place barriers to new entry is through the use of Frequent 
Flyer Programmes (FFP). By giving various benefits like free tickets to 
frequent flyers, brand loyalty is encouraged making this type of passenger 
reluctant to switch to another airline so as not to lose these benefits. 
Additionally, the greater route network that the large airlines have gives a 
distinct advantage over the smaller airlines. One solution proposed by 
Borenstein (1989) and Morrison and Winston (1987) has been to tax FFP 
benefits as income. Differentiation should be made however between benefits 
accumulated on leisure and personal travel, which should not be taxed, and 
those from business trips which should since they represent untaxed 
compensation from an employer. Separating the two kinds however could have 
practical difficulties. One of the characteristics of FFPs are their tendency to 
persuade passengers to travel on a higher class fare than they would otherwise 
travel only to obtain the extra benefits offered by the programme. The U. S. 
General Accounting Office is suspicious that FFPs like CRS are barriers to 
entry and could thus result to higher fares. Likewise the European Commission 
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acknowledged that they could be 'distortive of competition'. It is quite possible 
that without hub and spoke networks FFPs are not as valuable and that once all 
the competitors have their own programmes set up then any advantages will be 
equalised. 
2.5.3 Computer Reservation Systems (C. R. S. ) 
The majority of the space reservation for U. S. airlines is held in just two 
computer systems: SABRE owned by American Airlines and APOLLO 
belonging to United Airlines. The majority of travel agents responsible for the 
bulk of ticket reservations belong to one of these two systems. Travel agents' 
contracts with either system are structured so that it makes switching from one 
system to another a very expensive, unprofitable and cumbersome process. 
Various rival airlines from time to time have complained, usually justifiably, 
that the systems are biased towards the airline that owns the system, giving 
priority to the owner's flights regardless of whether these flights are the most 
convenient for the trip requested. Hence there is a barrier for any competitor of 
these airlines to break into a market. New guidelines were drawn by the FAA 
dictating the conditions of use of the CRSs. 
Another aspect of their anti-competitive effects is the possibility they offer to 
airlines to signal threats to their competitors, either to deter entry or to 
discourage lowering fares. Usually the one carrier signals its intention to 
respond to any cut in fares of its competitor by pre announcing greater cuts in 
the markets the competitor is entering, but to also announce wide-ranging cuts 
in other markets of its competitor which are not under been entered. Therefore 
the new entrant unless it wants a price war will have to cancel its original cuts. 
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All this occurs in advance of any actual fare cuts and never reaches fruition. 
Ironically this is the principle of contestability in reverse. Carriers like America 
West and Midway airlines are said to have been victims of this tactic. 
At this point research has not shown conclusively that society gains from the 
ownership of reservation systems by the largest airlines. In the future good 
reasons might appear to warrant divestiture and separate ownership of these 
reservation systems from their present owners. American Airlines has already 
divested itself from exclusive ownership of SABRE. 
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3 DEREGULATION OR LIBERALISATION? 
3.1 THE EU AIRLINE DEREGULATION 
3.1.1 The EU Market Before Liberalisation 
The problems arising from the iniquitous resolution of the issues in the 1944 
Chicago Convention can be said to be directly responsible for the historical 
weaknesses of the European carriers. Fear of a very powerful United States 
eager to compete anywhere, but particularly in a Europe slowly becoming 
prosperous, led to European governments seeking protection measures to shield 
their airlines and their ruined economies. This naturally led to restrictive 
bilaterals and for some countries it led, in turn, to chronically under-productive 
and state subsidised flag carriers. Over the last 20 years as some of the 
European flag carriers became more productive and efficient (either through 
privatisation or other measures) and gained competitive advantage, their 
outlook tended to favour a multilateral competitive regime. Correspondingly, 
others, (e. g. Air France, Iberia, Alitalia, Olympic, TAP) have resisted this trend 
and have sought continued protection from the regulators and their respective 
governments. The fact that from the late 70s to the mid 90s most of these 
countries were under the control of centre-left governments meant that the 
possibility of adopting free market principles and economics were rather 
remote. 
While the European carriers were engaged in a moderate competition in trans- 
Atlantic travel, the domestic scheduled market remained heavily regulated 
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through bilateral agreements until the mid-eighties. The European airlines were 
mainly public airlines or majority state owned. They enjoyed the duopolistic 
situation created by the bilateral agreements, which prevented new entry in the 
intra-European market. Through these bilateral agreements, the airlines pooled 
their revenues and shared capacity, thus eliminating any competition between 
themselves on these routes. 
3.1.2 The EU Cartel Histories 
Cartels are secret horizontal agreements concluded by the main economic 
operators in a given market, in order to eliminate competition between them, 
artificially raise prices and restrict output. These attempts to replace a 
competitive environment 
- 
the driving-force of a market economy 
- 
with co- 
ordinated and centrally controlled regulation of the market are by far the most 
destructive infringements of competition law. In increasingly economic 
globalisation the possibility of cartel formation is more pronounced since there 
can be a greater number of players as well as greater rewards for the successful 
cartel. Accordingly, the potential damage caused by cartels is increasingly 
severe. The creation of the illusion of competition although there is no 
effective consumer choice, fix the costs in line with the least competitive 
producer they form a barrier to any efficiency gain measures. On an 
international scale these cartels are estimated to cost hundreds of million of 
Euro on the EU economy. 
The larger European countries were very reluctant until the mid-eighties to 
abandon the protected status of their national carriers by advocating more 
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liberal competition policies. These governments directly or indirectly 
subsidised their carriers, the extent of which, varied from country to country. 
Airline Capital injection 
(US$ million) 
State Owned 
Commission-approved state aid 
Sabena (1991) 1,800 
Iberia (1992) 830 
Aer Lingus (1993) 240 
TAP (1994) 1965 
Air France (1994) 3300 
Olympic (1994) 2245 
Alitalia (1997) 1708 
Sub total 12,088 
Using 'Market economy investor principle' 
Air France (1991) 338 
Sabena (1995) 267 
AOM (1995) 49 
Iberia (1995) 593 
Sub total 1,247 
GRAND TOTAL 17,405 
Private airlines 
BA (1993) (rights issue & bonds) 1355 
KLM (1994) (rights issue & bonds) 1100 
Lufthansa (1994) (rights issue & bonds) 1440 
Finnair 1992/4/5 175 
Total 4,070 
Source: Doganis 2001 
Fig. 33: State Aid Capital Injections For EU Carriers 1991-97 
Financial assistance was provided to: 
1) compensate airlines for the imposition of a public service obligation 
2) develop and operate domestic services 
3) encourage the acquisition and operation of specific aircraft (national or 
European designs) 
4) provide service to economically underdeveloped regions of the country 
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5) simply to cover the operating costs of the airline since it was been used as an 
instrument of employment policy. 
Stringent laws were enforced to deny access of competitors into the market, 
directly protecting the national airlines. The operation resulted in a very 
inefficient allocation of resources and these airlines consistently suffered 
losses. 
In similar circumstances, in 1986, British Airways after having suffered 
consistent bad years was sold to the private sector. In early 1987 and after 
having undergone radical workforce restructuring program, BA waged a highly 
'nationalistic' campaign to 'rescue' the failing British Caledonian from the 
hands of the foreigners, namely SAS, and 'took over' its only serious domestic 
rival. 
With declining profitability in its European operations BA signed a marketing 
agreement with United Airlines. This way United's schedules and networks in 
America were integrated into BA's transatlantic services to American cities. At 
the same time this agreement enabled BA to share passengers and to increase 
the quality of service offered particularly to business travellers since they were 
able to find more suitably timed departures and arrivals. As a result BA's load 
factor on the transatlantic routes increased by up to 40 percent. These 
innovative operations enabled British Airways to rebuild its equity in a very 
short space of time. 
Any comparison of the benefits of deregulation between EC and U. S. should be 
treated with scepticism because of the European market characteristics, which 
are covered in more detail in Section 3.5. 
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First, competition from other modes of transport (high speed trains, cars) is 
much greater over short haul distances than in the U. S. 
Second, average journey lengths are shorter causing take off and landing costs 
to represent a larger proportion of total costs. 
Third, Europe's domestic services account for a considerably smaller 
proportion than in the U. S. 
Fourth, the U. S. never developed a significant charter market. This absence 
meant that while fares were regulated, carriers competed on service quality and 
thus operated very low load factors. 
After deregulation carriers usually developed markets using low cost services 
for leisure travellers which raised load factors so as to reduce average costs. In 
the case of Europe, charter carriers have served leisure travellers satisfactorily 
within regulation. The effect of regulatory collusion has been to maintain 
higher than normal load factors. Furthermore, charter operations occur on 
distinct city pair routes, which sometimes don't even have scheduled service 
(Alpine and Mediterranean destinations) and usually are operated outside peak 
hours. Hence, given this situation in Europe it appears that there is scope for 
the development of discounted scheduled services for both leisure and business 
markets. 
The likely gains from the anticipated increase in average load factors are more 
difficult to evaluate. The table below shows the general weakness in European 
load factors. During the 1990s they were indeed lower than the U. S. Following 
the recession of the early 1990s European load factors fell considerably more 
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than in the U. S., and needed a much longer time to recover. Additionally, it can 
be seen that higher load factors in domestic operations were, with the exception 
of 1997, generally higher than infra European ones. It is also shown that they 
have not been dramatically increasing since the advent of deregulation. 
Conversely, the U. S. data show a steady increase after the recovery from the 
early 1990s recession. The EU data can be compared with the expected figure 
of around 70 percent, indicating that the gains have not significantly affected 
average load factors. 
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Fig. 3.2: Comparison of U. S. and European Average Load Factors 1976-99 
The airline industry since the late 1980s has undergone an ambitious 
liberalisation process. For almost 30 years after the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome the air transport sector has been excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
European Commission. This changed in April 1986 when the European Court 
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of Justice ruled that the competition rules spelled out in the Treaty of Rome 
must also be applied to the transport industry. This historic decision opened the 
gates towards European airline liberalisation. In December 1987 the Council of 
Ministers adopted a first package 13 of measures introducing new competition 
rules, relaxing price controls and opening market access. Over the time that 
followed pressure to further deregulate airlines mounted and by 1989 it 
resulted in a second phase of `Euro-liberalisation' as it was later called. A third 
package14 of legislative measures leading towards an `in-principle' open intra- 
European market was put into effect from Ist January of 1993. Since then it 
seems that the legislative momentum in creating a common aviation policy has 
subsided and that the time is being used to allow the implementation of these 
measures to take effect. 
The EU decided to introduce liberalisation as a way to apply the principles of 
market integration across the member states. This received further impetus by 
the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 which specified the completion 
of the Internal Market, where goods and services would be able to move freely, 
by the end of 1992. 
One of the criticisms levelled against the European airlines has been that the 
price on most routes has been consistently higher than prices charged for 
" Council Regulation No 3975187 laying down the procedure for the application for the rules on 
competition to undertakings in the Air transport sector. Council Regulation No 3976187 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices 
in the air transport sector. Council Directive 87/601 on fares on scheduled services between member 
states. Council Decision 87/602 on the sharing of passenger capacity between carriers on scheduled 
air services between member states and on access for air carriers to scheduled air service routes 
between member states. 
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similar distances in the United States. This has often been attributed to the 
shared monopolies in most markets created by bilateral agreements between 
member states. The whole `liberalisation' movement started in an effort to end 
these monopolies and to bring prices down to a `more competitive' level. 
In May 1987, the Commission's competition commissioner Peter Sutherland 
threatened the 12 member state to take them to European Court for operating 
an illegal cartel in violation of the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome. 
After a meeting of the Ministers of Transport in June 1987 in Brussels where 
considerable resistance to change was overcome, a package was agreed that 
would allow some flexibility on setting fares. This was eventually adopted after 
several months of tough negotiations, on December 7`h 1987. Under these 
terms the airlines were allowed to offer `deep discounts' 
- 
between 65 to 90 
percent 
- 
of the economy class fares, provided that this was accepted by the 
Member states. It also allowed for an increase in capacity shares on a route 
provided that the shares split between two countries were not outside the range 
of 45 
- 
55 percent, up to October 1,1989 and 60 to 40 percent thereafter. 
Furthermore it addressed the question of access more directly by allowing 
multiple designation on country pairs and city pairs, while at the same time 
preventing one carrier in one country trying to enforce a reduction in the other 
country's capacity merely by reducing their own. This was an historic 
agreement as it had taken more than 23 years for the European countries to 
agree as a whole on a multilateral agreement, however minimal the legislation. 
14 Council Regulation 2407/92 on licensing air carriers, Council Regulation 2408/92 on market 
access, Council Regulation 2409/92 on fares and rates. 
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According to the EC Commissioner for Transport Karel van Miert in a 
Symposium in June 1989: 
" 
...... 
the first phase of the package is proving a modest success. In 
traffic between member states, a variety of more flexible arrangements 
have been made 
- 
some under bilateral agreements but many stemming 
directly from the package... " 
In the Commission's Report on the First year (1988) of the Implementation of 
the Aviation Policy Approved in December 1987, published in 1989, its main 
conclusions were: 
EC airlines have made good use of favourable macroeconomic trends 
to generate traffic increases. 
ii. Profitability has improved. 
iii. The general level of fares has followed the rate of inflation. 
iv. Bilateral capacity shares in the EC have changed little. 
v. Substantial oad factor increases were experienced form 1986-1988. 
vi. the reduction of fuel prices helped the lowering of the unit cost 
prices of AEA carriers. 
vii. Development of new routes from the hubs to the regional airports has 
been favourable. 
viii. Fifth freedom routings have re-emerged significantly. 
Unfortunately, the results were truly a modest success and those supporters of 
liberalisation expecting the emergence of lower fares among other consumer 
benefits were certainly disappointed. It seems that the efforts of the more 
conservative countries to protect their interests and to secure exemptions were 
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successful, since the first package contained many compromises. In fact some 
states went further by being reluctant to accept the implications of these 
agreements long after the agreeing to the package exemptions. Several cases 
appeared where legal proceedings were opened by the Commission against 
alleged breaches of the agreements. 
Nevertheless, the impetus from this breakthrough culminated to the last round 
of negotiations on June 22,1992 in Luxembourg where after ten years of hard 
negotiations, the European Community had agreed on issues that would finally 
create a more competitive environment in Europe's skies. 
The European Commission has shown that it considers air transport as a typical 
example of what can be achieved by the single market. It set a final deadline in 
1997 for the final completion of the liberalised market. One of the main 
questions being asked is how great are the likely benefits of liberalisation. If a 
single market is achieved without any distortions (the ideal case) using 
passenger revenue of EC airlines from scheduled services within Europe 
totalling $ 10,8bn. in 1987 then benefits up to $ Ibn per annum (i. e. 10 percent 
approx. ) could be feasible. 
During the last decade the EUC has ruled on a variety of areas aimed at 
maintaining a competitive status quo and in further enhancing competition in 
associated areas such as state aid and subsidies, computer reservations systems, 
ground handling, and the contentious issue of slot allocation at Europe's 
constrained airports. 
The European airlines have felt the impact of the new "liberalisation" laws. To 
provide a buffer against the unavoidable price wars that followed the U. S. 
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deregulation, the European airlines began to restructure themselves, as well as 
their industry. Many of the internal restructuring programmes undertaken or 
considered by the European carriers focus on improvements in their cost 
structure. Corporate restructuring takes time as well as a good amount of 
pressure from the markets. The case of Lufthansa might be a typical example. 
The carrier has undergone a very substantial and ambitious restructuring 
process, similar to the one British Airways underwent in the mid 80s. In 
addition strategic alliances with other European carriers as well as U. S. carriers 
are being implemented. The necessary re-organisation and reduction of the 
workforce was one of the most difficult and probably painful process that the 
airline went through. In Lufthansa's case several institutional, political, and 
legal constraints, not directly under the airline's control made it increasingly 
difficult to arrive at a competitive cost structure. Nevertheless, at the beginning 
of 1993 Lufthansa launched a major marketing initiative, slashing prices on 
selective routes. 
At the same time, they have sought to consolidate their domestic markets to the 
exclusion of other competitors and strengthen their intra-European and 
international traffic by forming strategic alliances operated through hub and 
spoke networks. 
Progress has not been far reaching as testified by our route surveys. Out of 76 
major scheduled intra European routes in 2001,76 percent of them were 
operated by two or less airlines. On domestic routes, in 45 routes surveyed, 84 
percent were flown by two or less operators. 
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3.2 A DIFFERENCE OF EMPHASIS AND METHOD. 
When witnesses in a recent House of Commons Transport Committee Report 
were asked what they saw as the main difference between U. S. deregulation 
and EC liberalisation they replied that liberalisation would be gradual 
deregulation without the drawbacks. The most important drawback mentioned 
was the concentration of the U. S. airline industry that followed after the demise 
of most of its early products, namely the new entrant airlines. Some of them 
left the market after having failed to develop the necessary economies of scale 
and scope. Others were forced out due to financial difficulties resulting from 
being targeted by an incumbent airline or as a result of merging complementary 
hub and spoke networks in different parts of the country. The most recent 
consolidations have included the merger of airlines operating most of their 
services from the same airports and strengthening of the links between majors 
and small commuter airlines. This shows how important is an effective policy 
in merger control. 
The EU Commission's stated gradual and incremental approach, although not 
yet fully proven, was intentionally designed to avoid the Big Bang approach of 
the U. S. deregulation. As it was acknowledged": 
".... there was neither spectacular reduction in fares nor any dramatic 
disappearance of the more important carriers. Liberalisation has 
happened in a progressive way without any major upsets. " 
15 Presented in an analysis of the earlier packages of reform in Commission of the European 
Communities (1994) The Way Forward for Civil Aviation in Europe, COM(94)218, Brussels. 
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Because of that its proponents tend to consider it economically superior as it 
avoided the market turbulence that followed the ADA passing. Button Haynes 
and Stough (1998)16 show a stylised diagram of the time paths of Big Bang and 
incremental policy effects. Under the former approach there are high initial 
costs of disruption but a rapid move to the new higher level of social welfare is 
achieved. The incremental approach has fewer initial adverse effects, its 
benefits take longer to be achieved and it is also possible for a new optimal 
level to be reached which is lower than that of the Big Bang approach. 
Although the incremental approach gives time to the policymakers to learn 
during the reform process and thus introduce adjustments as necessary, it also 
allows the incumbents affected enough time to reorganise and consolidate their 
positions, forming new barriers and alliances. 
Despite the problems areas within the newly deregulated U. S. market, the 
general agreed view is that it resulted in overall positive returns for consumers 
and therefore European policy makers have accepted the case for liberalising 
their own aviation, but in a way to avoid the repetition of the U. S. problems. 
For any reforms of this scale to be successful it had to be tailored and 
encompass all the individual characteristics of the local industry. 
3.3 LESSONS FOR EUROPE FROM THE U. S. EXPERIENCE. 
Since the beginning of the U. S. deregulation in 1978 several studies and reports 
were quick to attribute the advantages and disadvantages for airlines, benefits 
and disservice to consumers to the new policy. Even at this point in time, one is 
16 Chapter 3, pp, 56 fig. 3.1 
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not able to declare clearly U. S. deregulation as an overwhelming success or 
failure. 
In the case of Europe, which initiated its program of liberalisation some eight 
years after the U. S., a lot of attention has been given in finding ways to learn 
from the lessons of the Airlines Deregulation Act of 1978 and at the same time 
avoid the possible pitfalls it presented. The possible major lessons seen so far 
can be summarised as: 
  
There is greater choice for consumers in terms of the products available. 
New kinds of services, priced in different ways have provided new, 
imaginative and innovative ways in operating, marketing and managing 
an airline. 
  
The new entrant airlines with their lower cost bases have put pressure to 
the incumbents to improve their efficiency by reducing costs and by 
tailoring their product closer to their customers' needs. 
  
Added competition has in many cases deteriorated into price wars where 
fares were cut below costs resulting in financial instability, inadequate 
profitability and several bankruptcies. 
 A trend has been established indicating increasing concentration of the 
industry with the five largest carriers developing disproportionate power 
that has been used to dominate the markets they served. 
  
As a by-product of the financial instability and the effort to cut costs, 
safety standards were eroded, creating the need for extra supervision by 
the authorities. 
  
The savings made from cutting costs have been transferred to the airline 
employees in terms of reduced wages. 
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The main question arising out of the U. S. Airlines Deregulation Act (ADA) of 
1978 refers to the contestability hypothesis and whether this has been proved to 
apply to all the markets. In Europe by having the benefit of hindsight and 
examining the progression of the U. S. deregulated industry several questions 
are generated. If the hypothesis and deregulation in general has not come up to 
the expectations of its supporters does it mean that it is flawed or is this failure 
attributable to other factors? What would be the implications and lessons to be 
learned by Europe's intention to deregulate / liberalise its markets? All these 
are questions that have been asked often enough but no clear answers are 
available. Finding answers to the questions above, is not within the remit of 
this research but it should be noted that the viability of competition or not, 
shouldn't be judged against the extreme cases of high levels of efficiency 
theoretically possible in a perfectly competitive market or against the policy 
making of a regulator whose sole consideration is the maximisation of the 
economic efficiency of the industry. In the latter case which is potentially 
applicable in the European context other factors like supporting national 
interests, shielding a weak economy sector and the case of several state owned 
airlines, will dilute policy making goals. What is important to the viability of 
deregulation is that a workable level of competition is achieved so as to create 
an environment within which deregulation can be propagated and sustained for 
long enough as to enable adequate structural reform in the industry itself. 
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3.4 BASIC ISSUES 
In the early stages of the formulation of the need for competition it was 
important to examine whether competition was possible in this kind of market 
or whether the market was readily monopolistic. Considering the fact that some 
large airlines have costs not lower than smaller ones indicated the lack of scale 
economies, suggesting that the market was naturally competitive. However this 
has proved to be a false premise. 
One of the peculiarities encountered with Europe's attempt to liberalise its air 
transport industry is the need for the Commission to empower and co-ordinate 
all member states to adopt the new philosophy. The difficulties seem to arise 
from the fact that in some cases airline businesses enjoy special characteristics 
that make it necessary to maintain some degree of governmental control to 
ensure that adequate services are maintained. These governments pointed to the 
public and consumer interests that would not be served by a free market 
environment. Also they used the example of the U. S. case to support the view 
that deregulation leads to chronic instability of service and disruption of 
essential operations. In answer to these points they proposed that some sort of 
entry regulation should be imposed to any future environment to assure 
adequate levels of profitability in an industry which by its nature, has very low 
natural barriers to entry. A brief overview of the progress of U. S. deregulation 
is provided here in the form of three phases that the industry went through. 
i) In the first phase new entry was easily facilitated by the new legislation 
and occurred readily. It produced a plethora of new carriers seeking to compete 
in markets both new and already served by majors or trunk carriers. 
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ii) In the second phase, by 1987, the cut price competition had ceased 
because by then the market had filtered out the low cost carriers responsible for 
the cost cutting and the price wars. Accordingly, the airlines' yields and 
financial results for the year showed marked improvements, resulting from the 
new order of oligopoly that had been imposed. It was uncertain however 
whether this new stability would be a long term one or whether it will be at the 
expense of the consumers. 
iii) In the third phase, from 1987 onwards the airline industry became even 
more concentrated as signified by the fact that the eight remaining majors were 
responsible for 94 percent of the domestic traffic. This phase is characterised 
by a period of mergers and take-overs and possibly the most significant 
industry development: the emergence of dominant carriers at major hubs 
having more than 50 percent of the total traffic at those hubs. 
This oligopolistic concentration has come as a surprise to the advocates of 
airline deregulation, who used the theory of market contestability as a basis for 
their argument. More specifically the widely acknowledged `father of U. S. 
deregulation' Alfred Kahn (1988) admits that ' the most unpleasant surprise 
has been the reversal of the large scale entry of new competitive carriers, the 
departures of most of them, and the re-concentration of the industry both 
nationally and at the major hubs '. He also accepts that deregulation advocates 
were `... misled by the apparent lack of evidence of economies of scale, 
differences of the route structures and... underestimating other obstacles to 
entry'. 
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3.5 EU DIFFERENCES 
There are marked differences between the European and U. S. air transport mar- 
ket structures. 
3.5.1 Domestic/ International nature 
The European market is essentially an international one. In 2000,66.5 percent 
of the AEA's passengers were on international services, 45.6 percent carried 
were intra-European, and 33.4 percent were purely domestic (within the 
borders of the same country). Ever since the end of the war Europe's airlines 
were of an international nature as even in the larger countries the majority of 
their routers were outside their own borders. International routes subject to the 
international bilateral agreements carried a considerable economic rent. 
On the other hand, European geographical differences from the U. S., being a 
larger population in a small geographical area, causing lower stage lengths has 
historically had competition from a heavily subsidised railroad system. 
Furthermore, a very competitive charter industry, devoid of any regulation on 
fares and capacity restrictions, has captured considerable amounts of traffic 
during the peak holiday season, further reducing the main carrier's market 
share. Competitions from other modes of transport i. e. rail and car, particularly 
over the shorter sectors tends to reduce the density of travel between point to 
point. 
All these features of the European market when put together suggest that 
demand-side benefits from liberalisation at first would be smaller because, at 
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least in theory, the airlines would be more competitive that their U. S. 
counterparts. 
3.5.2 Airport infrastructure 
European airlines do not have anywhere near the airport dominance in their 
main hub airport that their U. S. counterparts possess. Good Röller and Sickles 
(1993) suggest that as the intra-European network grew from within the 
bilateral regulation system the bilateral negotiations undertaken by the 
respective governments led to more rational pre-liberalisation networks for the 
major carriers. In contrast to that it can be argued that some of the more anti- 
reform minded governments have tried in effect to maintain the status quo as 
far as possible, shielding their carriers and even going against liberalisation as 
much as possible. European carriers usually have a single major hub in their 
largest city or capital (except Germany due to the partition of Berlin), and 
possibly a secondary one in another important regional capital. They have 
nowhere near the monopoly of U. S. carriers in terms of both slots and 
passengers, do not own or control gates and terminals but are provided by 
agreement by the airport authority. Intensity of operation is also lower since it 
is not possible to create the banks of departures and arrivals unless the traffic 
density or slots pre-exist. Because of the geo-economic factors above indirect 
trip routings within Europe via a hub would place a heavy time penalty on the 
more time sensitive business traffic which is importantly of a higher yield. 
In the U. S. because of the CAB's route allocation policy individual hubs have 
been chronically associated and dominated by a particular airline. With greater 
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consolidation in the last fifteen years the numbers of hub dominant airlines has 
decreased and the hubs they dominate have increased. Such a development will 
be impossible to replicate in Europe in exactly the same manner. The only 
possibility would be solely on an alliance level where alliance member flights 
from a single hub are counted as one. 
3.5.3 State subsidies 
By the end of 2000 out of 32 major European airlines 12 of them were still 
under government ownership or control. Airlines under government control is a 
result of the agreements afters the 2"6 World War were governments saw the 
airlines as a projection of the national prestige and security outside their 
borders. Although in the intermediate years the reasons for maintaining airlines 
in state control have become more political, the economic facts have always 
confirmed that private ownership would be a better manager for any airline. 
Fig 3.1 has shown the amounts of state subsidies given to European airlines in 
the variety of forms that were allowed under the provisions of the EUC 
regulations on state aid. As has been discussed already although subsidies have 
been given with the specific purpose to restructure the airline in reality have 
helped to maintain poor performances. Several studies amongst which those by 
Alamdari and Morrell (1997), have shown that labour unit costs, and 
productivity of EU airlines have been reducing by up to 23 percent in 1991-94 
but only mainly due to fast growth in productivity increases. In the earlier years 
from studies by Windle (1991), Encaoua (1991), it was shown that they are 
lagging behind the U. S. and a selection of other world airlines. The worst cases 
were state airlines receiving subsidies. 
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4 PREVIOUS THEORETICAL WORK 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The viability of competition shouldn't be judged against the extreme cases of 
high levels of efficiency theoretically possible in a perfectly competitive 
market or against the policy making of a regulator whose sole consideration is 
the maximisation of the economic efficiency of the industry. In the latter case 
which is potentially applicable in the European context other factors like 
supporting national interests, shielding a weak economy sector etc. dilute 
policy making goals. What is important to the viability of deregulation is that a 
workable level of competition is achieved so as to create an environment 
within which deregulation can be propagated and sustained to produce 
beneficial welfare gains. 
In the early stages of the formulation of the need for competition it was 
important to examine whether competition was possible in this kind of market 
or whether the market was readily monopolistic. For the market not to be 
monopolistic then ease of entry and exit should be case. 
As far back as 1950 it was predicted that the ease of entry would influence the 
performance and competitiveness of the industry. The opinion expressed was 
that with ease of entry, established firms would be forced to set prices well 
below the monopoly levels in order to prevent entry of a competitor. With the 
same hypothesis in mind they might alternatively, in the short term, set 
monopolistic price levels until just before the point actual entry occurs, when 
they will revert to a lower price setting, having accumulated monopolistic 
profits. 
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A model developed by Baumol and Willig (1981) investigates the effects of 
various types of barriers to entry with firm pricing. He states that if entry and 
exit costs are zero then even a natural monopolist will be forced to set prices at 
the zero-profit (absolutely competitive) level. When a market has these 
attributes then it is called 'a contestable market', which invites deregulation, 
even though it might be a naturally monopolistic market. This is the theory 
behind the decision of the CAB to proceed to full scale deregulation without 
any transition period. 
4.2 E. U. DEREGULATION 
Research carried out has attempted to provide a way of measuring the potential 
for price reduction if competition increases within Europe, while holding the 
cost constant. Could it be found that there is a sustainable price reduction 
possible for the European carriers, given their existing costs? If European 
carriers did not enjoy significant monopoly rents in the pre-liberalisation period 
(1980-1990), it is unlikely that more competition will allow them to lower 
prices much in the short run. In that case it would be expected for prices to 
move downwards as efficiencies and costs improved. Thus, potential benefits 
from liberalisation could be primarily realised through increased efficiency. 
Research carried out can be broadly grouped in the following categories, which 
will be analysed more closely below. 
4.2.1 Airline Efficiency 
There have been several studies examining airline efficiencies in a deregulated 
market. Most studies have tried to calibrate the economic performance of 
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European scheduled airlines via an international comparison, the most common 
being with U. S. deregulated airlines. 
Röller and Sickles (1994) use a model of the European airline industry to 
estimate the existing price cost margins and simulate the effect of increased 
competition. Their model uses the carriers home market, as a protected niche 
and an unprotected inter European route market where competition exists to a 
greater extend. 
Their initial hypothesis was that if European carriers do not enjoy significant 
monopoly rents pre-liberalisation, then it is unlikely that more competition will 
allow them to greatly lower prices. They find that with increased competition 
there would be little scope for dramatic decreases in prices, due to long run 
factors such as physical and human capital investments. At the same time they 
identified monopoly power in domestic markets. These results combined with 
European carriers' substantial cost disadvantage against U. S. airlines indicate 
that the benefits of liberalisation will be achieved very gradually only as a 
result of increases in airline efficiencies and the abolition of market niches. 
Further evidence of the effect of these long-run factors is provided by Captain 
(1994) who uses a dynamic industry model to simulate and solve for optimal 
efficient levels in the 1976-1990 period. This approach analyses the long-run 
strategies of the firms and simulates the optimal profit maximising levels for 
different scenarios. Like others he identifies high labour market rents, lack of 
economies of densities, and direct and indirect subsidies to airlines as main 
causes for the inefficiencies and high prices in the European airline industry. 
64 
More specifically, for the European market Stötzer (1989) has investigated the 
combination of efficiency and prices in Europe. Considering that the primary 
condition of neo-classical firm theory dictates that managers will seek to 
maximise their firm's profits, by allocating efficiently the factors of production 
if the input and output prices are determined by competition within the market. 
If competition does not exist, then this will cause managerial collusive 
behaviour leading to the inefficient use of resources, capital and labour and 
resulting in prices above their competitive economic levels. This premise is 
investigated through productivity differences in terms of output per employee 
and prices charged, carried out via comparisons with the U. S. industry. His 
findings are that the marginal price for a statute mile flown in Europe in 
October 1987 is `... about twice the figure for the USA' (206 percent higher), 
and the mean labour productivity of the European scheduled airlines are about 
a third below the mean of their US. counterparts'. 
He also notes that the fare structure encountered during his investigation were 
similar to that of the USA during the regulation era. 
4.2.2 Industry structure 
One different approach investigated frequently in the literature is that of 
modelling the structure of inter European competition under various scenaria. 
Nero (1994) studies the effects of competition within European routes for two 
airlines employing a hub and spoke network operation. He examines a two 
country / two airline model enjoying domestic monopolies and sharing a 
common route between their respective main hubs. The main competition 
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scenaria applied varied from the purely collusive cartel scenario to the 
competitive scenario reflecting a fully liberalised market after 1997. His 
findings suggest that under `the collusion scenario' the domestic segment 
traffic is larger than the hub to hub segment traffic, or conversely, output or 
traffic is more restricted under collusion than it is under monopoly. Also traffic 
connecting domestic periphery cities through the main hub will be better off 
than traffic from domestic point to the foreign hub via the connecting hub. As a 
result, the traffic along the shared route, i. e. intra 
- 
Europe, will be more 
restricted and more expensive. 
Under the `competitive scenario' where the airlines compete on the common 
hub to hub route, the traffic on the intra 
- 
European segment is larger than on 
the domestic segments, and therefore has a lower price. Furthermore, the 
competition on the intra 
- 
European segment will increase traffic in all other 
markets, benefiting all network passengers. This makes intra 
- 
European 
competition necessary, particularly when airlines operate hub and spoke 
networks and of more importance than the encouragement of new entrants. 
In response to the recent trends within the EC airlines to form strategic 
alliances, in lieu of full mergers, it was found in comparison to the 
`competitive scenario' the `merger scenario' does not increase traffic more that 
under the `competitive solution' and poses no threat as it functions similarly to 
the former in the non intra 
- 
Europe market, provided there are sufficient 
increasing returns to density. 
Button (1996) restarts the debate in the U. S. during the early 80s when the 
airlines were suffering big losses by asking the question whether a deregulated 
scheduled aviation market is likely to be viable in the long term or whether it 
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possesses inherent characteristics which when increased competition is applied 
will prove destructive. Citing the examples of the early large losses in the U. S., 
the market concentration which followed it, and the developments in the 
Canadian and Australian markets as unwanted alternatives for Europe, he 
points to the recommendations of the Comite des Sages (1994) as implicitly 
recognising these possibilities. 
The theory of a core proposed is the notion, used to show if competition can be 
unstable and inefficient by not achieving the optimal results. If an empty core 
exists it signifies a lack of competitive equilibrium and an inefficient allocation 
of resources. Testing for an empty core, he concentrates on two types of 
considerations, those of market entry and cost and demand. For the former, 
data relating the share of passengers between city pairs of EU member capitals 
were used to check if collusions in European aviation are due to an empty core 
problem, which were not conclusive. 
For the latter consideration, on the cost side, he evaluates if cost characteristics 
such as increases in marginal costs due to technological restrictions of the 
equipment, or marginal costs rising early before the full aircraft capacity is 
achieved are relevant to the empty core notion. In terms also of economies due 
to traffic densities in hub and spoke networks and the inflexibility such type of 
operations entails, an empty core situation is probable when there is intensive 
equipment utilisation. 
For the demand side, variability in demand negates the gains of competition. 
The methods the airline use in responding to market fluctuations by lowering 
prices to their short run marginal costs creates an empty core because these 
prices are not sufficient to cover the full costs of operating their schedules. 
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The cyclical variations occurring are also consistent with the core hypothesis. 
Although the testing of the indicators of collusive behaviour to predict with 
certainty the existence of an empty core did not provide the sufficient empirical 
evidence it nonetheless remains a useful tool for policy makers in deciding 
where to draw the line between allowed co-operation and unwanted collusion 
between airlines. 
Marin (1995) treats airlines as firms producing a variety of products, with each 
route being a different product. As the cost structures, quality of service and 
the set of products on offer change for each airline firm then the intra route 
heterogeneity (differences) of their characteristics could hold the explanation 
for the different market shares and prices offered. This type of model tries to 
explain the firms' behaviour in the air services market, market demand for their 
product and the corresponding pricing policy. A control group is used so as to 
clearly identify and isolate the effects of the liberal ASAs. In addition to the 
above it takes into consideration the effects of the long term domination by 
incumbents of the airport facilities and other ancillary services i. e. ground 
handling. The introduction of liberal bilateral agreements has given rise to 
increased competition in price and quality from both new entrants and amongst 
incumbents but at the same time greater incentives to improve efficiency have 
also been generated. Hence firms try to increasingly exploit their cost 
advantages arising from areas such as airport facility control, slot rights 
control, CRS ownership / participation, scales of scope and density. Overall, 
this looks quite promising. 
68 
The findings of the model analysis show that during the deregulated period 
there was a lower or negative growth rate of business and leisure fares, on 
routes with less traffic volume where price competition has been less intense, 
market entry has been greater. Flag carriers' market shares on routes with less 
traffic have fallen significantly, while price competition on heavily travelled 
routes has restricted frequency growth as carriers introduce larger aircraft to 
reduce their unit costs. Increases in traffic growth to a greater extent than 
warranted from the population density has been a characteristic of liberalised 
routes. 
Overall, entry and competition follow liberalisation of routes. As a result, firms 
try to exploit their cost advantages and some new competitors have initially 
consolidated their position in a more fragmented market. Emphasising 
perceived and actual market presence and exploitation of incumbency 
advantages is the way flag carriers maintain a high market share. Advertising 
intensity, and changes in strategic policies are also ways used by incumbents to 
ensure a long term market share lead. The liberal bilaterals are able to initially 
achieve greater competition, but on their own are not able to maintain a fully 
competitive environment in the industry as the control or airport facilities and 
services exercised by the incumbents could be enough for preventing the whole 
industry realising its full competitive potential. 
Further evidence on the condition of the barriers to entry and exit of the market 
can be gathered by observing the managerial attitudes. Schnell (2001) observes 
that exit barriers can play a role just as important as entry barriers. Despite the 
lack of empirical evidence in this area and the existence of just a few 
theoretical studies on this subject, he uses a questionnaire sent to a variety of 
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airline managers to canvass their views on the importance and effectiveness of 
exit barriers. 
His findings first of all confirm that exit barriers are indeed present in each 
route exit consideration, irrespective of the scale of this exit. The main factors 
preventing exit are in order of importance: feeding of main routes, exit of 
competitor, and the prospect of improved profitability. These factors in fact 
negate the contestability theory. Contrary to what has been suggested, the 
existence of sunk costs plays no part at all in the exit decision, because 
managers considered them a spent resource. Accordingly, although the 
prospect of paying compensation to laid off employees is considered 
unimportant, the human aspect of the action of making employees redundant 
does play a significant role. The perceived attitude amongst larger airlines is 
that strategic barriers are more effective than small carriers, making them more 
likely to continue serving an under performing route. 
It appears from this survey that some correction of the accepted theory should 
be considered because it has overemphasised sunk cost as important barriers 
while overlooking the interrelationship of routes, an important aspect of any 
network airline operation, as valid and effective exit prohibition. 
4.2.3 Airports and competition 
With air travel market projected to grow at 4 percent a year and with a fully 
deregulated market an era of competition between airports has been introduced. 
The bilateral system of international regulation which allowed the more 
conservative or high cost airlines to prevent any innovation from a dynamic 
70 
airline has had a similar effect on the airports. Airports whose clients were non- 
competing airlines were able to transfer their extra cost onto them with great 
ease. The cosy relationship between airport and client airlines was further 
enhanced by the restrictive slot system, which allowed the airlines to establish 
control of hub airports. For many countries in Europe airport management and 
operation was usually seen as a distant function of a government department, 
rather than the separate major business, which it was becoming. 
With the advent of new entrant low cost airlines who in their efforts to provide 
the cheapest fare to the consumer have kept away of the main airport and their 
high servicing costs and have searched for alternatives where this share could 
be minimised. Although other reasons apart from the high cost of the 
traditional airports were responsible (slot availability, counter space and 
handling) "... about 45 percent of their operations are at airports with no or 
little service by the main line carriers. " (AEA 1999) 
The traffic generated by the low cost new entrants at these underused 
alternative airports has propelled them into very high market share percentages 
for the routes served. 
Barett (2000) studies the economics of competition between airports in Europe 
as a result of airline deregulation. Initially examining the reasons leading to 
airport privatisation in the UK he is critical of the privatisation of BAA as 
single entity, because it placed the airports owned in a non competing 
environment other than through BAA itself. The arguments about the viability 
of building and operating of airports due to economies of scale, offered at the 
time in the White Paper on airport privatisation, are considered debatable and 
questionable in the light of subsequent developments. 
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The quickening of the pace in EU liberalisation has lead to service competition 
between airlines. Falling airline fares have put considerable downward pressure 
on airport charges, which in many cases established airports were not able to 
deliver to their clients. The manner in which the commercialisation and 
privatisation of airports in the UK has been carried out has prevented the full 
competitive forces to prevail. Instead their profitabilities such as BAA's have 
exceeded by almost three times the return on investment of its clients [ Borgo 
and Bull Larsen (1998)]. 
Having looked at airport charges of 37 European airports and the impact of low 
cost carrier operations for the routes used by Ryanair from Ireland and the UK, 
concludes that airport competition is sustainable and is essential to start and 
maintain this latest dramatic stage of deregulation. Provided policy makers do 
not impose artificial restrictions on the growth of these airports the gains to 
passengers from reduced fares, increased choice and better suitability will 
provide a completely deferent environment to the lethargic past. 
Parker (1998) closely studies the performance of BAA before and after 
privatisation. Using a data envelopment analysis (DEA) whereby the relative 
efficiency of a set of decision making units (DMUs) he measures the technical 
efficiency before and after privatisation Although he considers that one 
disadvantage of the DEA method over time is that intend to favour later DMUs 
over earlier DMUs it is likely to be biased in favour of confirming 
improvements. Despite this his results find no evidence that performance 
improved, or that privatisation had any beneficial effects. When he examines 
the performance of individual airports within BAA and compares then with 16 
other independent airports in the UK he finds that with exception of good 
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performance from Heathrow, Glasgow and Edinburgh the under-utilised 
Stansted and Gatwick were poor performers. Additionally he comments that 
Government regulation may distort incentives to be efficient and the 
Government ` golden share' shields BAA's management from the threat of take 
over. 
Berechman and de Wit (1996) also looked at the issue of airport competition 
but from the airline's point of view. Examining data for the five largest western 
European hub airports (Heathrow, Schipol, Brussels, Charles de Gaulle and 
Frankfurt) they assess their potential to become primary getaway hubs, given a 
fully liberalised and competitive market. For a profit maximising airline facing 
potential entry in a competitive environment, a suitable hub airport must be 
selected which will allow it to exploit all of the microeconomic elements of 
airline behaviour under deregulated market conditions. Using a database of 20 
airlines and 26 O-D cities in the 1986-91 period, potential profits were 
calculated for each airport in terms of the airline's output in passengers, 
frequency, and load factor and route fare for each airport case. 
The results obtained showed that London Heathrow followed by Brussels gave 
the highest profit potential and would be the prime candidate for selection. 
Given however Heathrow's lack of runway capacity Brussels is the real choice. 
Frankfurt scored a negative value indicating the large airport charges it 
imposes. Two other scenaria were investigated (ranked third) were lowered by 
60 percent and where Schipol's charges remained 60 percent lower but 
Heathrow's increased by 20 percent. 
In the first scenario, Heathrow still came top, but Schipol beat Brussels into 
second place. Under the last scenario, Schipol came top, Brussels second and 
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Heathrow third. This type of sensitivity test was initiated to try to distinguish if 
the price setting of airport charges is an appropriate mechanism of attracting 
airlines. The results were inconclusive because the sensitivity of the reductions 
seems to be low, causing great difficulty in achieving these high rates of 
discounts. Also, the selection of a primary hub is a combination of many other 
equally important factors, slot availability, runway capacity, location, airport 
quality, availability and cost of labour being some of them. 
4.3 THE EFFECT OF LIBERALISING AIR SERVICES AGREEMENTS (ASAs) 
As seen earlier the gradual relaxation of the regulatory regime within the 
European air transport sector and the introduction of the first liberal bilateral 
agreements, although not centrally orchestrated, on several European air routes 
has been the first important step in European airline deregulation. 
Traditionally, European aviation has been regulated by highly restrictive 
bilateral Air Service Agreements (ASAs). Each route was served by the two 
national carriers of that country and they used to jointly set a single price and 
evenly split the demand. In the absence of entry of any competitors, and with 
capacity and price agreements, competition is not possible and the industry was 
characterised by a lack of incentives to improve the efficiency characteristics 
and consequently the product itself. In addition, generous subsidies received by 
their respective governments meant that costs were being allowed to increase 
inefficiently, sometimes aided by the pressures brought on by powerful 
professional associations. 
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During the eighties, some changes started taking place. Firstly, as the 
disposable income of people grew, there was a boom in the demand for charter 
services (not subject to regulation) which supply holiday routes. Secondly, 
following the passing of the American Airline Deregulation Act, the U. S. 
adopted an 'Open Skies' policy, encouraging competition on domestic and 
international routes, effectively exporting its competitive regime to others 
across the Atlantic. Several European countries had to re-negotiate their own 
ASA with the U. S. as a result. Some European governments followed this 
example for intra-European routes as well. 
In 1984, the UK and Netherlands pioneered the first such liberal bilateral 
agreement; others followed soon afterward e. g. UK-West Germany (1985), 
UK-Belgium (1985) and UK-Ireland (1986). Entry and price reductions were 
now possible, allowing for more competition and causing the first casualties in 
the market. 
This preparatory period was unique for the European market and was an 
example of how an introductory period was introduced to markets of countries 
whose flag carriers felt secure enough to undertake such a change. The 
European Commission cannot take any of the credit for this however as due to 
the fragmented aviation system of Europe it was down to individual countries' 
authorities to try to introduce changes in their respective bilateral treaties. A 
similar period was not possible in the U. S., which decided to introduce 
competition very abruptly. However there was a period from mid 1978 until 
1981 where the forces of competition had not completely taken hold of the 
industry as the airlines needed some time to adjust to the new environment. 
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There was good reason to expect that the introduction of liberal bilateral 
agreements had given rise to greater competition both in price and in quality, 
derived from either new entry or increased price competition amongst the 
incumbent carriers or a combination of both. Furthermore, these agreements 
provided the added incentive for firms to improve efficiency by taking 
advantage of their cost advantages (e. g. lower unit costs and larger economies 
of scope). Alternatively, firms found it more profitable to improve their 
product's perceived quality (usually through advertising campaigns) and, in any 
way to raise barriers to new entrants. Typical examples of such barriers are 
advantages derived from the control of airport facilities, ancillary services, 
computer reservation systems, Frequent Flyer Programmes, advantageous 
allocation of airport slots at their home airports, to name but a few. New 
entrants usually have to penetrate the market if they enjoy a cost advantage, 
such as lower wages, that allow them to offer a lower price. 
Research in this area already carried out by Encaoua (1991) extends earlier 
work carried out by Forsyth, Hill and Trengrove (1986), mentioned earlier here 
and provides strong evidence on firms' differences on cost structure and 
productivity. Evans and Kessides (1993) showed that in the U. S. market intra- 
route firm's differences explain most of the variation in prices set. Here 
evidence of the value of the incumbent's advantages mentioned above can also 
be found. One notable point that also emerges in McGowan and Seabright 
(1989) and Encaoua (1991) is that new entrants pay lower wages because they 
have not suffered from the bargaining power of professional associations under 
the regulatory framework imposed earlier on. 
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In particular Encaoua (1991) tries to explain the difference in attitudes to in- 
creased competition between airlines in Europe, by examining differences in 
costs and global factor productivity amongst European national flag carriers. 
Initially he identifies the pressures that lead to the introduction of change in the 
European regulatory framework: Charter companies using their low fares to 
invade the holiday routes, the export of U. S. domestic deregulation into 
European routes, and the effort by the Commission to introduce flexibility and 
competition in the system. 
For the first time Europe is divided in three zones comprising of the South 
(Spain, Portugal Italy, Greece) the Centre (UK, France, Germany, Benelux) the 
North (Scandinavia), and the type of traffic to each zone is distinguished i. e. 
mainly leisure to the South and business orientated to the North and Centre. 
Airlines from the South who are already in competition with charter carriers 
oppose any possible increase in competition. Added to that is the background 
of these airlines, which are all state, owned and which over the past years have 
been heavily subsidised by their governments leaving them unable to compete 
economically with the others. 
Flag carriers from the North fear full deregulation due to the restructuring of 
the route networks it would bring about, namely the 'hub and spoke' system 
which due to their geographical location would cause the disappearance of 
their own hubs and transform them to 'feeder' or regional carriers from the 
periphery. 
Countries from the Centre are divided. Because of their dense and sophisticated 
surface transportation system which is seen as a sufficiently competitive 
alternative mode of domestic transport they are against domestic deregulation 
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but in favour of moderate and gradual liberalisation on the European level. 
Clearly, this variety of attitudes is underpinned by economic reasons. The 
approach to analyse them is through the examination of differences of costs 
and factor productivity between the carriers. 
He finally concludes that: the starting initial conditions were so remote that the 
European Commission was right in trying to introduce a gradual reform policy. 
It seems that factor productivity trends bring nearer the relative competitivity 
of different European carriers even if important differences in factor prices 
remain. The more flexible and gradual reform policy exercised by the 
Commission has played an important in the process of adjustment. 
4.3.1 The impact of the liberal bilateral routes 
Abbot and Thompson (1991) analyse the impact of the liberal bilateral routes 
by comparing UK routes with a control group where no liberalisation has been 
allowed and finds that the new ASAs have indeed given rise to competition. 
Examples of the leisure product routes, those to Ireland and the Netherlands 
and the fully regulated routes were used for comparisons. In general, however 
they support the hypothesis that the restriction of competition does result in 
loss of benefits to the consumer which could be substantial depending on the 
market. 
Further more absence of entry in predominantly business type routes and 
insignificant fare price changes indicate imperfect competition. The advantages 
conferred to incumbents on these routes such as brand loyalty, Heathrow 
access, and interconnecting networks are mainly responsible for the 
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imperfections in competition, but also suggest advantages from a multilateral 
liberalisation approach. Hence there should be considerable advantage to 
liberalise those currently under restriction. 
4.4 NEW ENTRANTS 
As discussed earlier, Southwest Airlines has been the most successful low-fare 
airline since deregulation. While Southwest gradually expanded its service area 
becoming a "major" airline in 1991 by DOT definitions several other new 
airlines began offering low-fare service. Following a dearth in start-up airlines 
and a recession that dampened air travel demand in the early 1990s, new 
entries surged again. More accurately, out of a total 88 jet operators formed in 
1978,83 failed, and an estimated 164 ` paper airlines' never got off the ground. 
Of those that survived only 26 of them operated for 3 more years. In 
investigating the reasons behind the inability of the new entrants firstly to enter 
and then survive, particularly in the post 1987, post deregulation era, there 
have been two main studies with differing approaches. 
4.4.1 New entrant life cycles 
Rakowski and Bejou (1992) employ life cycle analysis to examine the 
dynamics of competition and of the airline industry in general and how the new 
entrants' life cycles are analogous to that of the biological (birth, growth, 
maturity and death). The paper also identifies a stage coined by Wasson as 
`competitive turbulence' being a period during an increase in consumer 
demand for a service in any deregulated industry. This stage occurs before the 
maturity stage of the life cycle and firms finding themselves in it resort to 
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battles for market shares. The stronger firms survive, entering the maturity 
stage whereas the younger and less experienced firms either merge or fail or go 
directly to the market decline stage. 
The individual milestones of the biological life cycle have been matched with 
the milestone years in the U. S. deregulation period. 
Combining airline data from these years the passage of the major airlines is 
charted through all these stages and a quick evaluation is made as to which way 
they are going. Taking into consideration other exogenous factors such as Hub 
airports, FFPs, and infrastructure constraints, they predict that when the 
industry life cycle reaches full maturity there will be between three to six very 
large nationwide or international carriers, complimented by up to six smaller 
feeders or regional carriers, competing with the large carriers only to small 
extent. 
A different approach is taken by Gudmunsdsson (1998b) by using the actual 
type of airline before 1978 to match it to the appropriate life cycle stage. 
By using a3 dimensional life cycle model the evolution paths of these airlines 
is tracked in terms of revenues generated and profits achieved as they grew 
from a small carrier. Separating the airlines into new entrants, charters, intra- 
state and regionals before 1978 would allow the replication of this 
investigation for the European airlines although because of the later stage of 
liberalisation more data would be needed. Prime examples for this would be 
the cases of Dan Air, Air Europe, Air UK, British Caledonian, Virgin Atlantic, 
and British Midland, as well the latest low cost operators like Ryanair, EasyJet 
and Debonair. 
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The evolution path approach has the advantage of allowing greater flexibility 
than other size classification schemes. The evolutionary path has been divided 
into three distinct phases: the new entrant, the transitional and the interim- 
major phase. 
In the first one containing carriers with low costs and motivated staff, placed 
emphasis on market presence or niches. In the second stage the carriers have 
increased complexity, and as they grow out of their niches, need broader 
market scope, more planning emphasis, and higher systems integration. The 
last stage contains airlines becoming more traditional, focusing on customer 
retention, existing markets, cost and debt reduction as they dissipate their cost 
advantage. 
The research indicates that there are similarities in the characteristics of new 
entrants' evolutionary stages and life cycle phases which where independent of 
geographical location. Beyond that there are significant differences between 
evolution stages. Accordingly, airlines follow the more general life cycle 
patterns of firms in other industries. 
4.4.2 Effects of new entrant entry 
According to the contestability hypothesis the incumbent airlines were the 
possibility of new entry. The impact of a new entrant entering a market has 
been well documented in a variety of studies. In the cases of new entry by 
People Express, between 1984-85 a mean drop of 34 percent in fares has been 
observed. The wave of consolidation that followed severely threatened the 
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existence of such carriers with one notable exception, Southwest Airlines 
(SWA) which has continued to grow constantly. 
The paper by Dresner Lin and Windle (1996) updates past research in this field 
by looking at the economic impact of low cost entry to carriers operating on 
other routes at the airport where entry occurred and on carriers operating on 
other nearby competing airports. 
Using the typical low cost airline SWA they analyse the competitive effects of 
entry onto routes from Baltimore Washington International (BWI) airport. This 
was a significant event as it marked this carrier's entry into the U. S. East Coast 
market for the first time. The adjacent airports to BWI were the capacity 
constrained Washington National (DCA) and the Washington Dulles (IAD). 
The entry of SWA into the BWI 
- 
Cleveland and BWI 
- 
Chicago Midway 
routes yields to fall and passenger traffic to rise dramatically not only on the 
routes that SWA entered but more significantly on competitive routes in 
adjacent airports and on other non SWA routes out of BWI. In fact fares at 
BWI fell by approximately 35-40 percent. The so called `halo' effect was even 
more pronounced if more than one competitive route was served by SW or 
similar airline. The corollary from this confirms that the presence of low cost 
carrier on a route has a positive spill-over effect onto other competitive routes, 
provided that there are alternative airports within close proximity [Greig 
(1987)]. 
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4.5 PRICING OF SERVICES 
Low cost airlines have based their philosophy in providing a `no frills' service 
at extremely low fares. As mentioned earlier executives of low cost carriers 
have been quoted to say that they calculate their highest fare to be not more 
than half of the equivalent main line carrier economy fare. These produce some 
extremely low fares where in some cases if the taxes are deducted only a single 
digit fare remains. These are the fares that are widely advertised in order to 
attract new passengers to these routes. 
The question that arises from this is what happens when traffic grows or during 
peak traffic periods. A study made by Bishop and Thompson (1992) examines 
the decision making process on pricing and the allocation of resources for the 
charter market between UK and Europe. This question is of interest to low cost 
operators because the economics of the two types of air travel are closely 
related. Although UK charter airlines have a majority of routes from the slot 
constrained London airports, low cost airlines have so far operated from 
unconstrained airports. However to a certain degree they use such airports as 
their European destinations. 
Using a peak load pricing method the high demand for air travel can be 
simulated to show the level of fare setting. Factors who will affect this include 
congestion in air space capacity, airport capacity constraints and their 
associated premiums, the direct aircraft operating costs route length and traffic 
density. 
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The results obtained show that charter air fares do reflect the underlined costs 
of different routes and conform to the peak load structure. Increased prices 
during week ends and summer months are typical examples. Fares from 
capacity constrained airports are higher by around 5 percent despite the below 
market airport charge setting applied to UK airports. 
From existing data of the way the low cost airlines set their fares it is obvious 
that they are already conforming to changes in costs and demand. Increasing 
queuing due to delays might have detrimental effects operationally for the 
airline but the fall in service quality should not affect low cost airlines' demand 
to the same extend as for main line carriers. The low fares offered by these 
carriers seems to mimic charter operations where most passengers are less time 
sensitive leisure travellers, have no alternative bookings for the same route and 
their service expectations are lowered by the savings they make. 
Having examined similarities between the low cost carriers and the charter 
sector it is now appropriate to also examine recent trends reported by a number 
of EU airlines. Recent research has indicated that for the first time business 
travellers form a small part of low cost airline passengers. The study by Mason 
(2001) examines whether business travellers using low cost airlines are a 
different market segment than those using mainline carriers or that the low cost 
airlines have captured some of the traditional full fare business travellers. 
The results obtained show that there is no clear cut separation between the two 
market groups. The low cost airline business travellers tend to belong to 
smaller companies, they predominately book their own tickets directly and 
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placed greater importance on punctuality, frequency and price. Main line 
business travellers tend to belong to larger sized companies, booked their 
tickets via a secretary and a travel agent, had mostly never used a low cost 
airline for such a trip but 79 percent of them that business class service did not 
offer value for money on short haul trips, but placed greater importance to 
punctuality, frequency and in-flight level of service. 
Some of the low cost airlines have begun to take account of this type of 
traveller by using business travel sales teams trying to negotiate route deals 
with companies where possible and by offering business lounges for a small 
charge on a `pay as you go concept'. Likewise the network carriers have 
realised that their small and medium sized business travellers are becoming 
increasingly price sensitive and are restructuring a business product for the 
lower end of the market. 
For the low cost airlines the consistent traffic provided by the business traveller 
will be critical in sustaining the traffic levels during the off peak periods, and 
allow the airlines to maintain adequate revenue stream through these periods. 
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5 ECONOMIC FORECASTS AND CHARACTERISTICS 
5.1 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
5.1.1 Forecasts Of The Future 
Within the new economic reality of the 1990s and the new millennium, the air 
transport industry is having to adapt to changes in the economic and socio- 
political environments. Particularly in the U. S. and to a large extend in Europe 
successive governments have shown that they are willing to re-appraise the 
policies under which society's resource allocation decisions are being made. In 
general the role of the state has tended to restrict itself to fewer functions and 
to allow market forces to have much freer rain in many sectors. This, has 
naturally led to states divesting themselves of interest in the national state 
owned airlines and privatising them. Nevertheless in air transport there is a 
long way to go before this becomes the general rule. 
5.1.1.1 World Forecasts 
There are two principal drivers that influence travel demand. Declining airfares 
in real terms (i. e. adjusted for inflation) and impact of increases in economic 
growth. The former factor can be attributable in the major technological 
developments such as the continuously improvements in aircraft productivity. 
At this point however these are mostly historical. Aircraft manufacturers have 
managed to squeeze out as much performance and improvements in operational 
economics out of the current types. Even the new planned super jumbo, 
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estimated to have capacity of at least 550 people will not add a substantial 
increment to what has already been achieved. As the former factor declines in 
the foreseeable future the impact of economic growth will become even more 
important. 
Rengaraju and Arasan (1992) identify two possible methods of air travel 
demand analysis: macroanalysis and microanalysis. The former is concerned 
with system-wide air transportation activities whereas the latter with more 
specific city origin-destination flows. Calderon (1997) follows the widely 
accepted trend to separate the demand drivers into geo-economic factors and 
service related factors. In the literature the consensus is that geo-economic 
factors include commercial, industrial and cultural activities the most important 
of which are income and population. Fridström and Thune-Larsen (1989) and 
Rengaraju and Arasan (1992) agree with this. In Calderon's (1997) model 
demand is directly influenced by: population, income, productive structure, 
distance, relative proximity, fare, frequencies aircraft size and opportunity cost 
to use the best next alternative. 
Holloway (1998) identifies the following macroeconomic variables that affect 
airlines: 
Economic growth as tracked by world GDP trends, trade, and industrial output 
measures. Overall growth in air travel correlated closely with world gross 
domestic product, although air travel shows considerable volatility, but is 
forecasted to remain positive over the next two decades. 
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Economic and industrial structures dictate the nature and direction of traffic 
flows. 
Economic and industrial policies influence the role that governments will play 
in terms of economic restructuring, regulation etc. Currently there is 
considerable optimism in this area as the tendency is for governments to allow 
market forces and the price mechanism to unleash previously suppressed 
demand potential. 
Other economic indicators include inflation, factor prices, exchange rates, 
national foreign indebtedness. 
Capital availability is very important to allow airlines to finance future growth. 
Important in both short and long terms. Recently, because of the industry's 
poor profitability and huge losses in the early 1990's the focus was shifted 
from aircraft financing to airline financing. With the progress of further 
restructuring under way it is foreseen that financing will need to be ` earned' by 
competitive performances in the marketplace. 
According to the Airbus forecast (2000) between 1999 and 2009 world annual 
traffic is due to grow by about 5.2 percent per annum. Growth will slow as 
markets mature, to average 4.6 percent through the following decade, resulting 
in a twenty-year average annual RPK growth of 4.9 percent through to 2019, 
when the airlines will be generating 160 percent more RPKs than today. 
89 
World annual traffic 
- 
trillion RPK 
9 
a 
ICAO traffic his ory ý (4.6% p. a. 
(5.2% p. a. ) 
4 
14.5% p. a. ) 
3 
2 
(6.96 p. a. ) AIrbU projection 
+ 4.88 °% per annum 
(11.2%p. a. ) 
1 
0 
1969 1979 1989 1999 2009 2019 
Source: Airbus GMO (2000) 
Fig. 5.1: World annual traffic trends in RPKs 1967-2017 
Historically, this compares with 11.6 percent for 1967-77,6.9 percent for 
1977-87 and 4.5 percent for 1987-97. On average since 1967 world traffic 
growth has averaged out 8 percent per annum in terms of Revenue Passenger 
Kilometres performed. Driven mainly by continuing economic (GDP) growth 
and reduced fares, passenger traffic (revenue passenger-kilometres) will grow 
at an average annual rate of 5.2 percent during the next ten years. 
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Fig. 5.2: Annual RPK Growth by Region. 
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Fig. 5.3: Travel share of GDP 
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Source: Boeing, CMU 2000 
5.1.1.2 European Forecasts 
Economic growth in Europe is a blend of smaller developing economies and 
larger mature economies. Growth is tempered by slow population growth and 
limited productivity gains in the mature economies. However, a united Europe 
could lead to more fluid labour markets and increased trade. In 1999 the 1.7 
percent increase in passenger-kilometres on intra-European routes translated 
into a growth in passenger numbers of 4.5 percent 
Overall, the 20-year forecast for annual GDP growth is 2.4 percent. Air travel 
on the region's carriers is forecast to grow at 4.5 percent, substantially faster 
than GDP. Fast growth is driven by continued liberalisation of markets. 
There are two reliable sets of data to show the expected growth in European air 
travel, which is shown in Fig. 5.4 below. They show differences in the 
expectations of the forecasters. The first one is from the Boeing Current 
Market Outlook (CMO of 2000). It shows the expected growth from 2000 to 
2009 to average 5.2 percent per year in terms of Billion RPKs. This will mean 
that from today's level there will be 600 billion RPK by 2007,800 billion by 
2013 and 1,000 billion by 2017. Alternatively the second set of data by Airbus 
shows that there will be a much slower growth in RPK, which will start from 
lower levels. Currently, Airbus predicts 300 billion RPK in 2005 rising to 400 
billion by 2012 and reaching 600 billion in 2020. This represents a 
considerably lower level than Boeing's forecast a difference of up to 50 percent 
in 2012-13, which is maintained to 2020. 
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Fig. 5.4 Intra European traffic forecast 
From the above, a disparity is noted between the starting positions of the two 
sets of data. This can be attributed to the fact that the start for the calculation 
was back in 1985 and therefore the projections are ongoing. Hence with the 
passage of time small initial differences in the growth rates for subsequent 
decades, if not corrected, can lead to large deviations after 40 years. Both of 
these forecasts should be assessed against the projections as to how the airport 
and airways infrastructure will be able to accommodate such large increases. 
This will be dealt at a more specific manner in one of the following sections. 
Another question that arises from the forecasts is how much of this traffic will 
be attributable to the already established carriers, how much will be captured 
by the low cost carriers and to what extent the predicted rates will materialise. 
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Summarising the various forecasts in the following table 5.1 it is obvious that 
the consensus is that Europe's traffic will grow by around 5.2 percent in the 
next decade and following that it will slow down to around 5 percent. Hence 
the two decade average will tend to be between 4.8 percent and 5.3 percent per 
annum. 
In both cases it is a quite high rate as the European market is a now maturing 
one. Growth rates like these, which are more prevalent in developing countries 
again, give rise to questions about how the infrastructure will accommodate the 
increases. 
BOEING AIRBUS 
World % World % 
2000-2009 4.7 1999-2009 5.2 
2000-2019 4.8 2009-2019 4.6 
1997-2017 4.8 1999-2019 4.9 
Europe % Europe % 
2000-2009 5.2 1999-2009 5.5 
2000-2019 5.0 2009-2019 5.0 
1997-2017 4.8 1999-2019 5.3 
Source: Boeing and Airbus forecasts, 2000 
Table 5.1 Annual Traffic Growth Rate in RPKs Summary 
Further evidence about the state of traffic is obtained from the IATA using the 
World Air Transport Statistics Series for the appropriate years. For simplicity a 
graph of the growth rates of IATA airlines observed is shown in Fig. 5.5. 
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Apart from 1993 which was still lagging behind the early 1990s recession, 
there were positive years until 1999 which saw a 4.5 percent drop in 
passengers, but over 20 percent drop in Revenue Passenger Kilometers, despite 
the airlines reducing their capacities by over 10 percent. 
Source: IATA Traffic Reports (various years) 
Fig. 5.5: IATA Traffic changes in Europe 1992-99 
But before we proceed to the closer examination of the low cost carriers we 
should check the performance of the established carriers of the EU. In order to 
do this data has been gathered on the airlines belonging to the Association of 
European Airlines (AEA). This association is comprised of all the established 
European flag carriers as well as a number of the largest independent carriers 
in Europe. Their membership in 2000 comprised of 27 carriers almost covering 
an area within Europe including all of Turkey, the USSR (up to 55°E), Iceland, 
the Azores, the Canaries, Madeira, and Cyprus. If low cost carriers are to 
compete within Europe, then these carriers are going to be their main 
competitors. 
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AEA Airlines' Performance on European Services 1987-99 
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Fig. 5.6: AEA Airlines intra European RPK/ASK Summary 
From figures 5.6 and 5.7 the outputs of the AEA airlines are shown for the past 
decade. What is apparent from the two sets of graphs is that up until the late 
1980s they were growing at a faster pace than in the 1990s. It is interesting that 
after the temporary slump in 1990-91 due to the effects of the Gulf War and the 
sharp rise in oil prices, growth did not recover to the same rate as that before 
the recession. Furthermore it is also obvious that there has been a continuous 
divergence between the ATK and RTK lines as well as between the ASK and 
RPK. 
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Fig. 5.7: AEA Airlines intra European RTK/ATK Summary 
This can also be verified by looking at the seat load factor historical data which 
show a sharp drop from a high of 73 percent in 1989 to a low of around 58 
percent in 1991 and 1992. Load factor then rose slightly but then quickly 
reached a plateau of 61 percent between 1995 and 1996. Thereafter it climbed 
to another plateau of 64 percent in 1997 and 1998 and has fallen in 1999. 
Although from Fig 5.8 it can be seen that the AEA carriers seem to be 
dominant in the European market, it will be important to examine in the 
following sections whether there is space for any of the low cost carriers to 
establish themselves and to expand their operations. The areas requiring 
examination will be airport infrastructure, airspace capacity, suitable route 
availability and the possible existence of niche markets where an initial 
operation can be established. 
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European Airline Scheduled Services 
by ASK share from Europe 2000 
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Fig. 5.8: AEA Airlines share of European Traffic 
A similar story of the unprofitability of the airlines is told by their Operating 
Ratios of Fig 5.9 calculated on their international routes, showing that 
collectively they took a long time to get back into profitability after the 
recession of the early 1990s. Apart from the good two years in 1997-98 the rest 
have seen marginal performances. 
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Ooeratina Ratios of AEA Airlines 1990-99 
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Fig. 5.9: Operating Ratios of AEA airlines 1990-99 
On a general note Europe seems to be offering marginal profits for Europe's 
main airlines. The question that arises from all this is naturally whether the 
carriers can improve their profitability. In respect of this, it is either a matter of 
being able to capture a greater market share, or to improve their yields on a 
wider scale than at the moment. Capturing a greater share of the existing or 
even growing market will mean a reduction in fares, which in turn will dilute 
their yield even more. None of the European carriers seem to have been able to 
refine their yield management systems to the extent that the more successful 
U. S. carriers have, although some of the more successful ones are getting 
closer. Other barriers to improvements in profitability seem to be market 
structure related. Europe is still home to 20 airlines that are at least 50 percent 
government owned. State owned airlines; particularly those of southern Europe 
have never operated along the same philosophy as that of a public limited 
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company. Their major shareholder being their own government has meant that 
they tended to have different priorities from privately owned carriers. Suffering 
from what Doganis (2001) describes as a `the distress state airline syndrome', 
they have over the years obtained a series of cash injections or subsidies from 
their governments, (see Fig. 3.1) under the approval of the EU Commission, so 
as to restructure themselves. Nevertheless, radical restructuring was never 
accomplished and most of their management discovered that a fast privatisation 
is not always easy to achieve. Because of their high under-capitalisation and 
accumulated loses they had problems maintaining adequate cash flow levels. 
They were thus prepared to dilute their yields in order to earn revenue and 
market share on routes they served. The overall effect was to depress prices, 
across the European market, particularly in the more price sensitive leisure 
passenger fare classes. High yield business traffic will always form a 
substantial share of operations, but will always prefer airlines with the best 
punctual service, frequent flyer programme and large connected network. 
An analogy could be made that the state owned `distress state airline 
syndrome' airlines were the mirror image of the U. S. airlines operating under 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. They certainly shared several financial 
characteristics like large long-term debts, under-capitalisation, inadequate cash 
flow, and inability to operate as a company seeking to maximise its 
shareholder's wealth. 
Herein lies one of the root causes of European majors maintaining services to 
partly profitable European destinations. Since the beginning of European 
liberalisation in striving to increase international traffic, most of the bigger 
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European airlines have become members of commercial or strategic global 
alliances such as Star Alliance, oneworld, KLM/Northwest and the Qualiflyer 
Group. The aim of the alliances is to provide seamless service between any two 
points in the combined network. Therefore routes between the majors' home 
airport and other European destinations are needed in order to carry connecting 
passengers from long haul services. Historically international and 
intercontinental traffic has been higher yield than intra European traffic, but at 
a more strategic level the latter is almost `a necessary evil'. As the alliances 
have attracted more and more members, competition has shifted away from the 
regional level to the global level. So, for example any intra-European city pair 
between a point and an alliance member home hub could be competing with 
another intra-European city pair that belongs to a competing alliance network. 
In turn, this means that home airports of the bigger European airline partners 
are likely to become more of a connecting hub, feeding traffic between the 
European hinterland and the long haul traffic destinations. The 
PriceWaterhouseCooper Report for the AEA (1998) shows that : 
`... alliances enable airlines to strengthen their network operations and 
compete more effectively at the network level, based on co-operation 
between partners operating in complementary markets. Alliances 
therefore are a substitute for organic growth, enabling airlines to 
extend the reach of their networks'. 
Fears about the anti-competitive potential of certain alliances prompted 
investigations by the EU Commission". Since, airlines 
have for some time 
1' The European Commission launched its investigations of the 
four main alliances in August 1996. 
British Airways (BA) and American Airlines (AA), announced 
in 1996, between Lufthansa, SAS 
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being focusing on the international markets outside European borders they 
have sought to increase their competitive advantage through alliance 
partnerships. If global alliances become more widespread and are truly 
strategic, then, rivalry between network airlines is sometimes the only 
possibility for policy makers. 
The reduction in average cost per passenger that can be obtained when a carrier 
manages to transfer a considerable volume of its passengers through a 
connecting hub means that either competition between carriers on a network 
level should be encouraged or a reduction in possible O-D city pair routes 
should be accepted. The economies of scale that accrue from networks can 
sometimes mean that even if there is an alternative point to point carrier with 
direct service, the fare will be substantially higher than that for a connecting 
service through a hub. Alternatively, in the absence of interconnecting 
passenger traffic, there would not be enough point-to-point traffic to support 
many lower volume transatlantic routes. In practice, these routes can only be 
operated by carriers as part of more substantial networks, which generate 
sufficient feeder traffic to make the routes viable. 
5.2 CAPACITY PROVISION ANALYSIS 
European airlines, particularly the flag carriers, due to their historical 
background have always been less dominant in their main airports. Unlike their 
American counterparts who in the pre-deregulation days identified strongly 
and United Airlines, as part of the Star Alliance, launched in 1997, the inclusion of British Midland, 
in the Star alliance. The Commission announced its proposed conditions for approving the BA/AA 
and Lufthansa/SAS/United alliances in Official Journal, C239/5,30 July 1998. 
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with particular geographical regions of the country (due to the old mail contract 
routes), European airlines were never in such a strong monopolistic position at 
the home airport. The main difference has been that only a few of the East 
Coast and West Coast airports in the U. S. were actual international gateways 
(i. e. JFK, Newark, LAX, SFO) where non-U. S. airlines were landing with 
international traffic rights. All the others only accepted domestic traffic. United 
Airways, the world's biggest airline (outside the USSR), was a purely domestic 
carrier until the sale of Pan Am's Pacific Division. On the other hand, due to 
the regulatory regime that prevailed since the war, the exchange of bilateral 
rights in Europe, created airports with a combination of domestic and 
international routes served by many foreign airlines with a few services a day 
in the best case. The home carriers in turn had to spread their capacity across 
their entire destination network, which included domestic, intra-European and 
intercontinental services, bilaterally accepting reciprocal flights from these 
destinations. Therefore the home carrier's share was diluted. 
5.2.1 Airspace Capacity 
This, being the quantity of aircraft able to be accommodated in space and time, 
varies greatly across the EU countries as well as across the different types of 
airspace available. Currently the European air traffic system is so fragmented 
that it consists of: 49 European control centres, 31 national systems, 18 
suppliers of system hardware, 22 computer operating systems and 30 
programming languages [AEA (2000)]. 
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At the airport level where the capacity shortfalls are measured, year after year 
delays are becoming the norm. During the last year there were 8 EU airports 
with percentages of flights departing later than 15 minutes were between 30 
percent and 36.6 percent. Thirteen of the airports on the AEA list had a delay 
rate (intra-European departures delayed more than 15 minutes) worse than the 
overall average for the year of 25.5 percent. That was actually an improvement 
on the previous year! Figure 5.10 in the next page indicates clearly the scale of 
the problems stored up for the future. 
The problem of airspace capacity naturally is pan European and as a result 
requires a pan European solution. The rationalisation needed will mean that in 
the short term greater Industry stakeholders particularly supported the idea of a 
more collaborative approach in seeking ways to accommodate demand in a 
sustainable way. 
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European ATC Capacity Deficiency 
45000 
40000 
35000 
30000 
25000 
20000 
15000 
Q 
10000 
5000 
0 
40 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
D 
10 
5v 
0 
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
I iTotal Annual accomodated movements ATM+Airports (thousands) 
=Total Annual unconstrained movements (thousands) 
-Total Annual unaccomodated movements as a% of total annual unconstrained movement, 
Source: ECAC 
- 
Eurocontrol 2000 
Fig. 5.10 European ATC capacity Deficiencies 
The present level of co-operation might not be sufficient to enable future 
challenges to be met successfully. In the longer term a more strategic approach 
is needed whereby specific national issues are not put up as barriers to further 
development. In view of the continuing impasse on airspace reform during the 
last few years, Eurocontrol has become much more interventionist on 
demanding deadlines for the implementation of new standards and technical 
specifications. 
The graph in fig 5.11 was part of a study by ECAC-Eurocontrol (2000) aimed 
to `... provide a broad "what-if' picture of when and where in the ECAC area, 
growth may become seriously constrained by capacity limits in ATM and at 
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airports. ' It shows clearly the shortfall between demand and capacity and that 
significant problems start appearing around 2005. The declining growth rate of 
the combined airport and ATM network effect indicates that only an integrated 
airspace solution will be acceptable. 
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Fig. 5.11 European ATC flow problems 
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5.2.2 Airport Capacity 
The capacity of an airport is expressed and can be limited by two parts: air 
traffic movements and terminal passenger numbers. The critical factors 
limiting the airports' capacity can vary from one to another, depending on 
many factors, for example: the season, the week or even the weather 
conditions. Although one would expect an airport to be largely dependent on 
how many aircraft can be accommodated per unit of time it has been known for 
relatively minor factors such as the capacity of the immigrations hall to cause 
major disruption. Achieving the maximum air traffic movement possible is 
dependent not only on the airport infrastructure but also in the surrounding air 
traffic environment's ability to feed aircraft into the airport efficiently. The 
process of European liberalisation and the competitive forces it has introduced 
has forced airlines to put more emphasis on higher levels of service, which 
means more frequencies and hence a more intensive use of airport resources 
and infrastructure. 
With the growth of air travel access rights held over many decades were 
unlikely to be surrendered but frequencies were increased. The rights to arrive 
and depart at an airport, commonly known as slots, in the latter years have 
become scarcer as well as a precious commodity, for the airlines. Several 
airports are co-ordinated by trying to limit the number of available slots to 
balance the most restrictive constraint. 
5.2.2.1 United States 
In the U. S. market the same problem of chronic congestion at a variety of 
regional hubs has been encountered. Administrative measures have been 
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adopted, such as hourly quotas limiting airline use of high-demand airports. 
However, these administrative remedies have had the unintended effect of 
presenting other obstacles to airline entry and competition. The air traffic 
control system-administered by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA)-being under public ownership cannot respond to marketplace 
demands. Without this freedom, constraints on the supply of airports and 
navigable air space have increased, and their adverse effects have been 
magnified. TRB 
- 
NRC Report (1999) supported the view of pricing the use of 
airways and airports as the most suitable approach for achieving these 
outcomes, and probably the only long-term solution to ensuring efficient use 
and supply of this vital infrastructure. Setting fees that reflect the true marginal 
cost of using congested airports during high-demand periods would encourage 
those peak users who place the lowest value on flying during these periods to 
either shift to off-peak times or to nearby secondary airports. The traditional 
landing fee has been based on an aircraft's weight, which mainly affects 
runway wear, but has not reflected the use of congested infrastructure at high- 
demand periods. 
A further development has been the application of `Airport Perimeter Rules'. 
These are Federal and local rules that limit long-haul flights to and from three 
major U. S. airports-Washington Reagan National, New York LaGuardia, and 
Dallas Love Field. The rules no longer serve their original purpose and have 
produced too many adverse and anti competitive side effects. 
Originally, the FAA imposed slot controls in the 1981 air traffic controllers 
strike at National, LaGuardia, JFK, O'Hare and 18 other congested airports. 
During this period, FAA allowed airlines to trade, buy, and sell slots in order to 
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maintain networks and ensure efficient use. Slots at the 18 airports were 
removed in 1984, but bolstered by this experience, the FAA allowed slot sales 
at the four original and continuing slot-controlled airports, beginning in 1985. 
In adopting the "buy/sell" rule, FAA explicitly acknowledged that scarce slots 
had become valuable assets to airlines. Although the slots remained under 
federal ownership they have never been recalled. One of the reasons for the 
high demand for slots is the economic value of the higher price-inelastic, 
business traffic that is made possible by having these key airports in their 
networks. At the initial sale the FAA allowed the `grandfather' use of the slots 
to airlines that held them at the time of the rulemaking, only withholding a 
small number to reallocate among new entrants. Despite included "use or lose" 
provisions and antitrust enforcement it did not stop airlines using slots as a 
defensive mechanism. The effects of slot controls on airlines have avoided the 
shifting of an increased share of slots to larger commercial aircraft, which carry 
the majority of air travellers. It has encouraged the hoarding of these assets, on 
a hub as well as on a regional level, by incumbents to restrict entry and 
expansion by rivals, preventing development of large hub and spoke network, 
at popular airports for business travellers, who are the type of passengers 
willing to pay the higher fares to use convenient airports. This is also reflected 
in the high prices paid by airlines for jet slots-often exceeding $1 million at 
popular hubs. Concentration of slots among a few major carriers simply might 
reflect more efficient usage but there will be reduced scope for new hub 
creation and new entry at any slot constrained airport because any new entrant 
would wish to quickly establish a sizeable scale of operation, made impossible 
by slot limitations. Also, the nature of pricing of the slots actually make them 
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more valuable to their owners in order to stop an unwanted competitor entering 
than to the new entrant in order to open a new destination. 
5.2.2.2 European Union 
In Europe as a result of a different historical background and recent 
legislation18 in most European airports slot allocation is carried out by an 
airport committee which `... as the competent authority determines the capacity 
available for slot allocation twice yearly in co-operation with representatives of 
air traffic control, customs and immigration authorities and air carriers using 
the airport and/or their representative organisations and the airport co- 
ordinator, according to commonly recognised methods. ' 
Slots may be freely exchanged between air carriers or transferred by an air 
carrier from one route, or type of service, to another, by mutual agreement or 
as a result of a total or partial take-over or unilaterally. Any such exchanges or 
transfers should be transparent. However, analysts have for a long time 
suspected that slot trading or `slot bartering' has been taking place, indirectly 
under `silent agreements' between airlines at particular congested airports. 
Similarly to the U. S. system there are clauses whereby, a pool shall be set up 
for each co-ordinated period containing new and unused slots, together with 
slots which have been given up by a carrier to be reallocated. 50 percent of 
them are offered to new entrants and new services and the rest to other 
applicants. 
18 Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of 
slots at Community airports and Official Journal L 014,22/01/1993 pp. 1- 6 
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Additionally a `use-it-or-lose-it' philosophy is applied with a usage threshold 
of 80% as in the U. S. In many cases the role of the co-ordinator of slot 
allocation is taken up by either the regulatory authority of the country 
concerned, usually a government agency or by the airport authority, which 
might also be state owned. In the many cases where the national carrier is also 
state owned then a conflict of interest may arise as to the implementation of the 
EUC policy. By the end of 2000,23 European airports will have been 
designated as fully co-ordinated according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 
95/93 investigated by the EUC report (2000). 
The European regulatory authorities have resisted any attempts to allow any 
major changes by introducing market practices in the form of even limited slot 
trading. They do not consider the marketplace as an efficient way to allocate 
scarce resources. Consequently, from a variety of data it appears that the 
airlines are doing exactly what their U. S. counterparts did after deregulation. 
They have recognised from an early stage that slots are valuable assets, which 
will increase in value with time. As the congestion becomes worse and because 
of the political costs involved in the building of more runway capacity, airport 
slots are increasingly becoming rare. New slots are not likely to materialise in 
quantity so, the airlines have to use their existing portfolios of slots to 
introduce new and extra services. Slots used on secondary airports or by 
franchisee operators can be transferred to the main carrier when necessary. 
CAA (2000a) data shows that at London's main airports UK scheduled 
operators are spreading their services so as to capture as much airport capacity 
as is possible. The evidence is shown by the very gradual rate of increase of the 
ratio of passengers per aircraft movement. The implication of this is that 
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mainline carriers are not increasing the average aircraft size and instead prefer 
to increase frequencies at a congested airport so as to maintain a higher slot 
share as possible to themselves. 
Passenners oer Air Movement at London's Ainoorts 
-*-UK Operators Scheduled fUK Operators Non Scheduled -9&-Total 
120 
110 
100 
90 
80- 
4) 70 
0 2 60 
ä 50 
x ä 4030 
20 
10 
0 
C 
C' 'CCCO ý°j0ý 
C 
Ce 
e 
ý°ýý 
C°oý 
ql; O Ci ß°'4b re 
Source: CAA Airport and Airline data (various years) 
Fig. 5.12: Aircraft and passenger usage at London's Airports 
Conversely, the charter operators are actually shown to have increased the 
passenger density in their aircraft movements, despite being historically 
operators of high density aircraft and high load factor services. It seems that the 
charter airlines are making more efficient use of scarce slot resources, despite 
the fact that a large volume of slots is required during the summer-time 
package holiday season, which is historically a very busy period for airports. 
Some infrastructure upgrade is under way and is being planned for the future. 
Between 1998 and 2010,4 new airports have been planned in Oslo (1998), 
Athens (2001), Berlin (2007) and Lisbon (2008). Also, during the same period 
there are plans for 15 new runways to be built around Europe [ECAC (1998)]. 
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5.3 MARKET ANALYSIS 
New carriers are adding new routes, developing low fare structures in many 
parts of Europe. Larger carriers are developing hubs with waves of regional 
departures. Both schedule and price effects should drive traffic gains. In 
addition, parts of Europe do not travel as much as their incomes would imply. 
Some of this behaviour is cultural, especially in southern Europe, where people 
tend to vacation with their families in the local countryside or drive to other 
locations within Europe. 
In the summer 1999 timetable, AEA airlines performed 68.3 percent of all 
cross-border seat-km in Europe. Of the rest, by far the largest proportion, 18.1 
percent, was operated by charter airlines; the so-called `low-fare' carriers 
offered 3.9 percent of the total capacity. The remaining 9.7 percent was a 
mixture of non-AEA national and other mainline carriers, and regional airlines. 
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Fig. 5.13: Shares of European market by airline type 
Combining scheduled and non-scheduled service, European airlines fly over 
half of their traffic within Europe and to short-haul markets in the Middle East 
and North Africa. Increasingly, the leisure airlines of Europe are listing their 
flights as scheduled. Low-cost carriers also increasingly fly within Europe with 
smaller jets, mainly by the Boeing 737. The expected increase in low cost 
carriers using smaller 737-300/400 sized aircraft, independent of the mainline 
carriers will avoid the restrictive scope clauses of the U. S. affiliated regional 
airlines, which limit the wider use of regional jets. 
As connecting hubs are generally much less developed than in the United 
States due to population distribution, slot limitations will result in more hub 
bypass and point-to-point services. It is possible that due to the market 
fragmentation the established airlines could gradually re-align their marketing 
towards international oriented routes and allow space for the routes that low 
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cost carriers would be more suitable to operate. Some signs have already been 
seen with BA's divestment of its involvement in GO, the low cost subsidiary 
which was recently sold off. BA made a tactical decision to re-align its product 
more towards the higher yield passenger. Naturally, this would be a gradual 
process, and it is possible that some of the ailing south European airlines, if 
restructured, could take advantage of their lower costs to become part of a two 
tier market. 
The possibility also exists that provided the European Single Market does 
begin to work as an integrated market with a single currency, true labour 
mobility, free access to information and devoid of localised protective national 
laws then in due course infra-European to long haul traffic could be carried by 
3 to 4 large carriers, or carrier groupings. This tier would include most regional 
carriers who would either become aligned to the main carriers or be wholly 
owned subsidiaries. Their role would be to provide feed traffic to the main 
airline hub airports and could also be used as a marketing tool to open up low 
density routes with low risk for their parent company. It should not be expected 
for the main carriers to follow the example set by the U. S. counterparts in 
trying to combat the spread of low cost operators by starting up their own in- 
house low cost subsidiaries. This will only cause problems for their overall 
structure. 
This role should be left for the lower tier airlines from which could evolve a 
low cost market sector which would carry leisure and V. F. R. (visiting friends 
and relatives) traffic to the secondary or smaller regional airports of Europe at 
lower fares. As Southwest has proven, by providing proper attention to this 
market segment there is no reason to suggest that the low cost market should 
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also be a low quality market. The opportunities exist for this segment to grow 
considerably to similar levels as in the U. S. 
Finally, in this scenario the charter companies will mostly maintain their 
existing mode of operation, possibly by making their product more flexible and 
with wider variety in order to satisfy the current trend for more self catering 
accommodation and exotic holiday locations. 
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6 MODELLING A LOW COST CARRIER 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
For the purposes of this research it was necessary to examine the costs 
involved behind an airline operation. At the time of researching for this thesis, 
the European liberalisation had already been initiated in the late 1980s and by 
the end of 1992 the legislation achieving full liberalisation of the scheduled air 
transport services was complete. However unlike the United States there was a 
lag between that date and any real developments. 
During the first five years, not forgetting that recovery from deep recession 
was also taking place, there was some restructuring in capacity. In the low cost 
sector there were a handful airlines like Dan-Air and Air Europe in the UK 
which used to provide a mix of scheduled and charter services. Both these 
airlines did not survive the recession and failed in late 1992 and 1991, 
respectively. In Europe the carriers that provided lower cost travel but were 
still in the same operating mode as the main carriers were independently owned 
airlines like TAT, Air Liberte, AOM, AirOne, Spanair, and City Jet of Ireland. 
There were also two other carriers who rose out of the ashes of ILG's (Air 
Europe's holding company) original European network, Air Europa in Spain 
and Air Europe SpA in Italy. After ILG's demise they were taken over by local 
investors but retained the original name and livery. Both of them are now 
operating a mix of European or long haul charter and domestic scheduled 
services. Until October 1995 Europe's airlines had experimented with a variety 
of small changes in routes, but had decided not to take full advantage of the 
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opportunities offered to them by full liberalisation. Overall the main benefits of 
the liberalisation were mostly felt in the local domestic markets where new 
entrants started challenging the monopoly of the domestic operators. 
The main development on an intra-Europe basis which formed the beginning of 
what is now known as the `low cost no frill sector' was the emergence of 
Ryanair in 1991. Ryanair was established in Dublin since 1985 as a competitor 
to Aer Lingus, serving the Ireland-UK market with a mixed fleet of turboprop 
and jet aircraft. In 1991 after losing money, it re-invented itself as a low cost- 
no frills operator, flying an all Boeing 737-200 fleet, imitating the model of 
Southwest airlines. In October 1995 easyJet and Debonair were established in 
London Luton airport. From these two only easyJet offered the same type of 
low cost service as Ryanair. More recently British Airways tried to purchase 
easyJet but when that failed decided to establish a wholly owned subsidiary, 
GO airlines at Stansted, which was to operate on the same philosophy as 
Ryanair and easyJet. This move was seen as a cynical attempt by BA to use its 
superior financial strength to put the two Luton airlines out of business, or to 
get slots at Stansted with a view to future expansion. KLM, whose subsidiary 
KLMuk was also based in Stansted decided in 1999 to merge out of KLMuk a 
similar airline, renamed `buzz'. 
6.2 METHODOLOGY 
In order to find a way to project this type of operation it was necessary to 
model a typical low cost airline. Low cost airlines are known to operate a 
single type of aircraft, or in some cases sub types of the same model. Ryanair 
for example uses an all B737-200 fleet which is now being upgraded to an all 
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B737-800 fleet. easyJet similarly is using only B737-300/700s, and Go an all 
B737-300 fleet. 
For the purpose of simulation cost data were required from real airlines. 
Unfortunately this is a commercially sensitive area for which even historical 
data are very difficult to be obtained prior to publication in IATA / ICAO 
surveys. Therefore our own model was built up using relationships already 
known from real airline operations' parameters and other data widely available. 
It was considered that the most important cost area to focus would be the 
Direct Operating Costs (DOCs). Any advantage that these new airlines would 
have over the established carriers would be in this area. So starting with a 
lower cost base, if they could maintain it, would allow them to offer truly lower 
fares and remain profitable at the same time. 
Using this model it was possible to obtain approximations for the DIRECT 
OPERATING COST of particular aircraft types based on a nominal stage 
length. Having obtained that, we then calculated other parameters such as total 
sector costs, total seat kilometre costs and total direct operating costs per block 
hour. 
These results would then be applied to a number of European city pairs, hence 
building up a potential network of costed routes on which the airlines could 
operate if they so wished. 
All other things being equal, an airline operation can be simulated with 
reference to other factors such as schedule information, traffic capacity and 
available seating capacity. One area where again it was difficult to get a true 
value for our simulation was the approximation of landing and ground handling 
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costs. Again it is a known fact that the low cost airlines are very adept at 
extracting very beneficial rates from the secondary airports they serve. The 
offer of the possibility of achieving a scheduled jet service with the associated 
traffic and revenue it brings to the airport and the local economy are a powerful 
incentive and the airport operators agree to lowering their airport charges. 
However once the introductory period of the initial contract expires or requires 
renewal then airport operators are very likely to want to raise their charges to 
more realistic levels. In this case, part of the cost advantage of the low cost 
carrier is eroded. It will be interesting to see in the long term whether this trend 
can be resisted by the carriers. 
6.3 DESCRIPTION OF MODEL PARTS AND THEIR FUNCTION. 
This simulation is based in 3 parts. First is the main part which aims to provide 
a way to calculate the Direct Operating Costs of a typical low cost airline. 
Under the DOC category, a wide range of costs can be included [Jenkinson, 
Simpkin, Rhodes (1999)]. Usually, standardised DOC methods of calculation 
can be broadly covered under four main groups. 
Standing charges. Charges usually not directly dependent on aircraft 
flight. Depreciation of the capital investment, interest charges on capital 
employed, aircraft insurance. 
Maintenance costs. Can be expressed as total maintenance cost and 
include all maintenance on airframes and engines plus the maintenance 
burden, being the charge to cover the overhead costs of providing 
maintenance on an hourly basis. 
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Flight costs. All costs directly relevant to the aircraft flight. Crew costs, 
fuel and oil consumption, landing and navigational charges. 
In these cost categories their constituent parts are possible to be derived from a 
variety of known aircraft or operating parameters. Therefore here below is a 
list of the expressions used in our model simulation. The starting point is the 
selection of an aircraft type and a nominal sector length. Here this was the 
Boeing 737-300 and a 1,000 mile sector. For establishing the relationships 
between the various parameters the costing formulae of the Association of 
European Airlines was also taken into account, but efforts have been made to 
adapt and simplify it, where necessary, to fit the current low cost carrier 
characteristics. 
6.3.1 Operational Calculations 
Parameter Name Calculation 
Stage length, km Stag =sect * 1.852 
Block fuel, lb Blkf =fucon * 2.205 * blkt 
Block time, hr Blkt Derived from schedule data (*) 
Utilisation, sector/yr Util =3750 / (blkt+0.5) 
Fuel price, $/U. S. gal Fupr 0.85 (World Average for 2000) 
Number of seats Nsea (As per type 
, 
intra-Europe avg. ) 
Seat Load Factor SLF 0.75 
No. of engines NE As per aircraft specifications 
C1 C_1 =1.27-0.2 * BPR A 0.2 
C2 C2 =0.4 * (OAP/20) ^ 1.3+0.4 
C3 C_3 =0.032 * NC + 0.57 
The stage length is the sector length in kilometres. Block fuel is expressed as a 
function of block time and fuel consumption. Fuel consumption figures 
published in Flight International aircraft surveys have been used. 
An expression for block time is derived from aircraft schedules on a variety of 
routes, using the OAG timetables. A detailed explanation of the derivation of 
the block analysis data is given in section on Route Survey Description below. 
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The fuel is calculated using the data for actual fuel consumption in kg/hr from 
aircraft and airline data surveys available from associated organisations (Flight 
International, ATA, AEA). This is converted into block fuel by simply 
multiplying it with the block time. 
Fuel price is the world average for 2000, the number of seats are the actual 
seating configuration in a one class high density seating. Seat load factor is the 
number of seats actually occupied in flight expressed as a percentage of the full 
amount of seats in the aircraft. Low cost carriers tend to operated their aircraft 
with seat load factors at least in the 75 to 85 percent region. 
Cl, C2 and C3 are engine parameters referring to the mass airflow speed at 
various points of the engine. BPR is the engine by-pass ratio and OAP is the 
engine overall pressure ratio, calculated between the entry and exit of the 
compressor. 
Utilisation of aircraft in sectors flown per year is a function of block time and 
the mode of Operations involved in. For Short Haul operations 3750 hours per 
year is used compared with 4800 hrs per year for long haul operations. 
6.3.2 Technical Characteristics 
The Manufacturers Empty Weight has been taken as the operational empty 
weight. Data referring to aircraft or engine specifications have been checked 
from the appropriate Jane's All the World's Aircraft and Engines Yearbook. 
Prices of aircraft and engines have been checked from either Avmark Aviation 
Economist Jet Values or Airline Business surveys or the Lloyds Aviation 
Aircraft Types and Price Guidelines. Where a spread of values was given, then 
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a two third point value is selected. This is done in order to represent both the 
carriers that use new bought aircraft, as well as those using older second hand 
equipment. 
List Of Technical Characteristics In Model 
Parameter Name Calculation 
Engine weight, kg WE As per engine specifications 
Engine price $U. S. Mill ENP As per manufacturer price list 
By Pass Ratio BPR As per engine specifications 
S. L. stat. thrust, t SLS As per engine specifications 
Overall Pressure Ratio OAP As per engine specifications 
No. compressor stages NC As per engine specifications 
Max. TOW, t MTO As per aircraft specifications 
Manuf. Weight Empty, t MWE As per engine specifications 
A'c price, $U. S. M MSP As per manufacturer specifications 
Labour rate, $/hr LR 66 
Tot. Inves't $U. S. M TI =MSP+0.1*(MSP-NE*ENP)+0.3*NE*ENP 
Airframe weight, t AFW =MWE-NE*WE/1000 
6.3.3 Individual Shares of DOC Calculation 
The parameters used for the model calculation are shown overleaf together 
with the formulae used to calculated them. As data for the parameters were not 
directly available, approximations had to be used. This was accomplished by 
using relationships describing the required variables in parametric form. 
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Parameter Calculation 
Depreciation =Tl*1000000/20/util 
Interest =50000*Tl/util 
Insurance =6000*MSP/util 
Cockpit crew =460*blkt 
Cabin crew =60*INT(nsea/35+0.5)*blkt 
Landing fees =10.6*MTO 
Navigation charges =0.5*stag*SQRT(MTO/50) 
Airframe maintenance =(0.09*AFW+6.7-350 / (AFW+75)) * 
(0.8+0.68*(blkt-0.25)) * LR + (MSP-NE*ENP) 
(4.2+2.2 * (blkt-0.25)) 
Engine maintenance =NE*(0.21*C_1*C_3*(1+SLS)^0.4*LR+ 
2.56*(1+SLS)^0.8*C_1 *(C 2+C_3))*(blkt+1.05) 
Fuel costs =fupr*blkf/fden 
Total sector costs =SUM(C17: C26) 
Total seat km costs = 100* Total sector costs /stag/nsea 
Total seat mile costs =100* Total sector costs /sect/nsea 
Total Direct Cost 
Per block hour $ = Total sector costs /blkt 
Depreciation is a function of the utilisation rate and the time span of the 
aircraft. Usually the accounting practice is to depreciate the aircraft over 20-25 
years, but here 20 is taken as the standard. 
Total Investment (TI) is the sum of the Aircraft Price (MSP), Airframe spares, 
and the spare Propulsion Units (ENP, NE). The Airframe spares holding is 
calculated based on the scale of the airframe as attested by the size of the 
engine, hence the two engine parameters. 
Interest and insurance are dependent on the price of the aircraft and its 
utilisation. Cockpit and cabin crew are paid according to the hours flown and 
the amount of passengers dictates the number of the cabin crew required. 
Landing fees are expressed in terms of the aircraft weight. In this area however 
there have been numerous developments on pricing policy. Several airports 
have added passenger duties and environmental charges. Therefore as the study 
by the Cranfield University Air Transport Group for the AEA (1998) 
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concluded there is lack of conformity in the way charges are applied across 
Europe's main airports. For our calculations therefore we have taken the 
average cost per tonne of the aircraft related movement charges. 
The two person cockpit crew are assumed at $460/block hour each, based on 
the average remuneration package offered by a typical low cost airline in 2000. 
This was compared with the amount of aircraft hours the aircraft is flown, and 
the number of pilots employed by the airline taken from the CAA Statistics 
(2000b), thus deducing the number of hours each pilot flies (between 240 and 
340 hours per year). Navigational charges are dependent on the stage length 
and the aircraft weight. 
Airframe maintenance is a function of the flight time, (although by more recent 
trends it is flight cycle related), the airframe weight and the manufacturer's 
empty weight. The amount of flying the aircraft does and the level of 
complexity of the aircraft are also the main factors in the estimation of the cost 
of maintenance. Correspondingly, the type and complexity of the engine as 
well as its size, denoted by the Thrust rating, number of engines of the aircraft, 
number of stages and the corresponding airflow speeds through them are the 
main factors in estimating the cost of engine maintenance. 
Fuel costs are simply price per gallon per fuel consumed per block hour, 
adjusted for the fuel density of Jet A kerosene. 
Secondly, the results on the cost of operating as an airline are applied to a 
selected route network, using a variety of city pairs within Europe. Therefore 
the cost across the network is obtained. Hence, the total operating costs were 
formed using data about the ratio of Direct to Indirect costs from 4 UK airlines 
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representing each of the market segments. The data were obtained from the 
latest CAA annual surveys of Airline Operating Statistics. The airlines chosen 
where British Midland, easyJet, KLMuk and Monarch. Each airline represents 
individual market segments. The established independent carrier with a wide 
European network, the low cost carrier, the regional short haul feeder and the 
established charter airline respectively. 
6.3.4 Simulation model description 
The main aim of this simulation is to provide a way of evaluating the Direct 
Operational Cost of operating an airline schedule. This was undertaken by 
focusing on the aircraft type as this is the common denominator in any airline 
operation. Other items common to all airlines are landing charges, navigational 
charges, cockpit and cabin crew salaries, aircraft depreciation, interest on 
capital employed and maintenance of airframe and engines. The last two items 
are possible to be subcontracted to a third party supplier but will nevertheless 
feature as costs in the airlines' balance sheet. 
All airlines have also to deal with Indirect Operating Costs (IOC). IOCs are 
costs that are not directly attributable to the costs of flying operations, or to any 
specific aircraft type been operated by the airline. Instead, they are associated 
with all the functions supporting flying operations and therefore are not 
dependent on the amount of flying accomplished. 
They usually include items such as ground property and equipment, 
development and pre-operating costs, flight crew training, handling charges 
and parking fees, passenger embarkation fees and insurance, sales, 
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reservations, advertising and promotion, commissions, general and 
administrative station costs and passenger services. There are several standard 
methods of estimating, allocating and accounting for DOCs and IOCs, most 
notable been those of Boeing, the U. S. CAB/FAA and the UK Civil Aviation 
Authority. 
Airlines have the flexibility to allocate these costs according to their 
accounting practice and therefore there is some variety as to under which 
heading each cost will be categorised. Nevertheless for the purposes of this 
research the categorisation in the airline surveys of the CAA will be followed 
and the above headings will be considered as indirect costs. The DOC is 
usually expressed either as the cost per seat kilometre or per mile flown. 
When all the parameters and values have been inserted into the formulae a 
result for the total cost of this aircraft flying the sector (total sector cost) is 
derived in U. S. dollars. From that value the total seat kilometre cost is 
produced in terms of U. S. cents. Further results can be obtained for the total 
seat mile cost and the total direct cost per block hour, expressed in U. S. dollars. 
Further to obtaining these values, shares of each item as a percentage of the 
total sector costs are obtained and shown. This is useful as it can indicate 
differences in the economic characteristics between various types of aircraft. 
Additionally, a comparison can be made for the same type of aircraft operating 
in a different country or region i. e. Europe, USA, etc. 
The total seat kilometre cost is then used in the tabulation of the 253 routes 
surveyed within Europe, details of which are described in the section below. In 
the route survey tabulation the initial value of the total seat kilometre cost is 
apportioned to each particular route sector length, giving a particular DOC per 
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seat kilometre for each individual route. As a result of the route survey the 
block times for each route have already been found and tabulated. The DOC 
per block hour, can be calculated by multiplying the DOC per seat kilometre 
with the number of aircraft seats available, the sector distance and divided by 
the block time. This should give a value of thousands U. S. dollars. Finally the 
direct trip cost is calculated as being the DOC per block hour times the block 
time. 
At this point we have already found the cost of operating a particular aircraft 
type across a series of European routes, based on the expenses required for the 
aircraft flight. In this amount no account has been taken of the cost involved in 
all the supporting functions within the airline that operates this aircraft and 
which have to be recouped from the operational revenue of the aircraft, if the 
airline intends to break even. In other words all the Indirect Operational Costs 
have to be amortised in the overall flying operations. For this reason Indirect 
Operational Costs are expressed as a percentage of the airlines' Total 
Operating Expenses. 
The level of Indirect Operating Costs are largely depended on the type of 
operation the airline performs and its characteristics. There is therefore great 
variety of this percentage share across the airlines. For the low cost airline 
sector in the UK the corresponding figures vary from between 47.89 percent 
and 65.92 percent. In comparison the integrated chartered airlines vary from 
between 27 percent to 53.14 percent, whereas the established carriers vary 
from between 48.54 percent and 63.17 percent, as shown in Table 6.1. 
Because of the wide disparity of these figures it was decided to create 
representative costs for each airline type. This has the added advantage of 
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showing the difference in costs attributed to the type of market segment each 
carrier is operating in. 
IOC Share of costs % DOC share of costs 
Established carriers 
British Airways 59.00% 41.00% 
Virgin 48.54% 51.46% 
bmi 63.17% 36.83% 
Franchise carriers 
GB AIRWAYS 49.66% 50.34% 
Brymon 56.46% 43.54% 
City Flyer Express 52.17% 47.83% 
Low cost 
EasyJet 47.89% 52.11% 
Go Fly 54.56% 45.44% 
KLM uk 65.92% 34.08% 
Integrated operators 
Monarch 41.31% 58.69% 
Airtours 53.14% 46.86% 
Air 2000 44.04% 55.96% 
Britannia 48.52% 51.48% 
Caledonian 36.56% 63.44% 
JMC 26.86% 73.14% 
Source: Compiledfrom CAA UK Airlines Statistics, 2000 
Table 6.1 Comparison of costs for UK airline market segments 
As mentioned earlier the airlines selected were bmi, easyJet, KLMuk and 
Monarch, each representing a particular market segment. 
This was done by firstly calculating the breakdown between IOC and DOC for 
each airline and then applying it to the specific aircraft type, for each individual 
route. The values obtained showed the total trip cost for a specific aircraft type 
for every one of the 253 routes and the 43 short haul routes surveyed. This 
provided a wealth of city pair routes, each one costed according to a particular 
airline and a particular aircraft type of this airline, so that in the following 
module of schedule formulation it would allow the choice of any particular 
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route or set of routes for which costing information would be readily 
available19 
6.3.5 Route survey description 
A survey of 253 routes within Europe was carried out, the distances between 
city pairs were measured and tabulated together with the estimated block times 
required as obtained from schedule data. A further survey of 42 short haul 
routes (less than 1500kms) was also undertaken to better clarify this segment. 
In the tabulation the Direct Operating Cost per block hour and the Direct Trip 
Cost were also calculated for each city pair. 
An examination of the way the airlines schedule their services was carried out 
in order to find out the true flight times. It has been found that, particularly on 
short haul routes of less that 1200 km there is an overestimation on behalf of 
the airlines of the scheduled block time required. Block times sometimes varied 
between the outbound and inbound trips. This could be attributed either to 
operational reasons such as unfavourable routings (more circuitous route) on 
one leg or to congestion problems at the away airport. 
`Schedule Padding' as this practice is called is encountered in short sectors 
where the actual flight time is a smaller proportion of the total flight time. 
Furthermore as more and more airlines oriented towards the business passenger 
and focus on punctuality performance, they overstate the block time so as to 
achieve on-time flights despite delays on the ground at congested airports. 
Some low cost airlines have chosen to avoid congested airports and fly instead 
19 All aircraft and route data and results from this section are contained in file FLEET2DD. xls 
supplied on disk. 
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to empty secondary airports enabling them to maintain a 20 to 30 minute 
turnaround on the away landing. 
A relationship between the distance and actual scheduled block time was 
obtained and fed back into the parameters of the original simulation. 
Differentiation between all routes and short haul routes was necessary in order 
examine the short haul sector to more accurate level. The benefit was to obtain 
an improved correlation between the block speeds and sector distance for stage 
lengths less than 1,000 km. So, for all the routes the relationship between block 
time and stage length was found to be : 
Block Time = 0.0011165808 x stage length + 0.612331570 
R2=0.97068 
For short haul routes the relationship between block time and stage length was 
found to be: 
Block Time = 0.0013590695 x stage length + 0.496454844 
R 2= 0.80487 
The corresponding relationships for the block speeds were: 
Block Speed = 164.29966 x Ln (stage length) 
- 
613.90220 
R2=0.92129 
For short haul routes the relationship between block speed and stage length was 
found to be: 
Block Speed = 20.601 x (0.4743 x stage length) 
R 2= 0.9252 
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This effect can be seen from Figs. 6.1,6.2 and 6.3 where the amount of 
`padding' is also shown graphically as 32 minutes 29 seconds for all routes (30 
minutes and 33 seconds for the short haul routes). As mentioned earlier the 
developed relationships form the block analysis in this section were used in the 
formulation of the block times. 
6.3.6 Schedule formulation 
6.3.6.1 Low cost operation mode 
In this section after having chosen the type of operation preferable i. e. the low 
cost carrier type of economics, a small scale operation was set up in order to 
discover the total schedule costs behind it, as well as to simulate the early 
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stages of a new carriers' operational start up. In the schedule'20 destinations 
similar to those used in real life were considered and the simulation was 
undertaken with a variety of initial fleet numbers. Two particular scenaria were 
used: the high frequency, point to point, fast turnaround mode favoured by 
easyJet and Ryanair and the more European business and leisure orientated 
mode mix adopted by British Midland. The former is a5 aircraft 10 destination 
schedule and the latter is a6 aircraft 
-6 destination schedule. Turnaround times 
of between 20 and 30 minutes were used as much as possible to minimise the 
utilisation and increase the productivity of the operation. In both cases efforts 
were made to achieve the highest number of trips per day with the minimum 
amount of aircraft. 
For the low cost scenario, the mode of operation is one whereby each aircraft 
starts the day at the home airport and flies as many sectors a day on a 
maximum 30 minute turnaround at both ends of the sector. The selection of 
destinations was aimed to attract a mix of leisure and business passengers 
although the bias is definitely towards the leisure market segment. All daytime 
destinations are short haul with a maximum flying time of under 2 hours. This 
enables the operator to fly several rotations daily, particularly on the routes 
which have been identified as important. Experience in the U. S. and the 
European markets have shown that once low cost operators have identified 
suitable markets, they enter them at a fairly high frequency level in order to 
establish their market share quickly. 
20 All data and schedules are contained in file Schedules. xls contained in disk provided 
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In real life easyJet as a start-up carrier entered the domestic market to Scotland 
with 5 daily frequencies each to Glasgow and Edinburgh; it also flew 3 daily 
return trips to Aberdeen and Nice as well as 4 return trips to Amsterdam. 
However, initially it only flew once daily to Barcelona which is a5 hour round 
trip. 
This has been replicated as much as possible by providing four daily 
frequencies each to Paris, Dublin, Frankfurt and Amsterdam. London to Nice, 
Larnaka, Athens and Lisbon are once daily. It can be seen that these three 
destinations are leisure destinations which involve overnight flights. The 
choice was made in order to maintain a high utilisation rate, taking advantage 
of the long night hours as well as the fact that none of these airports have night 
time curfews. The distance of particularly the two Mediterranean routes are 
ideally suited to operating the aircraft on a pair of the longest intra European 
routes from London, during the night period which naturally has very little 
passenger appeal. In the schedule the departure times from London are 
reasonable times, and compare directly with those flown by real life scheduled 
airlines from London Heathrow. The arrival times back to London have the 
advantage of allowing the passengers to have a full day ahead of them. At the 
same time the aircraft is back in position ready to start another day's flying. 
From the daily utilisation table it can be seen that the two aircraft, numbers 5 
and 2, involved in the trips to Athens and Larnaka have the highest utilisation 
score, 18 and 16.6 hours, respectively. In general, utilisation varies from 9 
hours 20 minutes to 18 hours and 50 minutes, the fleet average being nearly 14 
hours. 
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6.3.6.2 European short haul type operations mode 
This schedule is based on the type of operation of a short haul European airline 
that is focused on a balanced mix of business and leisure passengers. It could 
be a similar type of airline as British Midland (bmi) which flies to most 
European capitals carrying business passengers at the beginning and end of the 
day, and leisure passengers in the rest of the day. bmi is a partner in one of the 
biggest alliances, the Star Alliance and has close links with SAS and most of 
its European flights are on a code share with Lufthansa, Scandinavian and 
United Airlines, all being major partners in the same alliance. Therefore it has 
to provide a connecting service to business passengers originating within the 
partner's networks as well as leisure destinations for its own passengers. A 30 
minute turnaround is scheduled although this is up to one and a half hour 
longer for the real airline. Another factor which can not be avoided is the time 
difference between the UK and continental Europe which loses an hour on the 
outbound trip. 
In order to satisfy both the business and leisure criteria, a schedule has been 
created focusing on frequent service to six major European capitals which have 
a dense enough traffic pattern to support several daily frequencies of both 
business and leisure passengers. In order to keep the number of aircraft to six, 
Dublin was not given more that two daily trips, so as to maintain a high 
frequency in all the other destinations. Because of the business traffic 
constraint, effort has been made to provide greater choice by having at least 2 
frequencies in the morning periods. Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Copenhagen 
and Frankfurt all achieve this before midday. To a lesser extend the same has 
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been aimed at during the evenings, to cater for the returning business 
passenger. In the case of Copenhagen, because of the distance, night curfew at 
London and the time difference it was not achievable, so the aircraft stays there 
overnight. Having aircraft staying overnight away from the base is common 
practice for network carriers as it allows them to have aircraft in place for the 
early morning rotation to begin. 
During the middle part of the day frequencies are allocated according to 
aircraft availability, with the general aim being to build up frequencies by as 
much as possible. Dublin leisure traffic is therefore catered in this section as 
well as during the return in the evening 
. 
Overall with this schedule, 6 return trips per day to Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt 
are achieved, 4 to Amsterdam and Copenhagen and 2 to Dublin. Daily 
utilisation varies between 9 hours 20 minutes and 13 hours 20 minutes, with a 
fleet average of 11 hours 10 minutes. The current average for the short haul 
fleet of a large European network carrier is 6 to 7 hours, while bmi's latest data 
published indicate an average figure of between 7.5 and 8.5 hours per day. 
6.3.6.3 Schedule costing 
This section is aimed at providing the full information on the airline's complete 
scheduled operations. All the operational information achieved from the 
schedule is concentrated to give the full picture and to show to the managers a 
quick picture as to the profitability of each route. 
In this stage the data from the schedules above are tabulated in such a way as to 
provide a summary of the block times, daily round trips and the passenger 
carried in each rotation. The fare charged is also applied to the traffic carried 
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and a complete breakdown of both total revenue and total expense is obtained. 
Finally, the profit or loss made on each route is shown together with the net 
margin. 
Several schedule costings were created for the Boeing 737-300 and 737-400 
and for the Airbus A320 and A321, to show which type is the more profitable 
on each type of operation. At this stage we depart from the assumption of the 
setting up of the cost model that all aircraft are filled up to a Load Factor of 75 
percent, but in order to show the differences in the airline operation the real 
load factors and seating densities are applied. So for a low cost operator a seat 
load factor of 80 percent is used and for the short haul operator bmi's most 
recent load factor of 61.3 percent. 
In order to have a complete picture of this operation the question is asked what 
would be the equivalent figure if a different airline was operating this schedule. 
This question is posed so as to examine the effect of applying the fully 
allocated Indirect and Direct Operating Costs from a different airline. Hence 
the schedules were first tested for all Airbus and Boeing aircraft using easyJet's 
cost breakdowns, then using bmi's cost breakdowns and finally an Airbus A 
320 and A321 using Monarch's cost breakdowns. 
6.3.7 Fares 
In this section a survey of the fares charged by airlines was done for the 
corresponding destinations present. Here, using the two internet reservations 
companies Travelocity. co. uk and Expedia. com the lowest excursonary 
restricted fares for the city pairs were taken and used as a sample of the level of 
low cost fare system available in Europe by the established airlines. Fares were 
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for travel taking place between the 13/3/2001 and 21/3/2001 period including a 
Saturday overnight stay. The tickets are booked on 14 days minimum in 
advance and direct flights only are considered unless no direct connection was 
possible. Survey date was 27/2/2001 and airport and passenger taxes were not 
included in the fares. Currently these are the usual restrictions applied to the 
cheapest fares for passengers flying on non 
- 
low cost carriers. 
The above are not comparable to the fare levels charged by Southwest an other 
U. S. low cost carriers. Historically, fare levels for the U. S. majors have been 
lower per mile than for Europe, and Southwest's are considerably lower than 
the major's. Nevertheless it will be a useful indication to the kind of discipline 
in maintaining a low cost base required if the aircraft are to be operated 
profitably with this kind of revenue stream. In Europe, as in many other 
countries the airlines have made their profits from the business traffic they 
have carried. Consequently, an opportunity always existed to add leisure 
passengers in tourist class without compromising their high yield traffic. In a 
low cost fare situation demand is generated only by the attractiveness of low 
fares and the operator does not have the high yield passengers to boost revenue 
and profits. Fares on low cost carriers usually have fewer restrictions and are 
mostly quoted on a one way basis, two one ways making up a return ticket. The 
aim here was to show the lowest fare that is currently available, despite the 
restrictions imposed. Currently easyJet states that they calculate their 
maximum fares to be half of the lowest full-unrestricted economy fare 
available by the price leader (usually BA in the UK). Sample fares for a variety 
of destinations flown by low cost carriers are shown : 
139 
LONDON To: O. W. 4 O. W. <- Average RETURN 
ABERDEEN £ 24.50 
- 
44.50 £ 35 
- 
50 £35 
- 
80 
AMSTERDAM £ 29.50 
- 
34.50 £ 28.50 
- 
60 £30 
- 
50 
ATHENS £44.50 
- 
54.50 £ 40.50 
- 
60 £ 30-70 
BARCELONA £ 44.50 
- 
54.50 £ 50 
- 
70 £ 50 
-120 
FARO £ 34 
-154 £ 34 -154 £ 190 
GENEVA £29.50 
- 
34.50 £ 72 
-122 £ 40 - 90 
GLASGOW £22.50 
- 
74.50 £ 30 
- 
40 £ 25 
- 
60 
HELSINKI £90 £90 £170 
IBIZA £ 39 
-186 £ 39 -186 £ 172 
INVERNESS £ 34.50 £ 50 
- 
60 £ 25-50 
LYON £80 £80 £130 
MADRID £44.50 
- 
54.50 39.9 
- 
59 £ 35-40 
NICE £160.50 £ 35 
- 
59 £ 25-60 
PALMA £ 84.50 
-114.50 £ 70 - 89 £ 60-70 
REYKJAVIK £59 
-159 159 -159 £220 
TOULOUSE £130 £130 £140 
ZURICH £ 29.50 
- 
44.50 £ 41 
- 
72 £ 35 
-120 
Source: Compiled from individual airline data, 2001 
Table 6.2 Low cost fares from London for Spring 2001 
Additionally, for comparison purposes it was decided to include in the 
simulation an airline operation based on the economics of British Midland. 
British Midland is the largest independent scheduled airline in the UK and has 
the second highest amount of slots at London's Heathrow airport. It specialises 
in providing high quality business traffic to domestic and intra-European 
destinations as well as catering for leisure traffic on its network. It was chosen 
as an example of an efficient short haul airline with a good control of its costs 
which serves most of Europe's major airports. As British Midland relies on 
business traffic for a large part of its revenue it would be inaccurate to compare 
its revenue with a low cost model. Hence, a survey was undertaken to show the 
corresponding business fares that would be chargeable to its business 
passengers. For the simulation it was assumed that business class and economy 
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traffic account for 25 percent and 75 percent respectively of passengers on each 
flight. This level is representative of actual demand on a typical European route 
between major cities. 
Further surveys were carried out to establish the fares offered by the low cost 
carriers. These carriers usually advertise their lowest fares in the form of one 
way fares. They usually are as low as £4 each way plus taxes. Prices like that 
are however misleading as there are only very few seats available at these fares 
and they have to be booked long in advance, particularly during busy summer 
periods. 
In order to further investigate this tendency, a full search was undertaken for 
each fare class to each destination, for all UK low cost carriers. Fares quoted 
were for travel taking place between the 23/7/2001 and 31/7/2001 period 
including a Saturday overnight stay. The tickets are booked on 14 days 
minimum in advance for midweek travel. 
The fares survey across different companies has revealed that there is a variety 
in sophistication of the fare setting policy. The fully flexible fares reach up to 
20 times the lowest advertised fare. This leads us to believe that low cost 
carriers actually use an in house yield management system. This in turn means 
that the more experienced airlines' internal revenue and yield management 
systems are now able to adequately distinguish between their passengers in 
order to maximise their revenues. In examining the fare classes present the 
level of sophistication of the systems varied. The simplest found was that of 
`buzz' and GO using linear fare relationships, whereas those of easyJet and 
Ryanair used non-linear functions. It is therefore logical to assume that the two 
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older airlines have had more time to adapt their booking system to their 
individual market needs. 
Due to the increasing trend of internet bookings, which all the low cost carriers 
are encouraging, the passenger himself who is now the person booking the 
tickets, will encounter an increasingly complicated fare structure. In one case 
an airline had up to 8 different fare classes for the same destination. Although 
this compares well with the established airlines who have up to 50 different 
fare classes for the same trip the low cost carrier philosophy should include 
simplicity of fare setting. 
Unlike Southwest, the European low cost carriers are actively trying to attract 
the price sensitive business passenger, but at the same time they try to 
segregate him from their standard leisure passenger. This aim leads them to 
develop this extended fare structure. Ryanair usually quotes the lowest 
minimum fare for most of the destinations it operates. It should be noted 
however that the fares quoted are not inclusive of taxes and other charges. If 
taxes are included then, in some cases, the fare could actually double. Buzz, 
easyJet and Go in contrast quote for an all inclusive fare. In general their fares 
are similar, although GO's are slightly lower. 
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Minimum Return Fare index with distance 
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Fig. 6.4 Low cost fares in Europe 
6.3.8 Comparison of results 
The results of the simulation are summarised below. Firstly the data for the low 
cost mode schedule are shown. The annual number of passengers carried, the 
net profit margins and the average break even load factor have been calculated 
for this particular schedule. 
In these estimations two sets of fares have been used. For the low cost carriers 
the average fares quoted for travel between the various UK companies are 
used. For each route the fare charged by an airline actually flying this route 
was used. For low cost carriers the average was calculated from airline data 
from the range of the lowest advertised fare with restrictions to the highest non 
restricted fare. In the case where the airline did not state restrictions for its 
fares but only a price then the average was taken for ranges of fares for periods 
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of travel spread over several weeks, in order to represent the effect of 
increasing value for travel at short notice. The only route to which a low cost 
carrier doesn't operate was London to Larnaka. For this a simple fare-distance 
relationship was used from an existing low cost carrier to provide a fare 
reasonable for the type of destination. These low cost fares were also applied to 
the charter carrier as no direct fare information was available for seat only 
flights. The other type of fare applied to the European short haul carrier was 
the lowest restricted fare with a2 week advance booking as described earlier. 
The annual passengers carried are calculated based on the total daily number 
projected to a full year (360 days). The schedule net margin has been 
calculated based on the ratio of the total network profit or loss to the total daily 
costs. The average break even load factor is the combined average of all the 
breakeven load factors for each individual route in the network. Individual 
break even load factors for each route have been calculated based on the ratio 
between the Operating Cost multiplied by the Revenue Passenger Kilometers 
to the Operating Revenue multiplied by the Available Seat Kilometers. This 
ratio takes into account the characteristics of each route in terms of its potential 
for profitability at the current fare levels. 
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6.3.8.1 The low cost schedule 
Summaries of the results obtained are shown in Table 6.3. 
LOW COST CARRIER TYPE OPERATION 
Yearly passengers 
AIRLINE TYPE AIRCRAFT TYPE carried 
SCHEDULE 
NET MARGIN 
Average Break 
Even Load 
Factor 
Low Cost B 737-300 2,042,640 30.60% 71.41% 
B 737-400 2,319,120 28.73% 71.82% 
A 320-200 2,543,616 25.79% 67.65% 
A 321-200 3,065,760 46.27% 63.68% 
European Short 
Haul B 737-300 1,203,120 15.35% 56.26% 
B 737-400 1,458,720 20.33% 53.43% 
A 320-200 1,583,280 40.63% 46.24% 
A 321-200 1,904,400 34.74% 48.13% 
Charter A 320-200 2,457,360 65.45% 54.59% 
A 321-200 2,965,680 59.60% 56.54% 
Table 6.3 Low cost results comparison 
As expected the passengers carried annually increased with increase in aircraft 
size. If similar aircraft types are compared across different operation modes 
then the low cost operator carries 69.8 percent more passengers (B737-300), 59 
percent more (B737-400), 60.6 percent more (A320) and 61 percent more 
(A321). Comparing with the charter carrier with the low cost carrier the latter 
is enplaning 3.5 and 3.4 percent more on the A 320 and A321 respectively. 
In general, the schedule net margins of the low cost carrier are higher than for 
the European short haul carrier and lower of the charter carrier. Variations exist 
across the different aircraft types due to their different operating economics. 
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Net margin varied with aircraft size increase for same manufacturer aircraft, 
the exception being the European short haul carrier's A321. 
There is a discontinuity when changing from the Boeing 737-400 to the Airbus 
A320. It could be explained by the fact that the Airbus is operated with 184 
seats compared to 168 seats of the 737-400, a9 percent difference and yet the 
A320 at 73.5 tonnes is 17 percent heavier than the 737-400. Furthermore the 
type of powerplant might play a significant role. Both the 737 series and the 
A320 are powered by CFM engines, the former by the CFM 56-3 and the latter 
by the CFM 56-5. Although both engines are of the same core, they have 
different thrust ratings and the sub model powering the A320 is a later more 
refined derivative development of the -3 model. The best schedule net margin 
achieved for the low cost carrier is by the A321, by the A320 for the short haul 
European carrier and the A 320 for the charter carrier. 
The European short haul carrier in general, achieves lower net margins than the 
low cost carrier. European operators tend to configure their aircraft with a 
lower seating density and fly with lower seat load factors, consequently 
suffering reduction in passenger numbers enplaned. However this is 
counterbalanced by the benefits of mixing business traffic with leisure. The 
737-400 had been the mainstay of bmi's European fleet, although now it is re- 
equipping with an all Airbus fleet to increase its capacity. In general the A320 
is a very widely used aircraft on intra European operations. 
The average break even load factor broadly remains constant for the low cost 
carrier with increased aircraft size, but declines for the european short haul and 
charter carriers. This is the expected result as with a higher capacity aircraft 
proportionally more passengers are needed to achieve break even. The Airbus 
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of the European short haul carrier is the exception, as B. E. Load Factor is 
slightly higher for the A321. The best breakeven load factors are achieved by 
the A321 for the low cost carrier, the A320 for the short haul European carrier 
and the A320 for the charter carrier. 
As a result of the different type of operations the European short haul carrier 
suffers a cost disadvantage on the net schedule margin over the low cost carrier 
which varies between 8 points to 15 points. The exception to the rule is the 
A320, which has a better net margin to that of the low cost carrier by nearly 15 
percentage points. 
No calculations for the 737 series of aircraft were undertaken for the charter 
segment as most operators have now outgrown this size and their smallest 
aircraft for short to medium haul operations is a combination of the A320 and 
the A321. For the charter carrier schedule net margins between 65 percent and 
60 percent were obtained with an associated break even load factor of 54.6 
percent and 56.6 percent. The calculated cost difference on the net schedule 
margin with respect to the low cost carrier is 39.7 and 13.3 percent for the 
A320 and A321 respectively in favour of the charter carrier. The corresponding 
differences on breakeven load factor are 13.1 and 7.1 points lower than the low 
cost carrier. The results obtained here are over optimistic as in reality most 
charter airlines have break even factors above 80 percent or in the low 90 
percent region. They also operate on much smaller margins that those obtained 
here. The explanation lies in the nature of the business of the integrated charter 
operator. 
The charter airlines usually fly on behalf of a tour operator they are paid 
directly by the tour operator who fills up their capacity en block. Therefore 
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they receive a far lower payment per passenger than the minimum restricted 
fare quoted by scheduled airlines in Europe. Obtaining data on the level of 
these payments is almost impossible. They can afford to reduce their revenue 
because their indirect costs are low since most of the reservations, advertising 
and other non core functions are carried out by the tour operator and because 
they fly more efficient operations. In our results the calculation for the charter 
operators were carried out using the same fares as those charged by the low 
cost carriers. However this is misleading because although the fares might be 
similar, the revenue is collected by the tour operator, so there is no way of 
knowing the actual amount reaching the airline. In reality they would be much 
lower. 
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6.3.8.2 The European high frequency schedule 
Summaries of the results obtained are shown in Table 6.4. 
EUROPEAN HIGH FREQUENCY TYPE OPERATION 
Yearly 
passengers SCHEDULE 
AIRLINE TYPE AIRCRAFT TYPE carried NET MARGIN 
Average 
Break Even 
Load Factor 
Low Cost B 737-300 2,299,680 36.96 71.13 
B 737-400 2,610,720 32.40 73.58 
A 320-200 2,859,840 58.80 61.35 
A 321-200 3,450,960 52.80 63.76 
European Short 
Haul 
B 737-300 1,356,480 19.73 53.52 
B 737-400 1,642,320 27.92 49.21 
A 320-200 1,784,160 52.27 41.31 
A 321-200 2,143,440 45.72 43.17 
Charter A 320-200 2,766,240 71.57 54.93 
A 321-200 3,337,920 65.09 57.09 
Table 6.4 European High Frequency results comparison 
Increasing the aircraft size of the low cost carrier's B737-300, there are 
increases in passengers enplaned of 13.5 percent, 9.5 percent and 20.7 percent. 
Similarly for the European short haul carrier the corresponding increases are 21 
percent, 8.6 percent and 20.1 percent. For the charter carrier when changing to 
the A321 from the A320 there is an increase of 20.7 percent. 
If similar aircraft types are compared across different operation modes then the 
low cost operator carries 69.5 percent more passengers (B737-300), 59 percent 
more (B737-400), 60.3 percent more (A320) and 61 percent more (A321). In 
149 
comparison with the charter carrier the low cost carrier is enplaning 3.3 percent 
more passengers on both the A320 and A321. 
Net margins start from nearly 36.9 percent for the B737-300 to the highest of 
58.7 percent for the A 320 of the low cost carrier. Break even load factor in 
general follows the trend of increasing with aircraft size increases. The best net 
margin and break even load factor are achieved by the A320 and A321 
respectively. 
The European short haul carrier's net margins are broadly in line with the 
previous findings. The B737-300 produces a low margin, at 19.7 percent but as 
the size is increased it changes to a maximum of 52 percent for the A 320. 
With further size increase to the A 321 the net margin is reduced to 45.7 
percent. This is a similar observation to the low cost carrier mode where the 
A321 suffered a reduction. As in the previous mode the best break even factor 
is also observed for the same aircraft type, the A321, at 43.2 percent, However 
the margin and the breakeven load factor here are lower respectively. As 
before, the best net margin and breakeven load factor is achieved by the A320 
and A321 respectively. 
The charter carrier achieves net margins higher than the low cost carrier with 
breakeven load factors of 71.6 and 65.1 percent. As already explained, the net 
margins and break even factors achieved are very optimistic, since in our 
model it was impossible to have accurate data for the revenue a charter 
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company obtains from the tour operator for its flying operations. Consequently 
the breakeven load factor is also very low, as in reality it would be expected to 
be in the region of 80 to 85 percent. Despite this apparent inaccuracy the 
results clearly show the potential for low cost travel that the charter carrier has. 
6.3.9 Sensitivities of Net Margin Variation 
Having established a working model of the different types of schedules for the 
three separate market segments it is important to understand how this model 
responds to changes in the operating environment. For this reason it is 
necessary to calibrate this model according to its various parameters. The 
important parameters that are changeable are the seat load factor, and number 
of daily trips or frequencies. By varying these in turn for each aircraft type, 
changes in the schedule net margin will be observed and from this a better 
understanding of the underlying trends can be established. Furthermore 
evidence about the number of passengers carried on each schedule can be 
obtained, which will become useful in the later stage. The average breakeven 
load factor is not dependent on variation of the seat load factor but on the 
operating revenue, the operating expenses, the Revenue Passenger Kilometers 
and the Available Seat Kilometers and for this reason it has not been tracked in 
this part of the analysis. 
6.3.9.1 The low cost schedule 
The seat load factor was reduced from 15 points above to 20 points below the 
nominal level. This was carried out for each of the three market segments. For 
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each change in seat load factor the number of annual passengers and the 
schedule net margins for all aircraft types were tracked and tabulated. The 
results are shown in Fig. 6.5 overleaf. 
From a general examination it is apparent that results for the types are closely 
grouped. The short haul European types are concentrated towards the lower 
part of the analysis graph. The low cost mode aircraft are predominantly in the 
middle region and the top is taken up by the charter mode types. Comparing 
the three groups, it is evident from the relevant gradients of the lines obtained 
that the low cost types exhibit a lesser sensitivity to the variation in seat load 
factor than the short haul and charter types. 
This is further demonstrated by the fact that initially in the lower seat load 
factors the european short haul grouping, as a whole, achieved lower net 
margins (negative) than the low cost group. However around the 10 points less 
than the nominal L. F. its A320 and A321 start overtaking the low cost A320 
and 737-300. Examining the short haul group, the 737-300 crosses the 
borderline between a positive and negative net margin at 5 points less nominal 
load factor. 
The other types of this group are slightly better in that respect, with the best 
performer being the A320 which remains in positive net margins until just 
before 20 points lower than the nominal. 
The differences between types of the same group seem to be amplified in this 
type of schedule mode. 
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Whereas the two Airbus aircraft are close together they are considerably ahead 
of the Boeing aircraft; more specifically, the A320 is 20 and 25 points from the 
737-400 and 
-300 respectively and the A321 is 14 and 19 points respectively, 
as measured at the nominal load factor. Within this group there is slight 
divergence across the variation range. Between the lowest two types the 
divergence starts at a difference between the 737-300 and the 737-400 of 3.3 
points at 20 points less nominal load factor and reaches 5.8 points at 15 points 
plus nominal load factor. 
The low cost group achieve a net margin spread of 57 points (737-300) 56.4 
points (737-400), 43.7 points (A320) and 64 points (A321) across the variation 
range. In this schedule mode the A321 outperforms the smaller A320. For this 
group there is slight divergence between the A321 and the rest of the types. 
The 737-300/400 and the A320 are very close together, with the A320 lagging 
slightly. All the other types are almost equally spread. The A321 is the first 
type of this group to maintain a positive net margin across the variation range 
examined. 
Finally, the charter group outperforms the other two groups. The charter group 
achieves net margins spread of 74 (A320) and 71.3 points (A321) across the 
variation range. The A320 within this group performs better than the A321, but 
only by 5.8 points, which remains within a close area throughout the range. 
Both these aircraft provide the maximum of net margin of 22.7 and 18.4 
percent at 20 points below of nominal load factor. 
Comparing the same types of the low cost group with the charter group it is 
found that at nominal load factors the differences are 13.3 points for the A321 
and 39.7 for the A320. The reason for the low result for the A320 is that is the 
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lowest performer in the low cost group whereas the low cost A321 is the 
highest and has the better difference. Generally, taking the differences between 
the two closest types of the two groups it is shown that the low cost carrier has 
operating economics superior to the European short haul carrier and slightly 
inferior to those of the charter. However considering that the real results for the 
charter obtained were expected to be much lower, then the low cost carrier has 
the potential to be the best performer of all the groups. 
6.3.9.2 The European high frequency schedule 
The seat load factor was reduced by from +15 points, to 
-20 points of the 
nominal level as before. This was carried out for each of the three market 
segments. For each change in seat load factor the number of annual passengers 
and the schedule net margins for all aircraft types were tracked and tabulated. 
The results in Fig. 6.6 show the performance of each aircraft type in terms of 
how profitably it can be operated with reduced seat load factors. In general the 
737-300 and 737-400 aircraft in the European short haul operation exhibit the 
lowest variation of net margins with changes in the seat load factor. The next 
best group is the aircraft in the low cost operation and the highest are the 
charter mode aircraft. Across the variation limits examined, all the Euro short 
haul Boeing types showed a negative schedule net margin. 
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The aircraft in low cost operation are the less sensitive aircraft in changes to 
the load factor, as evidenced from the shallower gradient of their lines. 
European mode Boeing types are separated from the Airbus types by a constant 
margin from each other, as the aircraft size increases. The 737-300 has a 
margin difference between itself and the first Airbus in that group, across the 
variation range, almost 26 points at the nominal load factor. It maintains a 
positive net margin only up to 10 points less of the nominal load factor. 
Aircraft types in the low cost group show that there is no marked difference in 
their sensitivities to this parameter. 
In terms of the aircraft mode combination potential to provide a positive net 
margin with great variation in load factor, the European mode 737-300 fares 
worst as it only needs a 10 point reduction in load factor to have a negative net 
margin. The European 737-400, A320 and A321 performed better in that order, 
by reaching a negative net margin at a higher reduction in load factor. For the 
region of variation that was explored the most profitable performance was 
achieved by the charter A320 followed closely by the charter A321. This was 
as expected since the charter mode is the most efficient. 
The question remains how well did the low cost aircraft performed, particularly 
when compared to the charter mode. They came very close. 
Out of the low cost group the best overall performer was the A320, followed 
by the A321, the 737-300 and lastly by the 737-400. The differences between 
the same type in the low cost and charter groups are 12.8 points for the A320 
and 12.3 points for the A321, at nominal factor. In comparison the differences 
157 
with the short haul group are 18.8 points for the A320 and 19.4 points for the 
A321. Between the low cost and the short haul group, the differences for the 
same types were: 6.5 points (A320), 19.4 points (A321), 4.5 points (737-400), 
16.9 points (737-300). 
The low cost group achieve net margin spread of 60 points (737-300), 58 
points (737-400), 69.5 points (A320) and 66.9 points (A321) across the 
variation range. In this schedule mode the A321 outperforms the smaller A320. 
For this group there is no obvious divergence. The Boeings are very close 
together, and so are the Airbuses. Between the two makes there is significant 
diversion. The 737-400 is the only type of this group to reach a negative net 
margin across the variation range examined. 
The short haul group achieves net margin spreads of 68.3 points (737-300) 73 
points (737-400), 92.1 points (A320) and 83.3 points (A321) across the 
variation range. Finally, the charter group outperforms the other two groups. It 
achieves net margin spreads of 77.6 (A320) and 74.7 points (A321) across the 
variation range. The A320 within this group performs better than the A321, but 
only by 6.5 points which remains within a close area throughout the range. 
Both these aircraft provide the maximum of net margin of 27.24 and 22.43 
percent at 
-20 points of nominal load factor. 
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6.3.10 Passenger analysis 
Annual Passenner Sensftvlty to Seat Load Factor 
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The effects of variation of seat load factor on the annual passenger numbers for 
the low cost and high frequency schedules are shown in Fig. 6.7. There is no 
variation between the two types of schedules as the same rankings for 
individual aircraft types are maintained in both types of schedules. 
The general trend as expected is that there is an increase in the number of 
passengers carried with increase in the aircraft size. The high frequency 
European schedule carries a greater total number for every aircraft when 
compared with the low cost schedule. The highest number of passengers is 
carried by the low cost A321. There is clear separation between the European 
short haul and the low cost aircraft types. The former carried fewer passengers 
across all its aircraft and its higher capacity type approaches the lowest 
capacity type of the low cost airline. 
In the European high frequency schedule the group minimum is 913,680 
passengers for the 737-300 and the maximum is 2,668,320 for the A321. The 
equivalent for the low cost group is 1,724,400 for the 737-300 and 4,097,520 
for the A321. This is also the highest figure for all groups. In the low cost 
schedule the corresponding figures are a minimum at 812,160 passengers for 
the short haul 737-300 and the maximum 2,370,960 for the A321. The low cost 
group equivalent is 1,531,440 for the 737-300 and 3,639,600 for the A321. 
Again, this is also the highest figure for all groups. 
The charter group types in both schedules are lagging slightly below their 
corresponding low cost types at 3.51 percent (A320) and 3.4 (A321) for the 
160 
low cost schedule and 3.3 percent for both A320 and A321 for the high 
frequency schedule. 
In summary, it was found that analogous results are obtained across the two 
different schedules with the only variation being the increased number of 
passengers carried in the high frequency schedule. It therefore appears that the 
high frequency schedule is a more productive method of operation. This must 
be set against the fact that the high frequency schedule uses 6 aircraft in order 
to serve 6 destinations whereas the low cost schedule uses one aircraft less to 
serve three destinations more. Furthermore, consideration must be taken of the 
fact that in reality European short haul airlines similar to bmi have much longer 
turnaround times at both ends of their sectors, necessitated by the higher 
standards appropriate for their business traffic. Therefore the 30 minute 
minimum turnaround applied in our high frequency schedule is very optimistic. 
One hour to 90 minutes would be more representative, particularly in 
congested airports. It was used to show the possible economics of such 
operations for such an airline. 
Additional examination of the data in the schedules indicates that in the high 
frequency schedule there are a total of 27 frequencies, compared to a total of 
20 for the low cost. If a longer turnaround time is applied to the European 
schedule then the number of rotations per day will decrease, which will impact 
the number of passengers carried on an annual basis. Between the two 
schedules the difference in `productivity' i. e. how many passengers each 
schedule is able to transport is approximately between 11.00 and 11.2 percent, 
in favour of the high frequency schedule, for all types of aircraft and airline 
groups examined in this model. It remains the same across the variation of the 
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load factors. However, this difference is not very large and if we had 
comparisons with the same amount of aircraft then clearly the low cost 
schedule is the more efficient and productive of the two. 
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7 MEETING PASSENGER TRAFFIC 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
A small airline has been created and tested under two different modes of 
operation. During the simulation of flying operations the economics of the low 
cost carrier and two other types have been examined. Therefore from this 
testing procedure it is now obvious that the original setup parameters in 
estimating all the individual shares included in the Direct Operating Costs of an 
airline have performed fairly accurately and according to expectations. 
In the initial setup of the schedules the destinations were selected by a rough 
method of mixing both business and leisure points, in a similar manner to what 
the low cost carriers have tended to do in real life. On these occasions 
domestic and international routes which had considerable traffic but were 
undeserved by two incumbent carriers were targeted at the start. The new 
entrants in their choice of routes have chosen to use either primary or 
secondary airports or a combination of both. Having made their market entry 
operating a similar number of aircraft as in our schedules and having 
established their market, then they seek ways to expand their network. This 
phase however is a difficult one for many reasons. Firstly, because these 
airlines have achieved a market presence, the majors are monitoring them 
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closely. Secondly, choice of new routes21 becomes critical as a wrong choice 
could lead to problems later. Expansion usually has to be carried out in a rapid 
and dramatic fashion, achieve a substantial presence in the market and gain the 
benefits due to scale this brings. 
For these purposes the next phase will have to evaluate which are appropriate 
routes suitable for the low cost carrier to enter. There are signs that routes are 
chosen even on a seasonal basis, i. e. winter sports, summer holidays and year 
round short breaks, as well as established V. F. R. routes like London to Ireland, 
Spain and Greece. Some routes that do not support year round services because 
of their nature, are not operated during their off- peak season at all. Flexibility 
to choose routes according to seasonal traffic patterns is very important for the 
low cost carriers, but quite unusual for the scheduled airline sector. 
Conversely the low cost sector will quite readily enter a route even under trial 
and will just as readily discontinue it if it does not achieve the expected returns. 
This ability is in part due to the nature of the destinations and airports served 
by these carriers. 
The airports chosen usually are not slot constrained and do not require several 
entry requests until permission is granted. This section will examine the means 
an airline can use to carry out such a task. 
2' Sunk costs on new routes are likely to be high. European airlines estimate the introduction of 
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7.2 ROUTE EVALUATION 
7.2.1 Plan and layout 
To perform such a task it was necessary to identify routes that had the potential 
for low cost new entry. In this reference was made to CAP 685 (CAA 1998) 
where in Appendix 0a number of routes both intra-European and domestic 
have been identified as possible candidates for new entry. In the CAA's 
consideration these routes were intended as new routes for existing established 
airlines and not for the low cost sector. However if a potential for an 
established carrier existed then the low cost operator could potentially be as 
successful in operating them, provided that they are dense enough to generate 
the necessary traffic. 
The aim of this exercise is to estimate the number of frequencies possible if a 
low cost operator dedicated one aircraft to fly continuously on a route. 
Following that, assuming that the new entrant could capture 65 passengers per 
flight then what market share would that achieve if all else remained 
unchanged. 
The passenger traffic for the selected routes was firstly tabulated. The section 
below describes the method of data collection and filtering of unwanted 
elements. The number of frequencies for end of 1997,1998,1999 and most 
recently for February 2001 were gathered together with the number of 
competitors in each route. Having the complete number of frequencies and 
a new route to cost £ 10-12 million, in 1992. Betts and Gardner (1992) via G. Nero (1994) 
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annual passenger traffic the number of passengers per aircraft were calculated 
for the route before the new entry occurred. 
Hence, initially given a single aircraft operation with a 30 minute turn around 
between 6.30 a. m. and 11.30 p. m. the rotations achieved in a day, and how 
many passengers would be captured in total were calculated. These 
calculations depended solely on how many rotations are possible given the 
time available to the operator to fly his single aircraft continuously within each 
city pair. Following entry the number of passengers per aircraft is once again 
calculated to show the impact of the new entrant on a daily basis on each route. 
The market share of passengers assumes that a linear relationship exists 
between frequency and passengers enplaned. As mentioned earlier this was 
based on the new entrant capturing 65 passengers per flight. 
In CAP 654 (CAA, 1995) it is stated that an airline's market share is 
influenced more than proportionately by its frequency share. This means that 
the carrier with, say, a 60 percent frequency share will actually achieve an even 
higher market share than 60 percent. It proposes that a more realistic 
correlation follows an `S' curve theory based on the formula of: 
n= 2x f 
m2 f2 
where ml is the market share of the competitor with the highest frequency 
share fl and m2 is the market share of the competitor with the lower frequency 
share f2 
. 
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The simple effect of the `S' curve theory is to produce a smaller optimum 
aircraft size, for any new entrant. The incumbent's advantage will be that it 
will probably be already operating a larger aircraft than the new entrant 
although this could be attributable to other factors such as lack of slot 
availability, and the need to offset a higher cost base, as bigger aircraft are 
cheaper per seat. 
Taking this into account a separate formulation was carried out to conform to 
the `S' curve theory and to show that given the new entrant's possible 
frequency, and the other competitors existing frequencies what passenger and 
market share could be achieved by the new entrant. Finally this was translated 
into passengers per day for the new entrant and the number of rotations 
possible to transport these passengers in the low cost operator's 737-300 or 
737-400. For these aircraft the high seating densities and load factors of typical 
low cost operators were used, i. e. 80 percent. 
7.2.2 Data collection 
The selected routes had been investigated by the CAA in 1997 and therefore 
data for more recent years had to be found. This was accomplished via the 
European Commission's New Cronos database, which provides data collected 
by national authorities across the EU's member countries. The data collected 
comprise a variety of themes one of which is Transport. The Aviation domain 
within the Transport theme includes data series on more specifically, the top 40 
routes worldwide and EU-wide for each of the ICP airports in the Trans- 
European Airport Network (but any route with less than 400 passengers has 
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been excluded). Also a variety of rankings of the top 50 airports within the EU 
and Switzerland according to international origin / destination passengers 
carried are amongst others. 
The ICP (International Connecting Points) represent the top tier of airports in 
the Trans-European Airport Network, Data appearing in these tables is 
origin/destination data reported by each individual airport to/from second 
airports. This is true for all reporting airports except for Lyon and Paris where 
data reported relates to the airport systems: Paris (Charles de Gaulle, Orly, Le 
Bourget airports), Lyon (Bron, Satolas airports). In many cases for a town with 
more than one airport, the "second airport" actually refers to the airport system 
rather than a single airport. Note that in cases where the reporting airport 
provides information for all individual airports in a given town, not all routes 
concerning a given town may appear in the top 40 routes so that the top 40 may 
understate the town total. In these cases (e. g. Milan) all the individual airport 
data were added to provide a truer picture of the total traffic from the city area. 
No information was available for the ICP airports of Copenhagen-Kastrup, 
Copenhagen-Roskilde, Helsinki-Vantaa, Luxembourg, and Stockhom-Arlanda 
as the relevant reporting countries were unable to provide origin/destination 
information. 
These are tabulated so as to give individual traffic data per city pair within the 
EU market for the years from 1993 to 1999. In some years city pairs quoted 
were for the complete airport system of multiple airport cities like London, 
Paris, Milan, Rome and others. As the aim was to provide the data for city pairs 
then where available the airport system totals were used. If those were not 
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available then traffic from the individual airports was added to provide a total 
for the whole city airport system. 
Initially, the CAA's data for 1997 were checked and corrected as required, 
because some of them were projections based on an average growth rate from 
1995 data. Once the full set of traffic data were applied for 1997 to 1999 it was 
necessary to enter those for 2000. As there were no data collected by the New 
Cronos database for 2000, projections based on passenger growth were aimed 
for. Annual growth figures for each country were taken from the AEA 
collected statistics of successive years, which were those measured amongst 
the AEA members for their scheduled services. As individual countries had 
different growth rates then a compound growth rate was used, being the sum of 
the rates from the two countries whose cities formed the two ends of the route. 
In this manner traffic data for the intra European routes were fully completed. 
7.2.2.1 Domestic route data collection 
Problems were encountered with the traffic data for domestic routes. The New 
Cronos database does not contain specifically domestic traffic data from the 
member countries but only for intra European. The ICAO Traffic by Flight 
Stage Report (1999) was consulted, but again there were no domestic traffic 
data to be found, as these were not being reported. This created a considerable 
barrier to furthering this research as preliminary inspection of these routes 
indicated fertile ground for a low cost carrier. Furthermore, experience has 
shown that domestic routes, particularly in Europe tend to be monopolistic and 
dominated by one incumbent, usually the national carrier through a variety of 
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ways. Therefore it was imperative to find a way to estimate the amount of 
traffic carried on these routes. 
Due to the limits of publicly available traffic data for these routes a method of 
approximating the traffic was devised. A survey was carried out to find the 
number of daily frequencies flown by all the operators of each route from 1997 
to 2000 for the month of November of each year. In this manner the data 
already published by the CAA were checked and updated while at the same 
time a picture was obtained of the route developments since 1997. Frequencies 
of individual carriers were noted, and tabulated giving a total of the daily 
frequencies flown. Additionally, the number of carriers competing on each 
route were gathered, together with the aircraft types flown. 
In the survey any flights occurring less than three times a week were not 
counted. Furthermore in cases when flights were operated by a franchise or 
subsidiary carrier under a code-share, as well as by the parent airline were 
counted under the main carrier. Any 5th freedom flights were also disallowed 
if they fell below the three times per week rule as they can only offer limited 
capacity. 
The number of frequencies were converted to passengers by approximating the 
number of passengers carried in each aircraft by knowing the aircraft type 
used, the seat load factor and the seating density in the cabin. Data on seating 
densities were taken from individual airlines' timetables according to aircraft 
type. A nominal seating density was obtained as `average seats per aircraft' for 
each type in this way and this was applied for all carriers using the same type. 
Throughout these domestic routes the aircraft sizes varied widely from the 
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Airbus A300-600 to the Canadair Regional Jet and the DeHavilland Canada 
DHC 8-400. 
Seat load factors were used for the domestic operations of AEA member 
airlines from the AEA statistical appendices collected for the corresponding 
years. Having applied them instead of a more generic system-wide load factor 
provides a better picture. This is because the domestic market has historically 
been a higher load factor market when compared to the European network 
operations. It also adds a much needed margin of accuracy in what is an 
otherwise approximate exercise in deducing the correct number of passengers 
brought about by the lack of published data. Finally, the distance of the route 
and the block time allocated by the airlines were collected from the OAG 
guide. 
7.2.2.2 Leisure and charter routes 
In recent years the low cost carriers operating in Ireland, the UK and Europe 
have began to enter routes that would otherwise be the sole domain of the 
established charter tour operator airlines. These routes tend to be to either 
summer or wintertime resorts such as Treviso, Brescia, Perpignan, St. Etienne 
and in the past have been served by the package holiday sector during both 
summer and winter seasons as appropriate. 
It is expected that this practice will continue in the near future, particularly if 
trends in taking shorter and more frequent holiday breaks continue. One other 
area which could increase this trend is if consumers decide to create their own 
combinations of flights and holiday accommodation rather than buy an all in 
package holiday. For this reason it is envisaged that the low cost operators 
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would start challenging the charter carriers on the more dense charter routes 
they operate. From the New Cronos database several city pair routes included 
in the top 40 destinations from a variety of northern European airports 
conformed to this pattern. It was thus prudent that, since the data existed, a 
more serious investigation should be undertaken to examine the extent of the 
suitability of such routes to the low cost carrier mode of operation. 
A further survey was carried out containing a group of routes conforming to 
the leisure or charter type destination. This was achieved by including those 
city pairs containing destinations in the traditional European holiday resorts in 
the Mediterranean or the Canary Islands suitable either for the long summer 
vacation or for shorter secondary vacations. 
Having selected the appropriate city pairs then traffic data for between 1997 
and 1999 were tabulated and those for 2000 were calculated as described in 
section 8.2.2 above. 
As explained earlier until now the frequencies for each competitor on a specific 
route were counted on a daily basis with a cut off point of not less than 3 times 
a week to block very small scale operations. For this set of data however there 
were a number of routes operated by charter airlines on a scheduled basis, as 
contained in the OAG Flight Guides. However, the frequencies were very low 
since most of these flights occurred on selected days around the weekend and 
did not amount to a full daily schedule. This conflicted with the intentions of a 
low cost operator to enter any new route with at least a daily service. In order 
to maintain an accurate comparison it was decided to count individual flights 
and express them as a ratio of a weekly service by dividing them by the 
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number of days in the week. In establishing the number of competitors in these 
routes only those for which schedule data were available were counted. 
A further idiosyncrasy of the charter sector encountered was the lack of 
schedule information. This is quite natural, as there are no schedules published 
for purely charter flights, but remain internal to the charter carrier and are 
adjusted according to demand. In some cases in the past charter flights were 
`adjusted' or consolidated even a few hours before departure, so as to fill 
aircraft to the maximum extent possible. Because of this it was not feasible to 
establish the number of frequencies flown during the week. Another set of 
routes falling in the similar category were those for which only connecting 
schedule traffic was available instead of the required direct flights. In the 
tabulation the former, purely charter flights were marked as `No Schedule 
Service', (NSS) and the latter as `No Direct Service', (NDS). 
To overcome the problems with both these types of route, `probable' 
frequencies were approximated based on averages of frequencies taken from 
routes, which had similar traffic densities. This method sought to capture the 
effect of the charter airlines serving destinations with enough traffic density in 
a similar manner to that of scheduled airlines. The shortcomings of this 
philosophy however are that in real life charter airlines do not select their 
destination frequencies in this manner but depend on the attractiveness and the 
tourist development of individual resorts which are served by their parent tour 
operator. 
All city pair routes were analysed as before and were subjected to projections 
of expected market share under the S- curve assumption. Additional 
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projections established the number of passengers after new entry as well as the 
number of passengers per aircraft after new entry as with all the other types of 
routes. 
7.3 RESULTS OBTAINED 
The results were grouped into the following categories according to the 
tabulations made: 
i. Existing routes from Heathrow with potential for new entry. 
ii. Most likely routes between European hubs to have had new entry from 
1997. 
iii. Other similar monopoly or duopoly routes at European hubs to primary 
or secondary European cities using the CAP 654 criteria for entry. 
iv. Leisure or charter routes 
v. Domestic routes 
The findings within the individual groups provided variable information on 
how widespread is the potential for entry by a low cost carrier and on the 
critical factors affecting this potential. In order to provide a way to assess the 
suitability and identify the type of each route examined a set of criteria were 
applied. The initial suitability criteria set were: 
TYPE 1: 
" Passengers per aircraft higher than 65 per flight. 
" Annual passenger market share higher than 15 percent attained after 
new entry, as calculated under the S-curve assumption. 
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In addition to this set of criteria for compatible routes a further 3 were added to 
identify the characteristics of the other routes, which were not suitable, and to 
display the reasons why it was so. These further criteria were: 
TYPE 2: 
" Passengers per aircraft lower than 65 per flight. 
" Annual passenger market share higher than 15 percent attained after 
new entry, as calculated under the S-curve assumption. 
TYPE 3: 
" Passengers per aircraft higher than 65 per flight. 
" Annual passenger market share lower than 15 percent attained after 
new entry, as calculated under the S-curve assumption. 
TYPE 4 
" Passengers per aircraft lower than 65 per flight. 
" Annual passenger market share lower than 15 percent attained after 
new entry, as calculated under the S-curve assumption. 
7.3.1 Type 2 routes 
They are the typical case where the required market share is achieved at a 
lower load factor. This means that if a new entrant starts operating in addition 
to the existing carriers, it will not be able to attract enough passengers to 
achieve a satisfactory load factor. A characteristic of these routes is that the 
incumbents serving them do so at fairly high frequencies themselves. Since 
routes of this type tend to be short haul, mostly less than 1000km distance, if a 
new entrant dedicated a single aircraft it would be able to achieve a high 
number of daily rotations. This seems to work against the new entrant as more 
frequencies are added to what are routes already served with high frequencies 
by the incumbents. Generally, the frequencies possible with a single aircraft 
operation vary from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 12 per day. 
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In some of the routes it is possible for a new entrant to start operations 
provided that it restricts itself to a lower frequency schedule in order to 
maintain adequate load factors. Naturally, this will only hold true provided that 
there are no other changes in the incumbent's scheduling and the effect of 
lower fares of the low cost carrier applied to these routes is discounted. All 
these routes are flagged as `Low density' to indicate this characteristic. 
7.3.2 Type 3 routes 
They were flagged as `Higher Seats' as a result of a low market share, which 
nonetheless exhibited adequate levels of passengers per flight. In some cases 
they were of a higher seating level than some of those that were accepted as 
compatible. These types of routes could be considered as certainly dense 
enough for a low cost carrier although ones where a single aircraft solely 
operating would not be sufficient to achieve the necessary market share. It 
must be noted that the number of entry frequencies possible at new entry are a 
function of the sector distance and only a single aircraft would be earmarked 
for the route. This however should not automatically disqualify them from 
consideration since achieving the required market share would simply 
necessitate a more intensive operation. Routes of this type indicate that both 
the seat density and the market share will not be achieved at the current 
conditions. 
7.3.3 Type 4 routes 
The remaining routes flagged `Low seats and share' presented a combination 
of low seating and market shares. Although they were small in number (6) they 
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indicate that in the way these routes were being serviced currently there was 
not enough scope for a low cost carrier to enter. Usually these routes exhibited 
a very strong duopoly under which the two incumbents were operating 
sufficient rotations for the traffic available to allay the potential of new entry. 
In one of them an independent new entrant had started operations since 1997 
which caused the two incumbents to raise their frequencies since that time. 
Two of these routes were domestic city pairs, and one was a charter pair. 
From the overall route projections a total of 126 city pair routes were obtained 
as compatible and they will be described below, according to the group they 
belonged. These have all been tabulated in the spreadsheet file Schedules. xls. 
7.3.4 Heathrow Duopoly Routes 
- 
Group (i) 
All of Heathrow's routes examined were to another main hub of an incumbent 
airline or one of its secondary hubs such as Barcelona, Düsseldorf, Nice or 
Munich. 
A total of 10 Heathrow based routes were obtained as suitable. Within these 
only one had a minimum of 2 daily 737-300 (148 seats) service. The others had 
enough capacity to allow up to a maximum of six daily flights, the highest 
number being to Gothenburg which currently is a monopoly route. All the 
routes examined had enough capacity to allow a bigger aircraft size such as the 
737-400 (168 seats) to be operated on at least a twice daily frequency. In some 
cases routes were dense enough to accept the larger aircraft without even 
lowering the daily frequencies of the smaller 737-300 type. 
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Passengers per aircraft after new entry varied from a minimum of 70 for 
Düsseldorf to a maximum of 135 for Lisbon. The corresponding figures for 
market shares were a low of 15.4 percent for the route to Copenhagen and the 
highest were 100 percent for Gothenburg. In terms of 737-300 frequencies the 
top pair was Gothenburg with six and the lowest was Vienna with two. 
7.3.5 European Hub Duopoly routes 
- 
Group (ii ) 
Routes 16-30 examined in this group were again either between main hubs of 
incumbent airlines or one of its secondary hubs such as Barcelona. Route 
distances varied from a short 365 km for Frankfurt 
- 
Amsterdam to 2,101 km 
for Paris 
- 
Athens. The passenger traffic for 2000 varied between 512,618 to 
1,257,181 passengers. 
This group produced four Compatible, six Low Density, four Higher Seats and 
one Low Seat and Share routes. From the total of 4 routes obtained as suitable 
only one had a minimum of 2 daily 737-300 service whereas the others had 
enough capacity to allow up to a maximum of five daily flights, the highest 
number being Paris 
- 
Amsterdam All the routes examined here again had 
enough capacity to allow a bigger aircraft size such as the 737-400 (168 seats) 
to be operated without lowering the daily frequencies of the smaller 737-300 
type. The exception to this was the Paris 
- 
Amsterdam route which suffered a 
reduction of one daily frequency. 
Passengers per aircraft after new entry varied from a minimum of 67 for Paris 
- 
Amsterdam to a maximum of 76 for Amsterdam 
- 
Madrid. The corresponding 
figures for market shares attainable were a low of 16.67 percent for the route to 
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Amsterdam 
- 
Madrid and the highest were 21.87 percent for Paris 
- 
Amsterdam. 
In this group all but six routes were duopolies between the incumbent carriers 
and there was one monopoly between Stockholm and Copenhagen. All of the 
routes identified as compatible were for previous duopolies. The monopoly 
route was flagged as Type 2 low-density route suggesting that the 19 daily 
frequencies the incumbent was operating were sufficiently intensive. 
7.3.6 Other European Duopoly Routes 
- 
Group ( iii ) 
Routes 31-75 examined were either between the main hub of incumbent 
airlines or between main and secondary hubs or large cities. Typical examples 
of these latter routes were Madrid 
- 
Hamburg, Amsterdam 
- 
Birmingham, 
Milan 
- 
Barcelona, or Madrid 
- 
Bologna. This group contains 10 monopoly, 28 
duopoly routes and 6 routes with 3 competitors. 
A total of only 4 routes were obtained as suitable. The great majority were 
flagged as Type 2 routes and just two and one as Type 3 and 4 respectively. 
From within the compatible routes the passengers per aircraft after new entry 
varied from a minimum of 67 for Madrid 
- 
Bologna to a maximum of 109 for 
Paris 
- 
Lisbon. The passenger market share varied from a low of 16.67 percent 
for both Amsterdam 
- 
Barcelona and Paris 
- 
Lisbon to a maximum of 100 
percent for Madrid 
- 
Bologna. As with the case of Heathrow 
- 
Gothenburg 
earlier, so too Madrid 
- 
Bologna indicates that the incumbent's 3 daily 
frequencies were undeserving the available passenger density. This further 
suggests that since either the new entrant will quickly dominate, if it enters 
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with a single dedicated aircraft on the route or it could simply match the 
incumbent and obtain a higher load factor. 
Within these, a minimum of 2 daily 737-300 service for Amsterdam 
- 
Barcelona and a maximum of 8 for Madrid 
- 
Bologna. A bigger aircraft size 
was also possible without frequency changes for 2 of the four compatible 
routes. 
The large number of routes flagged as Type 2 suggested that the existing 
number of frequencies operated by the incumbents were depressing the average 
load factor. As noted earlier, particularly for the shorter distance city pairs, the 
possibility of the new entrant dedicating a single aircraft to ply the route simply 
works against his interests as it floods the market with extra frequencies. 
It is matter of debate if the new entrant wishes to assume such an aggressive 
market entry from the outset or to seek a more compromising tactic knowing 
that its lower costs will put him in a stronger position versus the other 
incumbents. 
7.3.7 Leisure / Charter Routes 
- 
Group (iv ) 
Routes 76-334 examined fell in one of two categories: a) between a main hub 
and a either for summer time or winter time holiday destination, and b) 
between a main city or hub and a secondary city in Europe which could carry a 
mix of leisure and holiday traffic. Leisure traffic is defined under the short 
break or the `Visiting Friends and Relatives' categories. 
In the selection of routes in case (a) above the main criterion was for traffic 
between northern, western or central European cities to holiday resorts in the 
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Mediterranean or the Canaries and Madeira. Consequently a lot of these routes 
involved predominantly charter airlines flying a mix of scheduled and charter 
flights. 
Category (b) is less biased towards these charter destinations and includes 
cities with traditionally strong tourist traffic. 
This group contained 91 monopoly and 69 duopoly routes, 22 routes with 3 
competitors, 24 routes with 4 competitors and 6 routes with 5 competitors. 
A total of 102 routes were obtained as suitable, 153 were Type 2 and 2 each 
were Type 3 and 4. The group is characterised by large passengers per aircraft 
levels and consequently by large daily frequencies possible using the two types 
of aircraft available to the low cost operator. In general for all the groups, and 
more specifically in this leisure / charter group such high values, are indicative 
of the lack of scheduled services available to these destinations. It is 
misleading therefore to assume that in the case of Brussels 
- 
Alicante, for 
example, just fewer than 290,000 passengers a year were dependent on a single 
weekly frequency. Hence according to this model, if the new entrant started 
operating on this route then it would effectively be a monopolist, carrying 
almost the total of the traffic. In reality a charter airline such as Sobelair would 
still attract a sizeable proportion of the total traffic, which given its end point 
will be subject to considerable seasonal variations. 
What this table tries to show is that some operators consider these routes to 
offer enough potential to operate a sometimes small number of scheduled 
frequencies as well as the normal charter services. A good example of this is 
route no. 248, Palma 
- 
Manchester. Operated by Air 2000, the UK's second 
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largest charter carrier, once a week although Air 2000 flies several charter 
flights to Palma from Manchester and other UK points through the summer 
holiday season. 
From within the compatible routes the highest passengers per aircraft after new 
entry were 423 for Palma 
- 
Manchester and the minimum were 65 for Vienna 
- 
Frankfurt. The passenger market share varied from a low of 18.75 percent for 
both Brussels-Rome and Vienna-Frankfurt to a maximum of 1400 percent for 
Brussels-Alicante. 
In general, the routes belonging to category (a) above hold more potential for a 
new entrant who could serve them adequately given its lower cost base. 
7.3.8 Domestic Routes 
- 
Group (v) 
Routes 335-381 examined were either between one of the country's main 
airports or hubs and another city or a secondary hub in a regional capital. The 
secondary city varied from cities like Hamburg and Lyon to smaller ones like 
Rhodes, Perpignan, Cagliari or Helsingborg. Typical examples of these latter 
routes were Madrid 
- 
Hamburg, Amsterdam 
- 
Birmingham, Milan 
- 
Barcelona, 
or Madrid 
- 
Bologna. This group contains 24 monopoly, 14 duopoly routes and 
8 routes with 3 competitors. 
No routes were found to be suitable. The great majority (44) were flagged as 
Type 2 routes and just two as Type 4. The passengers per aircraft after new 
entry varied from a minimum of 9 for Marseilles 
- 
Biarritz to a maximum of 45 
for Heathrow 
- 
Newcastle. The passenger market share varied from a low of 13 
percent for Paris 
- 
Montpellier to a maximum of 100 percent for Marseilles 
- 
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Biarritz. Within the whole group, daily frequencies possible with a 737-300 
varied from one to five and with a 737-400 from one to four. 
As noted earlier, the large number of routes flagged as Type 2 suggested that 
the existing number of frequencies operated by the incumbents were depressing 
the average load factor. One characteristic of these domestic operations, and 
particularly with reference to the shorter distance city pairs, where all are 
below 900 km and most are between 350 km and 700 km it is apparent that the 
airlines devote disproportionate frequencies of routes to what are mostly thin 
densities as confirmed by the figures for passengers per aircraft above. This 
could be explained as a defensive mechanism against new entry into what they 
considered their rightful territory. 
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8 PROJECTING LCC FUTURE GROWTH 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since 1991 the year of Ryanair's re- incarnation as a low-cost, no-frills carrier 
there have been another five carriers of the same philosophy inaugurating 
scheduled services within Europe. All, except Virgin Express have been based 
in the UK. Everybody familiar with Southwest's illustrious growth in traffic 
and profits, expecting these airlines to perform just as well, might have been 
surprised from the failure of Debonair, one of the original UK low cost carriers 
which failed only after three years of operations and two years after a 
successful stock market floatation. [Doganis (2001)]. 
Although, the reasons for the demise of Debonair is not part of this research, 
Doganis notes that during the last two years of its operations Debonair was 
steadily moving away from the core model of the low cost, no-frill operation to 
the extent that just before its collapse it had become a `low cost full-frills' 
airline. This combined with the intense competition encountered after the 
establishment of BA's GO at Stansted and Ryanair's European route expansion 
also from Stansted meant that the airline entered a downward spiral from which 
it did not emerge. 
If Debonair's fate was due to management errors would the future of all the 
other airlines be secure provided they followed closely the original Southwest 
philosophy? Naturally, although within the airline industry there is no security, 
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what needs to be investigated is whether the market conditions are likely to 
favour these airlines. 
It is proposed to do that by examining various forecasts for the short and 
medium term and try to correlate these factors with problems that might arise 
as a direct consequence of factors external or internal to the airline's operation. 
8.2 SHORT TO MEDIUM TERM FORECAST. 
As mentioned above four of the five early European low cost carriers have 
been based in the UK. The future growth of the markets they serve will be 
investigated using the Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions Air Traffic Forecast for 2000 [DETR (2000)] (the DETR has since 
been renamed to Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions, 
DTLR). 
The key variables used in determining air traffic were domestic and foreign 
economic growth (principally GDP); airfares; trade and exchange rates. This is 
consistent with the results of other research conducted over many years by the 
former Department of Transport (DOT) and others into air passenger demand 
and is also what would be expected from economic theory. Forecasts are given 
for five yearly intervals from 2000 to 2020. The total forecast is built up from 
individual forecasts of 16 international market segments and 3 domestic 
markets 
The forecasters recognise that high demand growth in air travel is now largely 
historical for the developed countries of Western Europe, because the market in 
air travel has been maturing for some time already. Although there is variation 
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in the maturity stages of individual market segments within the overall market, 
there are significant signs that the declining income elasticities, which 
accompany market maturity, implies are becoming increasingly prevalent. It is 
also possible that part of the attraction of low cost carriers is precisely the fact 
that in their low cost philosophy are addressing this change in air travel 
consumption. Looking at past forecasts of average annual growth rates of 
terminal passengers at UK airports have generally been declining over time as 
the market moves toward maturity, falling from 12 percent in the early 1960s, 
to just over 5 percent between 1990 and 1998. The mid point forecast of an 
average of 4.3 percent over the next 20 years continues the long term trend of a 
gradual reduction in growth rates. 
However the above rates because they include the large growth being 
generated by the scheduled low cost carriers it is actually masking the static 
effect of the rest of the industry performing more conservatively. 
Year I Including L. C. C. Excluding L. C. C. 
1960-69 14.00 14.00 
1970-79 7.30 7.30 
1980-89 5.70 5.70 
1990-99 5.10 5.00 
2000-10 4.30 
2010-20 4.30 3.80 
Source: CAA UK Forecasts 2000 
Table 8.1: Trends in Average Annual Growth Rates 1960 to 2020 
186 
Table 8.1 shows this effect if the SLC airlines are taken away. For the second 
decade of the forecasts, 2010-2020, trend growth is assumed to fall to 3.8 
percent, slightly less than the 0.7 percentage point decline in the previous 
decade, reflecting that the rate of decline is expected to slow. From this in the 
first and second decades of the century it can be established that the forecasted 
growth rate of the low scheduled airlines can account for up to quarter of a 
percentage point of the whole UK market. 
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Fig. 8.1: Forecasts of scheduled low cost airline traffic 
In Fig. 8.1 the growth in SLC is shown in terms of both total and business 
passengers. Throughout the first two decades growth average growth reaches 
6.6 percent per annum central scenario, however the average is raised to this 
high value by the large growth rates calculated for the years to 2005, which 
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average 15 percent per annum. Growth in this period is due to the introduction 
of new routes, and thereafter for the years between 2005 to 2020 due to more 
passengers using the existing network. 
The fast growth of the SLC can also be verified from data gathered by the AEA 
where the number of weekly seats offered in the summer seasons of a series of 
years in shown in the figure below. Although the capacity growth is very rapid 
these airlines have been able to fill up their aircraft as testified by their 
increasingly high average load factors 
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Fig. 8.2: Scheduled Low Cost airline Capacity 1995-01 
The shape of the graph in the above figure shows clearly the changes of the 
rate of adding capacity. This effect is two fold: firstly it depends on the 
expansion plans of the existing carriers which have a continuous rate of 
introducing new aircraft in their network and secondly, the capacity added by 
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the new airlines starting operations. In 1995 there were only Ryanair and 
Virgin Express, operating, the latter in its original guise of Euro-Belgian 
Airlines. By the summer of 1996, easyJet closely followed by Debonair joined 
the market with four aircraft each (148 seats and 103 seats respectively) while 
Ryanair had began to grow. The years between 1997 and mid 1999, showed a 
slowing down of the pace and some consolidation was taking place. Then in 
May 1999 GO started operations again with four 148-seater aircraft. Between 
that time and the present, `buzz' has also started in early 2000 while Debonair 
ceased operations just before that. The rate of growth of capacity has been 
rapid since mid 1999 because both Ryanair, easyJet and GO, to a smaller 
extent, have quickly moved to establish themselves in an almost defensive 
tactic. It will be interesting to see to what extent this expansion rate can be 
sustained, although it would be more realistic to expect it to abate. Recently, 
Ryanair has announced the opening of a new hub at Brussels Charleroi airport, 
where it is going to base 4 of its aircraft and operate 7 new routes to existing 
points on its network. 
8.2.1 Contribution From Established Airlines And Charter Operators 
It is interesting to note that in the DETR's forecast methodology it is 
considered that the minimum number of passengers allowing a feasible SLC 
operation is 70,000 per annum, whereby 70 percent of which was new traffic 
generated and 30 percent was traffic diverted from existing incumbents. This 
places all routes with traffic levels of at least 100,000 per annum within the 
scope of entry by an SLC. This fact combined with the statement that SLC's 
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nature is to enter only routes already operated by existing airlines should cause 
some concerns with incumbents. Clearly SLC are aiming to exploit their lower 
costs by attacking the markets of the incumbents. Despite this not all airlines 
have closely followed this strategy. Current experience with Ryanair shows 
that there are several airports in Europe without existing service by 
incumbents, which can become successful SLC destinations of their own. 
Ryanair has gone to great lengths to associate these airports with the nearest 
traditional destination, even to the extent of applying to IATA to re-designate 
them using the main city's name. In most of these cases these airports have 
individual catchment areas in addition to those of the nearby traditional hub. 
Passengers diverted from Mainline 
carriers (mill) SLC PASSENGERS 
Year Business Leisure Total Business Leisure Total 
1998 0.51 1.56 2.10 1.70 5.20 7.00 
2000 0.81 2.43 3.24 2.70 8.10 10.80 
2005 1.41 4.20 5.61 4.70 14.00 18.70 
2010 1.62 4.83 6.45 5.40 16.10 21.50 
2015 1.86 5.55 7.38 6.20 18.50 24.60 
2020 2.10 6.33 8.46 7.00 21.10 28.20 
Source : Compiled from DETR UK Forecast 2000 
Table 8.2: The effect of SLCs on incumbent airlines for UK market. 
Given this analysis, it can be quickly calculated that the following numbers of 
passengers will have been diverted from the mainline carriers during the time 
periods shown in table 8.2. 
One of the problems this poses for the mainline carriers is that in recent years 
there has been a stagnant business travel sector and the main growth has 
occurred in the low yielding economy segment. What this analysis displays is 
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that the established carriers are not only going to haemorrhage some of their 
economy passengers but up to 20 percent of the losses will be at the more 
important business traffic. 
As already explained earlier the low cost airlines are beginning to successfully 
market their flights to the more price sensitive business passengers who are 
increasingly getting a taste of this alternative form of travel. 
8.2.2 Contribution from Charter Operators 
As described earlier the low cost airline in their efforts to find new routes 
which are not heavily operated by the mainline carriers have entered some of 
the traditional charter routes, usually flown by the inclusive tour operator 
airlines. In some cases these airlines combine scheduled with charter 
operations as is the case of Virgin Express. Virgin Express based in Brussels 
National airport previously known as Euro-Belgian Airlines (EBA was 
established in 1992). Since 1996 when it was taken over by the Virgin Group 
and renamed Virgin Express it has focused on the low cost scheduled sector. 
Nonetheless until today it has maintained a considerable number of charter 
destinations. Although as can be seen from the figure below since 1997 the 
charter share of its activities has been declining it still managed to carry around 
a million passengers. 
This occurrence is not restricted to the Virgin Express. In other countries with 
the same degree of charter industry development like Germany and Italy there 
are several major airlines that fly a combination of charter and Scheduled 
routes. Airlines like Condor, LTU, Hapag Lloyd and Aero Lloyd have a 
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considerable charter route portfolio but several of these routes are flown on a 
published weekend scheduled all year round. 
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Fig. 8.3: Virgin Express traffic breakdown 
In fact LTU has recently forged close links with scheduled mainline carriers by 
becoming a member of Swissair's Charter Airline Alliance. In other airlines 
like Spanair Air Europa and Air Europe S. p. A of Spain fly a mix of charters to 
the Canary and Balearic Islands or even to long haul destinations as well as 
operating scheduled domestic routes [Mason Whelan and Williams (2000)]. 
Competition between charters and scheduled low cost carriers has not appeared 
to become very prevalent yet, perhaps due to the fact that the two market 
segments are still separable. Alternatively it could be hypothesised that there is 
enough traffic available to keep the two segments separate and until now the 
only blurring has been occurring at the periphery of each market. It is possible 
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that if a downturn affects the leisure industry then the SLC airlines will have to 
look harder at possibilities offered by the charter market. For the time being 
there is even some co-operation between the two as signified by GO's 
supplying some of its scheduled seat capacity to Thomson, the UK's largest 
inclusive tour operator and owner of Britannia, the UK's largest charter airline. 
Results obtained from our own study where the charter type routes were 
examined indicated that there is considerable potential for a low cost carrier to 
enter. A lot of the charter routes have considerable traffic on an annual basis. 
Although some of that traffic is highly seasonal, given the traffic generating 
abilities of the SLCs they should become compatible routes for operation on a 
year round basis. Out of these, only routes with an annual SLC passenger share 
of less than 120,000 passengers would retain a summer only schedule. 
Looking at the purely charter routes it was found that a median of 220,779 
passengers per annum were attainable translating into a median of 75 percent 
market share under the scheduled mode. These numbers are very encouraging 
and in some cases are superior to the traffic share at the start up period of some 
of the existing routes. 
8.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND ELASTICITY DATA FROM FORECAST 
Economic literature and textbooks are awash with definitions of elasticity and 
the descriptions of various types of elasticities. In general elasticity describes 
the relationship of a resource to an external factor whose property is not fixed 
but varies according to external conditions. With reference to air travel when 
elasticities are mentioned what is meant is either income elasticity or price 
elasticity, both of these refer to the demand for air travel. 
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This type of relationship was firstly developed when it became apparent that as 
people's incomes grew then they were more likely to travel by air either for the 
first time of for repeat journeys. Therefore the definition of income elasticity of 
demand is the ratio between the percentage change in demand to the percentage 
change in income usually expressed as an integer number. With the same 
reasoning it follows that price elasticity of demand is the ratio between the 
percentage change in demand and the percentage change in price or fare. 
[Doganis (1985)]. 
Both types of elasticities have become useful tools in predicting changes in the 
behaviour of consumers and for finding the reasons behind these changes. 
Elasticities are changeable and will be useful only if their information is recent. 
In order to do that however it is important to have accurate elasticity. As the air 
travel market becomes more fragmented, so do the elasticities for the 
individual market segments. 
In order to achieve adequate accuracy multiple regression techniques are used 
in order to isolate the impact of all the other variables from the required 
quantity. Advanced methodological procedures and recent data on various 
economic aspects are required to produce accurate results. Without entering 
into a long debate about the intricacies of obtaining price and income 
elasticities of demand we shall accept the reliability of and refer to those 
published periodically by the CAA or BAA or in this case the DETR's aviation 
forecasting unit. 
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Chapter 7 of the UK Forecast for 2000 provides a breakdown of the method 
used to obtain the appropriate elasticities affecting air travel in the UK. 
Elasticities for the following variables were defined: 
8.3.1 Reduction in medium term GDP growth trend. 
Using the Treasury's economic forecasts for the long term average growth rate 
between 1998 and 2020, falling from 2.25 percent per annum to 1.75 percent 
per annum produced an income elasticity of +1.5. 
8.3.2 Market maturity 
Market maturity affects air travel adversely. As the market matures there is 
less preponderance of consumers to travel because, in a way, there is reduced 
novelty in the idea of air travel. Provided all other variables stay the same a 
maturing market will cause a reduction in the growth of air travel. This 
however has to be matched to each particular market segment which might 
have considerable differences between them. Such is the case between business 
and the leisure markets. Hence 2 different elasticities were calculated, one of 
+1 and the other for +2. It is the latter that better fits the fast growing SLC 
market. 
8.3.3 Application of aviation fuel tax 
A government tax that is being considered for the middle of this decade aimed 
at making airlines more sensitive to environmental issues with respect to the 
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burning of fossil fuels and to the aircraft emissions. The tax will start at 10 
percent of fuel costs and will be gradually increased up to 100 percent. Being 
an industry wide tax it has uniformity, which will protect the existing fuel 
differentials and is predicted to raise costs by 1 percent per annum. Elasticity 
value: 
-1.0. No special effects are expected for the SLC airlines although most 
of them are already operating newer recently purchased aircraft and have large 
orders for brand new fleets. 
8.3.4 Increases 
- 
decreases in fares growth 
The forecast assumption of the historical trend of a2 percent reduction in fares 
per annum has been adjusted to 1 percent per annum to reflect the new 
structure in traffic types of the current marketplace. Due to this, one sensitivity 
test assumed a1 percentage increase per annum, giving a constant fare and the 
other test a reduction of 1 percent per annum giving an overall reduction of 2 
percent per annum. The elasticity value used was: +1.0 
The former assumption does not fit well with the historic reduction of fares in 
real terms. Although this reduction cannot continue indefinitely, the effect of 
the very low fares offered by the SLC airlines will maintain a considerable 
downward pressure on this variable. Hence, the 2 percent reduction per annum 
is more appropriate although in the initial period to 2005-10, it could be even 
lower. 
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8.3.5 Airport charges 
Airport charges representing a bigger share of airline costs up to nearly 20 
percent, particularly for infra European and short haul carriers any large 
increases from the main airport operators, would have a detrimental effect of 
the carriers costs and the fares passengers pay. Because the SLC airlines have 
avoided large, congested and expensive airports and have negotiated very 
attractive deals with the airports they serve, as well with their own home 
airport, they will be considerably shielded by this effect. Applying a price 
elasticity of 
-1.0 reduces demand by 7.5 percent per annum, a high figure for a 
SLC. A rough estimate would put this figure closer to 3 percent per annum. 
Naturally, it is a matter of debate however as to the resilience of these airlines 
in fighting the pressures of increased airport charges as they mature and move 
away from their initial niche markets. All the price elasticities of demand 
calculated above have been applied to the forecast for traffic growth of the 
scheduled low cost airlines and the corresponding traffic figures derived are 
shown in table 8.3 at 2010 and 2020 year marks. 
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Mid-point traffic 
forecast 
Percentage 
change (%) 
relative to 
in 2010 in 2020 central 
Sensitivity Test (million) (million) scenario 
Central Scenario 21.50 28.20 
- 
Lower medium term GDP growth 17.85 23.41 
-17.00 Greater market maturity 1.0 income elasticity 18.92 24.82 
-12.00 
Lesser market maturity 2.0 income elasticity 24.08 31.58 12.00 
Environmental fuel tax 19.35 25.38 
-10.00 
A1 pp increase in fares growth p. a. (0%) 16.13 21.15 
-25.00 
A1 pp decrease in fares growth p. a. (- 2%) 25.80 33.84 20.00 
Increase in airport charges 20.86 27.35 
-3.00 
Source: Compiled from DETR UK Traffic Forecast 2000 
Table 8.3: Results of sensitivity tests for Scheduled Low Cost carriers 
8.4 FACTORS AFFECTING LCC'S GROWTH TRENDS 
Looking to the future one asks what would be the factors that could slow down 
the rapid growth in the Low cost carrier's life cycle. The general answer would 
be reductions or adverse changes in the factors that have created their rapid 
growth in the first place. The current forecast produced by the DETR used the 
following inherent assumptions in reaching its conclusions. 
8.4.1 Factors affecting Travel Demand 
The main drivers of travel demand are economic growth measured in terms of 
GDP Growth. High rates of GDP growth create a virtuous circle of higher 
disposable incomes, higher business activity and higher demand for business 
and leisure air travel. The assumptions of economic growth and their trends in 
the UK and Western Europe have already been covered in an earlier section. In 
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this forecast they averaged for the period of 2002-2015 at 2.25 percent for the 
UK and at 2.1 for the whole of Western Europe as defined by the International 
Monetary Fund. 
8.4.1.1 Trade Volumes 
This area is one of the indicators of the current state of economic activity. 
During the early stages of the economic cycle its growth tends to be faster and 
higher that GDP growth although in the longer term the two rates converge and 
stabilise. For the low cost airlines this parameter is not very important, as there 
is a fairly small proportion of their traffic affected. However it is possible that 
over time and as these airlines' market matures then it will start gaining 
significance in their forecasts, particularly if they start attracting business 
travellers in larger numbers. 
8.4.1.2 Exchange rates 
The relationship between the exchange rates and air travel demand is not 
entirely simple, as an appreciating pound should make travel more attractive 
for residents of the UK but have the reverse effect for residence in Europe. It is 
nevertheless stipulated that there is a positive relationship as there are more UK 
residents starting trips from the UK than European residents travelling from 
Europe. Currently with the establishment of the Euro as the only currency 
within the EU, this area has been considerably simplified. A three way 
interaction still exists between Sterling, Euro and Dollar since many of an 
airline's external payments for aircraft, leases, fuel etc are in dollars. 
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8.4.2 Factors affecting Air Fares 
GDP growth is a major determinant of the growth in demand for air travel 
because, higher levels of GDP produces higher growth rates which in turn 
produce growth in demand for air travel. 
In addition to that air fares also affect this, so the factors examined below 
contribute either positively or negatively. 
8.4.2.1 Aviation fuel prices : 
With the price of oil having recently risen steadily during the last year, 
propelling the jet fuel prices from around 45 U. S. cents a gallon in spring 1999 
to nearly 110 U. S. cents in autumn of 2000, has since been falling to an 
average of 78 U. S. cents per gallon. In the longer term it is expected to decline 
further following the value of the price for a barrel of oil. Although all airlines 
hedge their fuel to some degree, a sustained price increase could possibly wipe 
out any savings and cause an increase in their costs, which would have to be 
passed onto the passengers. According to the DETR calculation, fuel is 
approximately 10 percent of costs so that even a 50 percent change in the price 
of oil has a modest effect. Last years' increases were in the region of 144 
percent, from trough to peak, although they have since fallen to around 73 
percent. 
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8.4.3 Competition and deregulation 
A more deregulated market despite the variety of barriers and imperfections it 
still possesses is conducive to lowering fares. The usual historic trend of a 
reduction of 2 percent per annum which driven by improvements in aircraft 
technology, changes in traffic types and other structural changes of the industry 
brought about by factors as hub and spoke networks and airline alliances have 
reduced this trend growth to 
-1.0 percent. 
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9 FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
9.1 SCENARIA POSSIBLE 
The air travel market has historically consisted of the scheduled and charter 
airlines. Charter airlines came into being in the mid sixties because of the need 
to by-pass the IATA fare restrictions. They were developed in their current 
form solely in Europe because the very high airline fares were making foreign 
travel prohibitively expensive for the average family. Furthermore they by- 
passed currency controls, because all the payments were done in the UK before 
departure. 
IATA has not attempted to bring the non-scheduled operators under its control 
but instead allowed them freedom, as they did not pose a threat to the flag 
carriers. Some of the flag carriers had their own in house charter company and 
airline. (BA, with Sovereign and British Airtours, Lufthansa with Condor etc. ) 
Non-scheduled EU operators have thus enjoyed ease of route entry and exit, 
and have been allowed to sell some of their capacity as seat only tickets at low 
prices. During the EU liberalisation process the non-scheduled sector was also 
deregulated by allowing any operator to set up in any other European country 
subject to satisfying the same criteria applicable to the scheduled sector. 
It is anticipated that recent developments will further blur the differences 
between the two market segments. 
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9.1.1 A two 
- 
tier scheduled market 
9.1.1.1 Large scheduled groups for international & Long-haul 
The arrival of the low cost carrier is not going to change the face of the market 
suddenly. Despite the continuous advertising campaigns, the majority of 
passengers will continue to use the main line carriers. The attractiveness of full 
service carriers will not dissipate easily, provided the fares remain within 
reasonable levels. 
All the marketing tools aimed at the regular business passenger these carriers 
have developed will remain strong for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, this 
does not exclude the possibility that the same passengers flying on a main line 
carrier will not at some point try a low cost operator, whether it is for a summer 
holiday or a short break. 
Low cost carriers will remain a very localised development of the EU market 
for the next few years. It is highly unlikely they will try to enter the long haul 
international scheduled markets, which will remain the realm of the big 
alliance groupings and their partners. The slot restrictions at most major 
European hubs will certainly ensure that. Even, in the unlikely event that the 
EUC allows slot trading, such slots will be far outside the budgets of small 
carriers like Ryanair and easyJet. 
With respect to the intra-European traffic, alliances as they become more 
integrated will in fact lock out any international passenger on a transatlantic 
journey from the reach of an intra-european operator, unless the operator is a 
franchisee of the alliance. Even if that was not the case the low cost operator 
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would not be able to accommodate this traveller, unless the passenger 
specifically required it. 
The problems for the network carriers will start appearing when the low cost 
operators achieve adequate size and begin challenging them, as some of them 
already are, on their more lucrative routes. For example one of easyJet's stated 
aims is to capture Swissair's golden route between Geneva and Zurich, both of 
which are currently served from Luton. 
Attempts of an incumbent airline creating a low cost subsidiary, as was the 
case with BA's creation of GO have proved unsuccessful. Although BA was 
keeping a hands-off approach with GO, it has decided to divest itself from it 
and concentrate on its core business. Currently KLM is also practising the 
same strategy with `buzz' only this has been attempted in reverse by de- 
merging `buzz' out of KLMuk. Buzz's weaknesses lies with its ancestry, a less 
productive aircraft type, and an uncertain fare structure. Experience from the 
U. S. shows that all low cost subsidiaries of full fare airlines have not achieved 
performances similar to Southwest and eventually withdrew from the market. 
9.1.1.2 LCCs for intra Europe & ad hoc leisure 
The immediate future lies in increasing their presence within Europe by 
continuing to serve a combination of summer/winter leisure points as well as 
the more traditional main cities, but from `alternative', secondary airports. 
In the past, due to the high cost of travel, particularly from regional and 
secondary airports, there were many destinations for which air travel was 
unthinkable, either due to the cost or because the national airlines did not serve 
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them sufficiently i. e. London 
- 
Belfast, an early deregulated market. Now, this 
is gradually changing, as new destinations in France, Italy, Spain, Germany 
and Scandinavia are receiving scheduled service. By creating this possibility 
the low cost carriers are slowly changing travel patterns by initially attracting 
passengers who accept the lower fares to the new places, some of which are 
very likely to repeat the same trips several times or to other similar 
destinations. The next stage will be to create alternatives to the traditional 
Spanish resorts since some of the seaside points served start gaining acceptance 
from holiday makers from abroad, instead of from only the locals of the 
country. Airports in these destinations will follow the development of 
provincial airports in Spain and the Greek islands, which during the summer 
season, the national carriers' flights are in a minority if compared with the 
European charter operators. 
Increasingly targeting the `holiday routes' will bring low cost operators into 
competition with the charter carriers. As already seen there is a great number of 
charter only routes able to accommodate scheduled low cost carriers. 
Their larger size as a whole, currently four time the size of the low cost carriers 
in term of ASK, will provide a barrier to rapid growth into these charter 
markets. The reaction of the charter incumbents is not as straightforward as 
with any other single airline because the charter's routes are in effect dictated 
by their tour operators. 
Much will depend on the changing habits of holiday makers and whether 
greater acceptance of booking complete holidays independently or via the 
Internet will allow them to create their own holiday packages, taking advantage 
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of the cheap flights. Changes of this nature will also depend on age and income 
groups. Independent leisure travellers not requiring accommodation or 
prepared to make their own arrangements will be increasingly attracted by the 
flexibility and the low prices offered by the low cost carriers. Doganis (2001) 
stipulated that between 10 to 15 percent of the passengers currently carried on 
theses routes would travel on the low cost carriers. 
9.1.1.3 Charters for package holidays. 
In theory, if European deregulation was fully realised then charter flights could 
become obsolete. However, for most families wanting to book a holiday in the 
sun, tour operators and their associated airlines offer a service that is still 
valued because under the right conditions it removes all the inconvenience of 
dealing with individual parts of the holiday from the consumer. 
In the past some charter airlines have attempted to fly very low frequency 
scheduled services mainly to Spain, serving the community of British ex-pats 
there. These were withdrawn however once competition from low cost carriers 
was encountered. 
In the seventies and early eighties their aircraft sizes were classic examples of 
the need to transfer large numbers of passengers cheaply. For the shorter intra- 
european routes they used the early 737-200s and in due course slowly moved 
to the 737-300, with 140 seats and then to the A320 with 180 seats. The A320 
is the smaller type available while the largest would be the 767-300 or the 
A3 3 0-200. Other charter carriers are known to use DC-10 / MD-i is (Martinair, 
Scanair) or even 747-200s (Corsair). The average UK charter seating capacity 
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was 224 compared with that of the low cost operators is around 140 seats 
(higher than the mainlines' 130 seats) 
The economics of charter airlines, with time have been finely tuned to the 
specific markets they serve. The product of the charters is tailored to the needs 
of the tour operator and in the cases of seat only fares there is very little 
flexibility. Although the restrictions are not the same type as for the scheduled 
operator, any passenger has to conform to the times and days of a pre-arranged 
flight. Furthermore, the extensive use of night time flights aimed to avoid the 
curfews in the UK make these flights considerably undesirable for regular 
travel. Although on short haul flights, travellers are becoming more accepting 
of the inconvenience and `no frills' in return for savings in fares, it will be 
difficult to persuade them to cope with a4 hour plus flight under the same 
conditions. As a recognition of that charter airlines are now making a 
`premium class' available in their long haul flights for an extra payment. 
Charter operators can provide low frequencies to a destination because their 
passenger capacity is fixed by the tour operator who knows in advance the 
number of people booked in one flight. They do not have to compete for 
passengers in the traditional sense and thus frequency is more of a function of 
rostering aircraft and not of generating traffic demand. This gives them a 
considerable cost advantage over the ` no frills' operators. 
In addition they have operated much larger aircraft than the low cost operators 
have and at the very high load factors they achieve it is possible to restrict their 
frequencies. The airline's economics encourages the use of larger aircraft on 
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longer routes because the unit costs and performance in general are much 
improved. 
In the last decade charter operators have experienced considerable growth in 
holidays to more distant and exotic destinations to satisfy their passenger's 
increasing search for new places, beyond the usual Mediterranean resorts. It is 
therefore possible that some intra-european market capacity could be 
transferred to the scheduled mode. 
9.2 AREAS OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT 
9.2.1 Barriers due to market environment 
One of the main barriers possible in the near future is that of the effects of a 
maturing market. Although for the next few years forecasts predict traffic will 
grow at the current rate, beyond 2005 this rate will decline. In the intervening 
years low cost airlines will have spread their route network to as many suitable 
destinations as they can find in Europe. 
Scope for new growth will be more difficult to achieve. Currently there are 10 
routes out of London been contested by at least 2 low cost operators, as well as 
by mainline carriers. Although some of these routes are dense enough, within 
the low cost sector there will no doubt be fierce competition, resulting in some 
extremely low fares particularly during off peak periods. This will be 
aggravated by the need of low cost airlines to grow further while the 
incumbents also try to retain their passengers. 
During the summer of 2001 low cost carriers were due to operate 5.2 percent of 
the available seat kilometres within Europe. Although compared to the 
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previous year they grew by 33 percent, collectively they are still a very small 
part of the market capacity as a whole. 
Shares of intra-EU traffic by Available Seat Kilometers 
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Fig. 9.1: Intra EU Shares of EU airlines 
Even at the present phenomenal rate they will need at least 6 years to reach the 
current level of the charter carriers. Also, if in the near future other low cost 
carriers appear based in other countries then there will be higher still levels of 
competition. 
Apart from the economic indicators affecting generation and growth of traffic 
demand and which were examined in the sensitivity testing section of this 
report there are a number of other external factors consistent with increased 
competitive pressures, and market saturation. 
Signs of the ongoing competition is sometimes exhibited by recent court cases 
like: Ryanair vs. BA (on fare setting), easyJet vs. BA (regarding illegal 
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subsidising of GO), as well as a variety of newspaper advertisements about 
punctuality levels and comparable fares. 
Given this situation and the experiences of U. S. incumbents competing against 
Southwest the reduction in yields and fares caused the incumbent to cease 
operating the route. In this type of route one low cost carrier is expected to 
become dominant. If that becomes the case then business traffic is expected to 
follow because the main prerequisite in attracting the business passenger is the 
number of frequencies. This has been a standard occurrence in the U. S. but it is 
likely to be replicated in Europe too. Charter airlines dominating a route have 
attracted the business passenger too, provided there is no scheduled frequency 
alternative. 
Europe represents a geographical area of diversity. So far it remains an 
economic grouping of individual countries with individual traditions, and 
social characteristics. Europe in 2001 has not achieved anywhere near the same 
level of marketing integration as the U. S. despite the EUC's best efforts to 
achieve the Single Market. Barriers still exist across boarders in term of 
different national and local languages, national-specific regulations and 
artificial barriers blocking the free flow of information across Europe. In this 
respect the introduction of the single currency in Europe will be beneficial to 
consumers because it will allow them to see clearly real differences in prices, 
devoid of any exchange rate adjustments. The wide use of the Internet by the 
low cost carriers certainly slightly improves the situation but nevertheless 
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information in Europe is not readily available as in a one country market of the 
USA. 
Prospects of free movement of people and labour, as originally envisaged in 
the Treaty of Rome are very weak across EU at the moment. Lack of cross 
recognition of qualifications in engineering, management, and maintenance 
levels all form barriers for airlines trying to exploit lower wage scales of 
workers from other EU countries. A typical example of this were the problems 
encountered by Virgin Express in Brussels in trying to achieve more flexible 
working practices together with increased productivity from the Belgium based 
workforce. An entrenched and inflexible unionised workforce is anathema to 
the flexibility required by a low cost airline if it is going to be able to react 
quickly and effectively in rapidly changing markets. In this case the solution of 
placing the workforce in a newly formed, separate, non unionised company 
based in a low social cost EU country, was the answer which in the end was 
achieved with some considerable turbulence. 
9.2.2 Problems stemming from growth 
Growth of any company from an upstart to a medium size always carries with 
it particular challenges. In the case of low cost airlines the core problems 
would be maintaining the cost advantage unaltered or with as small change as 
possible. Maintaining a lean and highly productive operation while growing is 
critical for the future. 
It remains to be seen whether the managements of these airlines will be as 
focused as before or even that their choices will continue to pursue their initial 
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philosophy. A variety of opinions indicate that on several fronts there will be 
difficulties encountered. 
Firstly, in the area of achieving lower airport charges. The CAA believes that it 
will be increasingly difficult for a 30-40 aircraft company to expect the same 
discounts as that of just a few aircraft. This will apply in both cases of the 
home base airport as well as at any existing or future destination airports. 
Ryanair has already experienced efforts by Aer Rianta, the operators of Dublin 
airport, to abolish or drastically reduce discounts offered for operations during 
the off peak months, or for starting new discount routes as well as for use of 
existing airport infrastructure. On the other end of their routes they had to 
withdraw from operations at Rimini airport because it sought to renegotiate the 
existing contact it had with Ryanair. In a tactical decision they have allocated 
any route growth to be from Stansted rather than Dublin. 
Employee remuneration is another contentious issue. Employees might accept 
lower wages in order to enable a new company to establish itself. However 
when the company is very profitable they expect to gain better remuneration 
for their efforts. Southwest dealt with this by agreeing a ten year pay freeze 
from its employees in exchange for share options of the airline's stock. From 
the European airlines only Ryanair has so far emulated this. It is possible that 
as in the case of Southwest the share options are used to mask low wage scales, 
being considerably lower than the mainline carriers. In Europe however 
this 
will be less of a case as the wage scales offered by the low cost carriers are 
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lower than that of the flag carrier but comparable to other UK independent 
carriers i. e. British Midland and most of the charters. 
9.2.3 Barriers due to infrastructure 
Low cost carrier's philosophy of generating new traffic through low fares goes 
together with serving their airports with high levels of frequencies. For this 
they require a significant number of slots which might be available at an 
unconstrained home base airport but are not so easy to obtain at other large 
airports in Europe. This problem is somewhat overcome by their use of under 
utilised secondary airports. However several of the low cost airlines' 
destinations are to main hub airports e. g. Madrid, Athens, Paris CDG, Milan or 
Palma and Malaga. Most of these airports suffer from congestion and are 
regularly near the top of Europe's airport delay figures. Increasing frequencies 
to them in order to undermine a weaker competitor, they will be subject to the 
same types of restrictions as the others. Their need to grow will result in 
finding more under-utilised airports. Fewings (1999) indicates that there is a 
plethora of under-utilised airports in European countries with runway lengths 
more than 1600m. The concentration of flag carriers at their hub airports 
which they controlled via the slot system has restrained the development of non 
hub airports in Europe. Civilianisation of military airports not required by a 
contracting military will add to the numbers of available airports looking for 
customers. Passengers' preferences of local airports will add impetus to his 
trend and this is driving rapid growth of traffic in regional airports during the 
last few years. 
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The current growth plans of the low cost operators have consisted of initially 
achieving a considerable presence in their original choice of routes. From this 
they have added capacity as they saw fit to place them in the top 3 operators of 
that route. Once this hub was operating efficiently then a choice for moving to 
a second hub was made. The candidate hubs were sometimes destinations 
already served from their original base. Selection of a hub obviously depends 
on several factors but the more important ones are the agreement on charges to 
the airline and the traffic generation capability of the airport's catchment area. 
Growth into the new hub was by serving existing points in their networks first 
and later perhaps introducing new routes as appropriate. This is a low risk 
approach as at least one end of the route is a known destination, and the 
possibility always exists for the another existing destination to replace under 
performing destinations from the new hub. The added advantage of that is that 
the airline's position is further reinforced from both ends of the network. 
9.3 ISSUES FOR POLICYMAKERS 
The globalisation of markets, the introduction of the Euro, the completion of 
the single market continue to generate high levels of merger activity in Europe. 
In a context where markets are tending to become wider and where the critical 
mass that is necessary to be an active player is tending to increase, the number 
and complexity of mergers and alliances call for increasing vigilance from 
policy makers. It is noteworthy that the airline industry is still highly 
fragmented, with the six largest companies accounting for only 30 percent of 
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the market (Source: AEA), compared with 79 percent in the petroleum industry 
and 62 percent in the automobile industry. 
With respect to the development of the low cost scheduled sector, European 
liberalisation is beginning to provide some welcome benefits for the consumer. 
At the same time it has freed the flag carriers from their archaic bilateral 
agreements, with the results of creating new large alliance groupings. The 
benefits of these groupings could be that they reduce duplication in the market 
and thus increase the overall level of efficiency. The increased size of theses 
groupings and even of the flag carriers should not be allowed to thwart any 
efforts by the low cost carriers to fill the void left by the incumbents 
particularly if it has been successfully demonstrated that their ability to do so 
under the same consumer welfare benefits is at least limited. 
Further pressures for the privatisation of the remaining state owned airlines in 
Europe will certainly help along this aim. Therefore the Commission's task as 
a policy maker and its enforcement capabilities will be of paramount 
importance in ensuring the market develops in a free and fair way. 
So far in the last year, the Commission is due to finalise its position on the 
important intra-EU and transatlantic alliances. It will also undertake a 
consultation on the possible anti competitive effects of the current passenger 
tariff consultations in the IATA framework22, which could result in the first 
22 These industry-wide arrangements are covered by Commission block exemption regulation 
No 1617, which expires on 30 June 2001 (CEC 2001). 
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official stage of dismantling them, at least as far as the U. S. and European 
members are concerned. 
Latest European Commission proposals to amend the 1993 Regulation on 
airport slots have come under fire from the Association of European Airlines 
and its members, who believe that the Commission has reneged on a promise 
made last year to limit this stage of the legislative process to technical matters. 
9.3.1 Alliances 
Consolidation in the air transport sector continues apace, and the Commission 
examined a number of alliances and mergers during the year. In general, the 
Commission allows airline alliances provided it can be demonstrated that they 
bring benefits for passengers by extending networks and improving efficiency. 
However, alliances can also significantly restrict competition on individual 
routes and remedies may need to be imposed to mitigate this. 
Swissair, Sabena, TAP, AOM and Crossair, all members of the Qualiflyer 
alliance, came under the Commission's scrutiny regarding the termination of 
an agreement that allowed them to co-ordinate fare prices. 
Lufthansa and SAS' closer co-operation with Austrian Airlines, under the Star 
Alliance would eliminate competition on a large number of routes between 
Austria and Germany and between Austria and Scandinavia. The initial step of 
a wider investigation was started in 2000. 
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Other alliances investigated were between British Midland, Lufthansa and 
SAS, and the U. S. Air/United merger. On the latter alliance the Commission 
sought only undertakings, patently avoiding getting embroiled in the U. S. 
airline industry merger activity. 
The above activity in a single year indicates the amount of restructuring 
currently unfolding in the European market. The Commission will investigate 
and sometimes take action after an investigation that might last anything up to 
2 or 3 years. By the time the recommendations are announced it is too late for 
the airlines that have suffered under these anti competitive groupings. 
The application of economic theory is a perfectly legitimate endeavour but in 
dynamic liberalised markets it can never be retrospective but preventative for 
the future. The question is will the market remain unaltered until that time? 
9.3.2 Airports 
Landing fees and their application in Finland, Portugal and have been 
investigated in the case of Finland ordered to end discriminatory practices. A 
similar situation was investigated for the Spanish airports whose charge setting 
discriminated against foreign carriers landing at Spanish airports. A similar 
situation was rectified in Italy. Ground handling charges at French airports 
were also adjusted with a new system of non discriminatory commercial rate 
charges. 
Cases involving airport charges and ground handling discriminatory practices 
reflect the tendency of previously monopolistic organisations to obtain 
economic rents, despite now operating in a newly liberalised market. Reform 
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of past behaviour in terms of changing the working practices and internal cost 
structures are more difficult to achieve and take longer periods over which 
theses changes can be established. In the short term a mixture of past and 
present behaviour prevails. 
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10 CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the technical, theoretical and policy conclusions of the study 
will be presented. Any shortcomings in the method or other specific areas will 
be outlined and finally a number of suggestions for further research will be 
made. 
The objective of this research was to explore the current economic 
characteristics of the scheduled low cost carriers in Europe and to provide an 
insight as to how these carriers will use their advantages over the main line 
carriers to exploit markets and sustain their growth into the future. 
The U. S. deregulation has shown that low cost carriers have considerable cost 
benefits and by using them can achieve large potential inroads in to the markets 
served by the incumbent airlines. At the same time there has been considerable 
turnover of these companies significant numbers of which have failed. The 
most successful carrier in this sector is Southwest Airlines, which has achieved 
constant growth and profitability continuously from its inception until today. 
Its philosophy of marketing and operations has become the model for all its 
European imitators. This model has been imitated by a number of European 
scheduled low cost carriers which have entered the market since the mid 90s. 
In Europe the most successful of these has been Ryanair, which has had the 
longest operating time. 
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One of the barriers in carrying out this research has been the lack of adequate 
cost data for the different aircraft types. Although other factors such as Indirect 
costs also form a large part of the total, the levels of the Direct Operating Cost 
data form the core of the cost of an airline operation. Due to the sensitive 
nature this type of data it was impossible for a non-airline person to obtain 
accurate information. 
A model was thus developed to simulate the direct costs of operations of a low 
cost airline. The model provided information about the cost per distance flown 
for an airline flying on a given route. 
For the design of the model, a number of operational variables were used and 
expressed either directly or using accepted relationships from current airline 
design data. Examples include: stage length, block fuel and times, number of 
seats, seat load factor, en-route fuel consumption, and aircraft and propulsion 
specific technical data. These variables were put together to calculate 
individual shares of the overall total sector costs. The costing for a variety of 
aircraft types were obtained in order to have a library of fully costed aircraft 
types which could be used in an airline operation. 
Following that a number of route surveys were undertaken to provide candidate 
routes for use by the low cost operator. In the initial route survey 254 intra- 
European routes were tabulated for sector distance and block times and the 
derived costs were applied to them to obtain full costings of the low cost carrier 
being simulated, but also of 5 other known UK airlines representative of a full 
fare scheduled carrier, two low cost scheduled carriers, one regional carrier and 
one large charter carrier. 
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Subsequent to that a small scale airline operation was simulated by creating 
two different types of schedules, one to reflect the type of scheduled low cost 
operation with high daily frequencies with short turnaround times. The other to 
reflect the operation of a full cost independent scheduled operator, providing a 
mix of business and leisure intra-European routes and subject to the operational 
constraints this imposes on the airline. The latter schedule type was loosely 
based on British Midland. 
The general characteristics inherent in a low cost carrier used were: the single 
type of aircraft flown, the higher seating density configuration used, high load 
factors, high rates of utilisation of both crew and equipment and very close 
attention to limiting indirect costs. These were all reflected in the schedule set 
up. 
The other component of this study involved a method whereby prediction of 
the kind of city pairs available for entry by a scheduled low cost carrier was 
made. Here, it was aimed to discover the performance derived from the two set 
ups above and how this could be translated to new route entry. 
For this stage a further route survey of 381 intra-European routes was 
undertaken. These were grouped into scheduled routes which the CAA 
estimated were likely to have new entry, others where this likelihood was 
lower, leisure or purely charter routes, and purely domestic routes. 
For all of these the frequencies, number of competitors currently operating, 
sector distances and block times were tabulated. Projections about their 
compatibility for low cost entry were then made using the assumption of a low 
cost carrier entering a particular route with a single dedicated aircraft. Traffic 
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densities attainable by a low cost operator entering this route under these 
assumptions were calculated taking account of the `S' curve relationship 
between frequency share and passenger share achieved. 
Criteria for the acceptance or rejection of a route were set up and applied 
. 
Furthermore, the criteria were extended to classify the reasons of the routes 
rejected as not compatible in terms of traffic density and passenger market 
share obtained. The optimum amount of frequencies possible using a smaller 
and a larger size of aircraft were also found. 
The limitations of the methods used, firstly concerns the need to simulate the 
Direct Operating Costs. Although this was necessary, the overall integrity of 
this task has not been compromised due to the fact contemporary relationships 
in the parametric formulation have been used, as verified by typical industry 
sources as the standard AEA formula. Additionally, the values used have 
represented current rates of fuel consumption, cost and labour remuneration. 
In establishing the overall costs for a single type of an airline the specific 
airline's economic ratios of operation have been used to a large extent. It is 
therefore believed that the cost differentials between different types of carriers, 
i. e. `full frills', low cost, and charter have been maintained and permeate 
through the rest of the projections. 
10.2 OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS 
In total 126 routes were found compatible for new entry by a low cost carrier. 
The routes having London Heathrow at one end were the more promising, as 
they tended to have higher traffic densities. The majority of these routes were 
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duopolies with a single monopoly route. Out of a total 15 routes only 5 of them 
were being operated intensively enough to preclude new entry because a high 
enough market share would not be achievable. 
In the next group of routes, classified as previously likely to have new entry 
after full liberalisation, only five were suitable, the remainder were equally 
split between either low density or low market share attainable. From the 
previously less attractive group only three routes qualified as the rest were all 
rejected under the low density criterion. 
The most remarkable results were obtained in the leisure and charter grouping. 
Here, out of 258 routes examined nearly 40 percent were suitable, some of 
which were by very large margins indeed. Of those rejected it was 
predominantly due to their low market share. 
Finally, none of the domestic routes provided scope for low cost new entry as 
they invariably failed with very low market shares. 
Putting these results into perspective, low cost carriers have the following areas 
where they can fulfil their potential: 
Against the incumbent flag carriers on the main European trunk routes; against 
the incumbents on the secondary and scheduled leisure routes in Europe; 
against the charters on routes not served by scheduled carriers, the typical 
summer holiday destination. 
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10.3 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The fact that air transport has been historically one of the most regulated 
modes of transport, has allowed governments to consistently interfere with the 
state owned flag carrier. European liberalisation, has taken a long time to arrive 
and has been brought about by the need to provide a better and more efficient 
air transport sector. 
Unlike U. S. deregulation, euro-liberalisation has been introduced in a gradual 
manner, using a series of liberalising packages which removed regulatory 
barriers in several steps. This reflects the lack of homogeneity of Europe as 
compared to the US and its different industrial structure. The state owned 
airlines, the political cost involved in taking unpopular decisions for the 
national carrier, the state control of airports and infrastructure and the chronic 
under-investment, have been only a few barriers. Evolution of the EU reforms 
has been slow and for a few years after the market was fully deregulated there 
was hardly any obvious change. Then, the first of a number of low cost carriers 
appeared. 
Reforms have eventually caused changes in the internal structure of European 
air transport, but the reforming process is not complete. Areas such as ground 
handling, airport charges, and access have been dealt with but there is still 
some way to achieve the full benefits envisaged in the start. 
The gradualist approach has as its disadvantages, allowing the incumbents to 
react and assemble different structural barriers to those existing before. This 
has been seen in their response of creating global alliances, acquiring any 
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domestic or regional competitors and operating their home airports as network 
hubs with increased amounts of connecting passengers. Naturally, this can be 
explained as genuine market responses for companies maximising their 
shareholders' wealth. Increased vigilance is thus required to guard against any 
anti-competitive effects produced. Public policy makers are thus required to 
intervene at the first opportunity to safeguard enhanced consumer benefits. 
The scheduled low cost airlines are a thriving sector experiencing rapid growth, 
which is set to continue in the next few years. Since the time of their inception 
they have entered markets otherwise unknown to travellers and because of their 
low fares have created considerable amounts of traffic where otherwise there 
would be none, or where traffic was falling. In generating these new markets 
they are beginning to change the travelling habits of the public who are taking 
advantage of the low fares to make more frequent trips. 
Although, currently they are only a small share of the total European traffic, 
they have become well known due to intensive advertising campaigns. Their 
philosophies are aimed at entering routes by serving them with a combination 
of low fares and high frequencies which will quickly allow them to become 
dominant, thereby squeezing out any competitors. For this they need a very low 
cost structure. To achieve this they use a lean and productive operating 
structure along the lines of the virtual airline where only the flight operations 
function is undertaken by the airline itself. All other functions are outsourced. 
At this early stage growth is very important for all these airlines, some of 
which have achieved rates 20 percent or higher. Herein lies the danger as the 
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original role model in the U. S. achieved its amazing performance through low 
steady growth. Other high growth U. S. low cost operators eventually failed. So 
far in the European market there has been only one such failure. 
Continuous growth on the leisure sector will eventually lead to challenging the 
charter airlines. They, like the scheduled low cost carriers, are very efficient 
operationally; vertical integration with a tour operator who is responsible for 
the provision of their traffic to them plays a major part in achieving their 
efficient structures. 
The conventional carrier response to these airlines has been patchy so far with 
BA setting up a low cost subsidiary from which it eventually moved away. 
KLM has also created a similar airline using a previous subsidiary as its base. 
Past experience in the U. S. indicates that no mainline carrier has successfully 
created a low cost subsidiary that could replicate the low cost structure of 
Southwest. 
Looking into the future the possibility remains that a new scheduled low cost 
carrier will appear in another country within the EU. Countries in central 
Europe currently applicants to join the EU have considerable lower costs, 
which could be put into good use by a locally based low cost carrier. Any new 
competitor entering now however will encounter an increasingly competitive 
environment in which some consolidation will be a prerequisite for further 
growth. 
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10.4 AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The success of the low cost's point to point mode of traffic has led some 
people to question the economic efficiency of the hub networks so favoured by 
the mainline carriers. Southwest through its low fares and high frequencies has 
been able to enjoy market shares of over 50 percent in more than half of its top 
100 city pair markets. In this manner it has become the dominant carrier and in 
many cases the incumbents have been forced to exit routes affected by the 
entry of Southwest. Although there are some routes served by the low cost 
operators where they are dominant it is only so because either there is a very 
low traffic density, or because these routes are traditionally served by charter 
airlines. Hence there is no similar example in Europe to that of the U. S. 
Nevertheless, low cost carriers serve some hub airports in Europe. The E. U. 
Commission plans to reform the slot availability at Europe's congested airports 
in order to allow greater access to new entrants and to discontinue the current 
practise of incumbents of using `grandfather rights' or franchisees to hoard the 
slots for future expansions. 
i. Further work could examine firstly the possibilities and the effects on the 
low cost carriers of entering these hubs, and secondly what inroads they 
would make to the incumbent's traffic, and by how much these hub 
operations would be weakened on intra-Europe routes. Also, whether 
there is enough airport capacity available for setting up a hub, similar to 
Charleroi. 
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ii. Given Ryanair's setting up new hub airports away from its home base, 
firstly in Stansted and more recently in Charleroi, what are the other 
potential candidates for attracting other low cost carriers, and how their 
catchment areas differ, if at all, from those of the traditional hubs. Whelan 
(1998) has investigated the predisposition and levels of dependency on air 
transport in 13 nations of Europe. Therefore the combination of a high 
dependency to air transport with lack of competition on routes from the 
main airports of that country could be included to provide a more accurate 
picture. 
iii. As the low cost carriers grow and also become more dominant on their 
routes, there will be cases where they will be monopoly carriers. So far 
the consensus is that low cost carriers have lower costs because they are 
small, new and fly short sectors. With some of them due to exceed 40 
aircraft, in the near term, an investigation could examine their ability to 
maintain these low cost structures over time, coupled with the fact that 
slowly the number of suitable routes available to them will decline, due to 
the smaller geographical area of Europe. 
iv. As mentioned earlier, one of the potential markets exhibiting considerable 
promise is that currently, served by the charter operators. Given their 
scale of operation they will form a natural barrier to the continuous 
expansion of the `no-frills' carriers. An interesting proposition would 
therefore be to study how the charter carriers would react to any 
considerable encroachment of the market by the low cost carriers. What 
methods are available to them and how that would affect their 
competitiveness compared with the `no-frills' airlines. Furthermore to 
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what extent their vertical integration to their tour operator reduces their 
flexibility. 
v. This research, by definition of its title has focused on the future of the low 
cost carriers. There are many other areas concerning these type of carriers 
that are worth investigating. One such area is that of profitability. Here, 
again there are barriers because until very recently all with the exception 
of Ryanair have been privately owned companies. Therefore only 
Ryanair's financial data were publicly available after their stock exchange 
floatation in Ireland and the U. S. easyJet has recently undergone a part 
floatation and its data are now available from various analysts or from its 
web site. The long term profitability of these firms are worth of 
investigation to see to what extent the success of Southwest can also be 
replicated here. 
229 
APPENDIX A 
AIRLINE IDENTIFICATION INDEX 
8D VOLARE AIRLINES JK SPANAIR 
9G GALAXY AIRWAYS JY BRITISH EUROPEAN 
A3 AEGEAN AIRLINES KF AIR BOTNIA 
A6 AIR ALPS AVIATION KL KLM 
- 
ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES 
AB AIR BERLIN LH LUFTHANSA 
AF AIR FRANCE LT LTU INTNL AIRLINES 
AP AIR ONE LX CROSSAIR 
AY FINNAIR NB STERLING 
AZ ALITALIA NG LAUDA AIR 
BA BRITISH AIRWAYS NI PORTUGALIA 
BD BRITISH MIDLAND BMI OA OLYMPIC AIRWAYS 
BU BRAATHENS ASA OS AUSTRIAN AIRLINES 
DE CONDOR FLUGDIENST PE AIR EUROPE 
DI DEUTSCHE BA Q7 SOBELAIR 
DM MAERSK AIR RD ALITALIA TEAM 
DP AIR 2000 SK SAS SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES 
E8 ALPI EAGLES SN SABENA 
EI AER LINGUS TP TAP AIR PORTUGAL 
EN AIR DOLOMITI TV VIRGIN EXPRESS 
EW EUROWINGS U2 EASYJET 
FR RYANAIR U8 AUSTRIAN AIR TRANSPORT 
FU AIR LITTORAL UK KLM UK 
G7 GANDALF AIRLINES UX AIR EUROPA 
GO GO FLY VM REGIONAL AIRLINES 
HF HAPAG LLOYD VO TYROLEAN AIRLINES 
FLUGGESELLSHAFT VR TACV 
- 
CABO VERDE AIRLINES 
HV TRANSAVIA WF WIDEROE'S FLYVESELSKAP 
IB IBERIA X5 CRONUS AIRLINES 
IG MERIDIANA XK CORSE MEDITERRANEE 
IJ AIR LIBERTE XN AXON AIRLINES 
IQ AUGSBURG AIRWAYS YP AERO LLOYD 
IW AOM FRENCH AIRLINES ZB MONARCH AIRLINES 
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APPENDIX B 
DESTINATION CITY IDENTIFICATION INDEX 
ABE ABERDEEN EMA EAST MIDLANDS 
ACE LANZAROTE FAO FARO 
AES AALESUND FLR FLORENCE 
AGP MALAGA FMO MUNSTER 
ALI ALICANTE FRA FRANKFURT 
AMS AMSTERDAM FUE FUERTEVENTURA Canary Isl. 
AST ASTURIAS FUN FUNCHAL 
- 
Madeira 
ATH ATHENS GEN GENOA 
BCN BARCELONA GLA GLASGOW 
BER BERLIN GRZ GRAZ 
BES BREST GTH GOTHENBURG 
BGO BERGEN HAJ HANNOVER 
BHX BIRMINGHAM HAM HAMBURG 
BIA BASTIA HEL HELSINKI 
BIO BILBAO HER HERAKLION 
BIQ BIARRITZ HLB HELSINGBORG 
BLL BILLUND IBZ IBIZA 
BLQ BOLOGNA INS INNSBRUCK 
BOD BORDEAUX JOE JOENSUU, FINLAND 
BRE BREMEN JRZ JEREZ 
BRI BARI LBA LEEDS-BRADFORD 
BRU BRUSSELS LCG LA CORUNA 
BVA PARIS 
- 
BEAUVAIS LCY LONDON CITY 
CAG CAGLIARI LEJ LEIPZIG HALLE 
CDG CHARLES DE GAULLE LGW LONDON GATWICK 
CDW CARDIFF LHR LONDON HEATHROW 
CGN COLOGNE BONN LIL LILLE 
CPH COPENHAGEN LIN MILAN LINATE 
CRI, BRUSSELS 
- 
CHARLEROI LIS LISBON 
DRS DRESDEN LNZ LINZ 
DUB DUBLIN LPA LAS PALMAS 
DUS DUSSELDORF LPL LIVERPOOL 
EAP BASLE-MULHOUSE LTN LONDON LUTON 
EDI EDINBURGH LYS LYON SATOLAS 
231 
MAD MADRID BARAJAS 
MAN MANCHESTER 
MIL MILAN 
MPL MONTPELLIER 
MRS MARSEILLE 
MUC MUNICH 
MXP MILAN MALPENSA 
NAP NAPLES 
NCE NICE 
NCL NEWCASTLE 
NUE NURNBERG 
OPO PORTO 
ORY PARIS ORLY 
OSL OSLO 
OUL OULOU FINLAND 
PAD PADERBORN 
PAR PARIS 
PIK PRESTWICK 
PMI PALMA 
- 
MALLORCA 
PMO PALERMO 
PUF PAU 
RHO RHODES 
RNB RONNEBY- SWEDEN 
ROM ROME 
RVN ROVANIEMI 
- 
FINLAND 
SCN SAARBRUCKEN 
SKG THESSALONIKI 
STN LONDON STANSTED 
STO STOCKHOLM 
STR STUTTGART 
SVL SEVILLE 
SXB STARSBURG 
SXF BERLIN SCHONEFELD 
TCI TENERIFE 
- 
CANARY ISL. 
TLN TOULON 
TLS TOULOUSE BLAGNAC 
TRD TRONDHEIM 
TRN TURIN CASALE 
TXL BERLIN TEGEL 
VCE VENICE 
VIE VIENNA 
VLC VALENCIA 
VRN VERONA 
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